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Judicial Federalism and the Future of
Federal Environmental Regulation
Jonathan H. Adler'

ABSTRACT: This article assesses the current and likely impact of the
Supreme Cowt 's federalism cases on federal envimnmental regulation. As a
result of this assessment, the article seeks to make four points: (1) Thus Jar,
the Supreme Court's federalism cases have had a limited impact on federal
regulation, as federal courts have not used these cases as a basis for limiting
the reach of federal regulatory authority. (2) Notwithstanding this limited
impact, the underlying logic of the Supreme Court's cases does pose a
challenge for federal regulation, particularly in the Commerce Clause
context. (3) The thrust of the federalism cases makes it likely that the
Supreme Cou1t will revisit the constitutional limitations on the Spending
Clause, and this could have a substantial impact 01.2 federal envimnmental
regulation, as some federal environmental provisions exceed even the highly
deferential Spending Clause standard outlined in South Dakota v. Dole.
( 4) judicial~'V enforced limitations on federal regulatory authority do not
necessarily t-ranslate into limitations on envimnmental protection. The
federal government will retain substantial-although not unlimitedauthority to advance environmental protection. VVhere federal authority· is
const-rained, state and local governments and non-governmental entities
will retrain their ability to address many environmental concerns.

* Associate Professor of Law and Associate Director. Center for Business Law &
Regulation, Case Western Reserve University School of Law. The author would like to thank
Jack Adler, Melvyn Durchslag, Jonathan Entin, Erik Jensen, Andrew Morriss, Robert Natelson,
John Parry, Nathaniel Stewart, and participants in the faculty workshop at the University of
Pittsburgh School of Law for their comments and critiques, and Benjamin Cramer for his
;aluable research assistance. All the usual disclaimers apply.
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INTRODUCTION

From the New Deal through the 1980s the Supreme Court showed little
1
interest in policing the division of state and federal power. Beginning in the
1990s, however, tl1e Court reasserted the importance of state sovereignty and
enumerated powers, limiting the federal government's power, particularly
over matters traditionally left in the hands of state and local governments.
These accumulated federalism decisions put a multiple "whammy on
2
congressional authority." The federalist revival is arguably the most
significant constitutional law development of the past fifteen years and may
3
become the Rehnquist Court's most controversiallegacy.
The expansive reach of federal environmental regulation places it in
the middle of the federalism debate." Environmental regulation arguably
represents the most ambitious and far-reaching assertion of federal
1. For instance, the Supreme Court did not strike down a single federal statute for
exceeding the scope of Congress's enumerated powers between 1936 and 1995. In 1976, the
Supreme Court mled 5-4 that Congress could not require state governments to pay state
employees the minimum wage in National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976). Within a
few years, however, the Court began to whittle away at the Natimwl League of Cities holding and
overtmned it in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Tmnsit Aut./writy, 469 U.S. 528 (1985). Of
note, Justice Harry Blackmun provided the deciding vote in both cases.
2. Philip P. FJ;ckey & Steven S. Smith, judicial Review, the Congressional Pmress and the
}"fderalism Cases: An Intenlisciplinary Critique, Ill YALE LJ. 1707, 1722 (2002).
3. See, e.g.,.JOHN T. NOONAN,JR., NARROWJNG THE NATION'S POYI'ER: THE SUPREME COURT
SIDES WlTH THE STATES 1-14 (2002) (desCJ;bing and lamenting the re\~val of federalism); Jack
M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Understanding the Constitutional Revolution, 87 VA. L. REv. 1045,
1052-53 (2001) (characterizing the accumulated federalism decisions as a "constitutional
revolution"); Erwin Chemerinsky, PTotecting the Spe11ding Power, 4 CHAP. L. REv. 89, 105 (2001)
(" [T] he five most conservative Justices on the Court have engaged in great judicial acti\~sm in
limiting Congress's powers, reviving the Tenth Amendment, and expanding sovereign
immunity."); Erwin Chemerinsky, The Federalism Revolution, 31 N.M. L. REV. 7, 7 (2001)
("(T]here has been a revolution with regard to the structure nf American goven1ment because
of the Supreme Court decisions in the last few years regarding federalism.");Jesse H. Choper &
John C. Yoo, The Scope of the Commerce Clause after Morrison, 25 OKlA. CJ1Y U. L. REV. 843, 854
(2000) ("(S]hould the current ideological majority of the Court continue, we may be entering
an era where federal powers will continue to be restricted."); David Freeman Engstrom, Drawing
Lines Between Chevron and Pennhurst: A Functional Ana9•sis of the Spending Powe1·, Federalism and
the Administrative State, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1197, 1198 (2004) (noting the Rehnquist Court's
"revolution in federal-state relations"); Richard W. Gamett, The Nm.v Federalism, the Spending
Power, and Federal 01iminal Law, 89 CORNELL L. REv. 1, 12 (2003) ("[l]t is a hallmark-and
perhaps the legacy-of the Rehnquist Court to have brought back to the public-law table the
notion that the Constitution is a charter for a government of limited and enumerated
powers."); Linda Greenhouse, For a Supnnne Court GraybeaTd, States' Rights Can Do No Wmng, N.Y.
TlMES, March 16, 2003, § 4, at 5 ("The court has followed [Rehnquist's] lead in a stunning
series of federalism decisions that have curbed the power of Congress to bind the states to the
full reach of federal law.").
4. AE Professor Percival notes, "AE a result of the Rehnquist Court's 'new federalism,'
constitutional challenges to federal environmental regulations are now being raised with
regularity." Robert V. Percival, "Greening" the Constitution-Harmonizing Environmental and
Constitutional Values, 32 ENVTL. L. 809, 840 (2002).
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regulatory authority. The very premise of much environmental regulation is
that ubiquitous ecological interconnections require broad, if not all5
encompassing, federal regulation. This premise is contrary to that of a
6
federal government of limited and enumerated powers. Due to their
expansive scope, environmental statutes are particularly vulnerable to
challenge on f~deralism grounds, a fact noted with great concern by Justice
7
Stevens, among others. Even though federal environmental regulation
adopts a "cooperative federalism" model, the federal government sets most
environmental pliolities, imposes far-reaching restlictions on potentially
environmentally destructive behavior, and directs much state effort. Insofar
as a judicially enforced federalism constrains federal authotity, it could have
a significant impact on federal environmental regulation. Some even suggest
that the revival of federalism has "d1e potential to undo the foundation of
8
modern environmental law." Yet federalist limits on federal regulatory
authotity need not undermine the cause of environmental protection.

5. See generally MICHAELS. GREVE, THE DEMISE OF ENVIRONMENTALISM IN AMERICAN LAW
(1996).
6. David Orr, The Constitution of Nattwe, 17 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 1478, 1481 (2003)
("Nature is a unified mosaic of ecosystems, functions and processes. Government, on the other
hand, was conceived by the founders as a limited and fractured enterptise. "). Orr argues that
there is a fundamental "mismatch between the way nature works in highly connected and
interactive systems and the fragmentation of powers built into the Constitution." !d. It would be
a mistake, however, to assume that the Founders were unaware of broad economic and other
inteiTelationships and did not consider whether such interconnections justified a greater
centralization of government power. The existence of interstate externalities and
interrelationships was "an oft-repeated axiom in the constitutional debates." Robert G.
Natelson, The Enumerated Powers of States, 3 NEV. LJ. 469, 490 (2003) (emphasis omitted). In
other words, the decision to "fragment" government power hmizontally (through separation of
powers) and vertically (through federalism) was made despite the existence of such
inteiTelationships. !d. at 492-93.
7. See, e.g., Solid Waste Agency v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159, 175
(2001) ("Today, however, the Court takes an unfortunate step that needlessly weakens our
principal safeguard against toxic water.") (Stevens, J., dissenting); Printz v. United States, 521
U.S. 898, 960-61 (1997) (noting that the majotity opinion ignores the importance of federal
enactments such as the Clean Water Act, the Occupational Safety and Health Act, and the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Seminole Tribe v. Flotida,
517 U.S. 44, 77 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that the majority opinion "prevents
Congress from providing a federal forum for ... environmental law, and the regulation of our
vast national economy"); Nat'! League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 856 (1976) (Blackmun,
J., concurring) (noting that the majority decision "does not outlaw federal power in areas such
as environmental protection, where the federal interest is demonstrably greater and where state
facility compliance with imposed federal standards would be essential").
8. ENVTL. LAW lNST., ENDANGERED ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS PROGRAM BACKGROUND PAPER
1 (2003), http:/ /www.endangeredlaws.org/downloads/background_paper_final.pdf (on file
with the Iowa Law Review). The ELI paper characretizes federalism docttines as "arcane legal
theories, hostile to federal regulation." !d. As constitutional doctrines, they "go to the very
foundation of environmental and other kinds of laws, and address government's ability to
enact, implement, and enforce such laws in the first place." !d. at 4. "Taken to the extreme, they
have the potential to roll federal authotity right back seventy years or more." !d. at 6.
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Part I provides a brief overview of the federal-state relationship in
environmental policy, including the dominant regulatory paradigm of
"cooperative federalism." Part II summa1izes the tlvo central strains in the
Supreme Court's federalism jurisprudence: enumerated powers and state
sovereignty. Part III documents the limited impact that federalism
jurisprudence has had on federal environmental law to date, while noting
some areas, particularly relating to the Commerce Clause, in which the logic
of existing precedent suggests limitations on federal environmental
regulatory authority. Part IV looks to potential federalism limits on the
spending power and Congress's use of conditional spending to advance
environmental goals. Whereas it is generally assumed that restrictions on the
federal government's ability to regulate and fund environmental measures
will inevitably retard environmental protection, Part V suggests that
judicially enforced federalism need not have a substantial negative impact
on environmental protection. To the contrary, there are environmental
reasons to prefer a more robust federalism.
I.

FEDERALISM AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION

P1ior to the late 1960s, most environmental concerns were addressed at
9
the state and local level, if they were addressed at all. The few federal
regulatory measures adopted before that time largely focused on the
conduct of the federal government itself, rather than p1ivate industry, let
alone consumer behavior. 10 A few laws addressed uniquely federal concerns,
such as maintaining the navigability of interstate waters. 11 Beyond that,
federal environmental efforts were non-regulatory and largely consisted of
12
federal funding, research assistance, and the like. At the same time, va1ious

9. See Robert V. Percival, Envimnrnental Federalism: Historical Roots and Contempormy Models,
54 MD. L. REV. 1141, 1147-60 (1995) (discussing history of environmental protection prior to
1970).
10. Id. at 1158 ("To the extent that federal law was regulatory in character prior to 1970,
the primary targets of environmental regulation were federal agencies rather than private
industry.").
11. One of the earliest examples is the federal Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, also known
as the "Refuse Act." Rivers and Harbors Appropriations Act of 1899, ch. 425, 30 Stat. 1151
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 33 U.S.C.). While this statute could have been
used to control at least some sources of water pollution, it was rarely invoked for this purpose.
See Jonathan H. Adler, Fables of the Cuyahoga: Reconstmcting a History of Environmental Protection, 14
FORDHAM ENVTL. LJ. 89, 133-38 (2002). Indeed, it seems that federal agencies were satisfied so
long as rivers were sufficiently clear of debris to be suitable for shipping. For instance, in 1957
the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers declared the Cuyahoga River in "exceptionally good" shape
because none of the local shipping docks were obstructed, even tlwugh the water itself was
quite polluted. See Cuyahoga River Seen in Good Condition, CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER, March 28,
1957, at 19.
12. See, e.g., N. William Hines, Nor Any Dmp· to D>ink: Public Regulation of Water Quali(w Part
III: The Federal Eff01t, 52 IOWA L. REV. 799 (1967) (detailing early federal efforts to protect water
quality).
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federal programs subsidized widespread environmental despoliation,
13
typically in the name of development or economic progress. In the decades
following the Second World War, environmental protection as it is now
14
conceived was simply not a major public policy concern.
Although some environmental measures were improving in the l960s, 15
there was vvidespread dissatisfaction with environmental progress.
Throughout the decade, pressure grew for greater federal involvement in
environmental concerns. As America became more affluent, the demand for
16
environmental quality increased dramatically. At the same time, best-selling
books popularized the notion that modern industrial activity posed a mortal
17
environmental threat. A consensus developed in support of greater federal
18
involvement in environmental matters. Beginning in 1969, Congress

13.
14.

See infra Part V.A.
This in no way diminishes the significant conservation efforts of the pre-war period.
Many conservation groups, including the National Audubon Society, Izaak Walton League,
Boone & Crockett Club, and the Sierra Club, were quite active during that time. See JONATHAN
H. ADLER, ENVIRONMENTAUSM AT THE CROSSROADS: GREEN ACTIVISTS IN AMERICA l-7 (1995).
Indeed, the first park ranger to be killed in the line of duty was employed by the National
Audubon Society, not a government conservation agency. See FRANK GRAI-V\M, THE AUDUBON
ARJ(: A HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL AUDUBON SOCIETY 52, 56 (1990). For more general
background on the history of the American environmental movement, see generally AMERICAI\1
ENVIRONMENTALISM: THE U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL MOVEMENT: 1970-1990 (Riley E. Dunlap &
Angela G. Mertig eds., 1992); PHILIP SHABECO!'F, A FIERCE GREEN FIRE: THE AMERICAN
ENVIRONMENTAL MOVEMENT (1993); and THEODORE STEINBERG, DOVI'N TO EARTH: NATURE'S
ROLE IN AMERICAN HISTORY (2002).
15. See infi'a notes 589-97 and accompanying text.
16. See RICHARD L. STROUP, ECO-NOMICS: WHAT EVERYONE SHOULD KNOW ABOUT
ECONOMICS AND THE ENVIRONMENT 13-14 (2003) (summarizing research finding that
willingness to pay for environmental protection increases with income); Jason Scott Johnston,
On the Market for Ecosystem Control, 21 VA. EN\I'fL. LJ. 129, 146 (2002) ("There is abundant
evidence that the demand for outdoor recreation and environmental amenities increases with
national income."); Matthew E. Kahn & John G. Matsusaka, Demand for Environmental Good~o·
Evidence from Voting Patterns on California Initiatives, 40 J.L. & ECON. 137, 139 (1997) (noting that
most environmental goods are normal goods for which demand rises with income); Pauick
Low, Trade and the Environment: What Worries the Developing Countries?, 23 EN\I'fL. L. 705, 706
(1993) (noting that "the demand for improved environmental quality tends to rise with
income"); Kenneth E. McConnell, Income and the Demand for Environmental Quality, 2 ENV'T. &
DEV. ECON. 383, 385-86 (1997) (reporting on empirical evidence of an environmental Kuznets
curve); Richard L. Stroup & Roger E. Meiners, Introduction: The Toxic Liability Problem: Why Is It
Too Large?, in CUTTING GREEN TAPE: TOXIC POLLUTANTS, ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION AND
THE LAW 15 (Richard L. Stroup & Roger E. Meiners eels., 2000) ("Willingness to pay for
environmental measures ... is highly elastic with respect to income.").
Charitable giving in general is also elastic \\~th personal income. See RICHARD B.
MCKENZIE, WHAT WENT RIGHT IN THE 1980s 70 (1994) (noting that "[h]igher incomes lead to
increased giving").
17. E.g., RACHEL CARSON, THE SILENT SPRING (1962); PAUL EHRLICH, THE POPULATION
BOMB (1968); DONNELLA MEADOWS ET AL., THE LIMITS TO GROWTH (1972); VANISHING AIR: THE
NADER REPORT ON AIR POLLUTION (John C. Esposito ed., 1970).
18. Part of this consensus was due to industry support for greater federal em~ronmental
regulation in order to create uniform national standards and discourage more stringent state
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enacted a flurry of environmental statutes, including the National
20
19
21
Environmental Policy Act; the Clean Air Act; the Clean Water Act; the
22
Endangered Species Act;
the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and
23
1
Rodenticide Act; the Resource Conservation and Recovery Actt the Safe
25
26
Drinking Water Act; and the Toxic Substances Control Act. With the
enactment of these statutes, the federal government assumed a major role in
environmental protection.
Under several of the aforementioned environmental statutes, the
federal government asserted broad authority to regulate activities that can
affect environmental quality. For example, under the Clean Water Act, the
federal government prohibits the addition of any pollutant, defined to
27
include most foreign materials,
to any waters of the United States,
28
including wetlands, without a permit. The Endangered Species Act bars
private activities that kill, capture, or otherwise "harm" any animal species
listed as endangered by the Fish and Wildlife Service, including those
activities that do no more than modifY existing species habitat on p1ivate
29
land. Under the Clean Air Act, tl1e Environmental Protection Agency
30
31
regulates the chemical composition of gasoline and diesel fuel, the design
regulation. This was particularly so in the case of air pollution. See E. Donald Elliott et al.,
Towm·d a The01y of Statut01y Evolution: The Federalization of Envimnmental Law, 1 JL. ECON. & ORG.
313,330-33 (1985).
19. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (2000).
20. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-766lf (2000). It is worth noting that the first federal clean air
legislation was enacted in 1955 (Pub. L. No. 88-206) and amended in 1963, 1965, 1966, and
1967. With a few exceptions, such as the creation of federal emission standards for· new
automobiles mandated in 1967, the pre-1970 statutes were largely non-regulatory in nature.
Although the 1970 Act was itself~ technically, a series of amendments to the prior statutes, it is
commonly referred to as the Clean Air Act, as it provides the foundation for the contemporary
regulatory structure.
21. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1252-1385 (2000). The Clean Water Act is formally knoM1 as the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act.
22. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (2000).
23. 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y (2000).
24. 42 u.s.c. §§ 6901-6992k (2000).
25. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f-300j (2000).
26. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2671 (2000).
27. See 33 U.S.C. § 1362(6) (2000) (defining "pollutant" to include "dredged spoil, solid
waste, incinerator residue, sewage, garbage, sewage sludge, munitions, chemical wastes,
biological materials, radioactive materials, heat, wrecked or discarded equipment, rock, sand,
cellar dirt and industrial, municipal, and agricultural waste discharged into water").
28. !d.§ 1311.
29. 16 U.S.C. § 1538 (2000) (prohibiting the "take" of an endangered species); see also
Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys., 515 U.S. 687, 690, 708 (1995) (upholding the
definition of "take" to include "significant habitat modification or degTadation" that "actually
kills or injures "~ldlife").
30. 42 U.S.C. § 7545(a) (2000).
31. BRUCE YANDLE ET AL., CNTR. FOR FREE MKT. ENVJRONMENTALISM, REGULATING AJR
QUALm• THROUGH LITIGATION: THE DIESEL ENGINE EPISODE 26 (2002).
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32

of vehicle engines, and even the contents of some consumer products,
33
34
including paint and hairspray.
While federal environmental laws grant expansive regulatory authotity
to federal agencies, most environmental statutes are implemented following
35
a "cooperative federalism" model. The federal government outlines the
contours of a given regulatory program, typically through statutory
36
mandates elaborated upon by regulatory measures.
States are then
encouraged to implement the program in lieu of the federal government, in
accordance with federal guidelines. Provided these standards are met, states
are free to tailor the details of their individual programs to accommodate
local conditions and concerns. In most cases the federal standards operate
as a floor-albeit a highly prescriptive one-and states remain free to adopt
37
more stringent measures. State programs that meet federal standards are
38
typically eligible for federal financial assistance. States that fail to adopt
adequate programs are not only denied the relevant federal funding, they
can also be subject to various sanctions and federal preemption of their
programs. 39 That is, if states refuse to regulate in accordance with federal
guidelines, the federal government may regulate in their place.

32. 42 U.S.C. § 7521; see also YANDLE ETAL., supra note 31, at34.
33. 42 U.S.C. § 75llb(e) (1) (B); see also Allied Local & Reg'! Mfrs. Caucus v. EPA, 215 F. 3d
61, 66 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (upholding federal regulation of paint composition under the Clean Air
Act).
34. 42 U.S.C. § 75llb(e) (1) (B); 40 CFR §§ 59.202-.214 (2004).
35. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 167 (1992) ("[W]here Congress has the
authority to regulate private activity under the Commerce Clause, we have recognized
Congress' power to offer States the choice of regulating that activity according to federal
standards or having state law pre-empted by federal regulation .... This arrangement ... has
been termed cooperative federalism." (internal citations and quotations omitted)). Statutes that
employ the cooperative federalism model include the Clean Air Act, Clean Water Act, Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act, portions of the Safe Dtinking Water Act, and the Surface
Mining Control and Reclamation Act.
36. See John Dwyer, The Practice of Federalism Under the Clean Air Act, 54 MD. L. REv. 1183,
1184 (1995). See generally DENISE SCHEBERLE, FEDERALISM AND ENVJRONMENTAL POLICY: TRUST
AND THE POLITICS OF IMPLEMENTATION (1997) (detailing federal-state relations in the
implementation of environmental policy).
37. Adam Babich, Our Federalism, Our Hazm"dous Waste, and Our Good Fmtnne, 54 MD. L.
REV. 1516, 1534 (1995) ("The essence of cooperative federalism is that states take ptimary
responsibility for implementing federal standards, while retaining the freedom to apply their
own, more stringent standards."). A notable exception is the case of product standards. As a
general matter, federal product standards, such as vehicle emission standards, tend to preempt
more stringent state standards. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7543(a) (preemption of state automobile
emission standards); id. § 7545(c) ( 4) (A) (preemption of state fuel standards).
38. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1256 (2000) (authorizing financial support for state water
pollution control programs that adopt desired pollution control policies); see also Percival, sujJra
note 9, at 1173 (noting the use of federal funding to encourage land-use planning and solid
wa5te management).
39. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7509 (detailing sanctions for failure to attain the National
Ambient Air Quality Standards under the Clean Air Act); see also Percival, supra note 9, at 1174
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In this system, the states are "indispensable," though not "equal
partners." 40 While characte1ized as a "cooperative" structure, the federalstate relationship in environmental policy is often adversarial and ridden
41
with conflict. State officials "resent what they believe to be an overly
presoiptive federal mientation toward state programs, especially in light of
42
stable or decreasing grant awards," according to one recent study. The
proliferation of additional requirements without corresponding increases in
federal financial assistance raises state and local concerns about "unfunded
43
federal mandates." To some observers, the partnership of cooperative
federalism is more akin to a feudal relationship between a federal lord and
44
state "vassals. "
There are three reasons for adopting the cooperative federalism model
45
in the context of environmental protection. First, the federal government
does not have the resources or personnel to implement detailed regulatory

(noting that under most environmental laws, the federal government will adopt and enforce a
federal regulatory program in the absence of a sufficient state program).
40. Dwyer, supra note 36, at 1190 ("Although the states are by no means equal partners in
regulating the environment, they paradoxically remain indispensable partners.").
41. See Percival, sujJ·ra note 9, at 1144 ("[F]ederal environmental standards have been a
chronic source of friction for federal-state relations."). States are frequent litigants challenging
the validity or implementation of federal environmental regulations. See, e.g., West Virginia v.
EPA, 362 F.3d 861, 865-66 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (challenging federal regulations requiring nitrogen
oxide emission reductions under state implementation plans); Nebraska v. EPA, 331 F.3d 995,
997 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (challenging federal drinking water standards for arsenic); Michigan v.
EPA, 213 F.3d 663, 669 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (challenging federal regulations requiring nitrogen
oxide emission reductions under state implementation plans); Virginia v. EPA, 116 F.3d 499,
500-01 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (challenging federal vehicle emission standards).
42. SCHEBERLE, sujJm note 36, at 186.
43. See, e.g., Edward A. Zelinsky, Unfunded Mandates, Hidden Taxation, and the Tenth
Amendment: On Public Choice, Public Interest, and Public Services, 46 VAND. L. REV. 1355, 1356
(1993) ("Few contemporary issues concern state and local policymakers as intensely as
unfunded mandates."). Such concerns led to the passage of the Unfunded Mandates Reform
Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-4, 109 Stat. 48 (1995), but this legislation is largely symbolic. See
U.S. GAO, UNFUNDED MANDATES: REFORM ACT HAs HAD LlTTLE EFFECT ON AGENCIES'
RULEMAKING ACTIONS (1998); Rena I. Steinzor, Unfunded Environmental Mandates and the "New
(New) Federalism": Devolution, Regulation, or &fonn?, 81 MINN. L. REV. 97, 100 (1996) (noting that
UMRA's substantive requirements can be bypassed by a simple majority vote in Congress).
44. Dwyer, supm note 36, at 1185 ("So much political power has been reallocated to the
federal government that, at times, the states could be mistaken for vassals of the federal
government."). Indeed, in 1995 Nebraska Governor E. Ber\_jamin Nelson testified before the
Senate Judiciary Committee that "[w]hen I was elected Govemor in 1990 and prepared my first
budget, I honestly wondered if I was actually elected governor or just branch manager of tl1e
State of Nebraska for tl1e federal government." Hearing Before the Senate Subcommittee on the
Constitution, Federalism, and Prope11)' Rights, and the Senate Judicimy Comm. ( 1995) (staternen t of
Governor E. Ber\_jamin Nelson, Governor, State of Nebraska).
45. For a more detailed discussion of these justifications and tl1e nature of cooperative
federalism in environmental policy, see Jonathan H. Adler, Comment, The Green Aspects of
Printz: The Revival of Federalism and Its Implications for Environmental Law, 6 CEO. MASON. L. REv.
573,578-80 (1998). See also Dwyer, supra note 36, at 1217; Percival, sujJra note 9, at 1174-75.
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prosoiptions in all fifty states.~ The federal government may set
environmental priorities through legislation and regulation, but much of
the actual implementation is dependent upon state agencies and
7
personnel.~ Second, the geographic and economic diversity of the nation
requires local knowledge and expertise that is often unavailable at the
48
federal level. Environmental problems, and their solutions, will vary from
place to place, limiting the federal government's ability to adopt nationwide
solutions to environmental concerns that are equally applicable to multiple
9
parts of the country! Third, enlisting state and local cooperation in the
imposition of potentially costly or intrusive environmental controls can
50
blunt local opposition to federal mandates. This facilitates the adoption of
federal environmental standards while simultaneously blurring the lines of
51
political accountability. For these reasons, most m~or environmental

46. See Richard B. Stewart, Pyramids of SacJ"ifice? Problems of Federalism in iVIandating State
Implementation of National Environmental Policy, 86 YALE LJ. 1196, 1201 (1977).
47. See U.S. GAO, EPA's AND STATES' EFFORTS TO FOCUS STATE ENFORCEMENT PROGRAMS
ON RESULTS 16 (1998) (noting that states accounted for 85% of enforcement actions in 1996);
David L. Markell, The Role of Detmrnce-Based Enforcement in a 'Reinvented'" State/Federal
Relationship: The Divide Between Theory and Reality, 24 IV\.RV. ENVTL. L. REv. 1, 32 (2000)
(indicating that states are responsible for up to 90% of all facility inspections and
environmental enforcement actions).
48. See D\\')'er, sujlra note 36, at 1218 (noting that "[t]he knowledge necessary to
administer any air pollution control program ... can be found only at the local level'"); see aLm
HENRY N. BUTLER & JONATHAN R. l'vlACEY, USING FEDERALISM TO IMPROVE ENVIRONMENTAL
POLICY 27 (1996) ("Federal regulators never have been and never will be able to acquire and
assimilate the enormous amount of information necessary to make optimal regulatory
judgments that reflect the technical requirements of particular locations and pollution
sources."); Alistair Ulph, Harmonization and Optimal Environmental Policy in a Federal Svstem with
Asymmetric Information, 37 J. EN\'TL. ECON. & l'viGMT. 224, 225-26 (2000) (arguing that regional
differences in environmental concerns undermine the case for federal harmonization of
environmental standards where states have informational advantages over the federal
govemment). This observation is based on the insights of Nobel Laureate economist F.A.
Hayek, who observed "the knowledge of the circumstances of which we must make use never
exists in concentrated or integrated form but solely as the dispersed bits of incomplete and
frequently contradictory knowledge which all the separate individuals possess." F. A Hayek, The
Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 A.M. ECON. REV. 519, 519-20 (1945). For more information on the
"knowledge problem" in environmental policy, see jonathan H. Adler, Letting Fifty Flowers Bloom:
Using Federalism to Spur Envimnmental Innovation, in THE jURJSDYNAMICS OF ENVlRONMENTAL
PROTECTlON: CHANGE AND THE PRAGMATIC VOICE IN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 265-66 (Jim Chen
ed., 2004).
49. Stewart, sujlm note 46, at 1266 (noting the "sobering fact" that "environmental quality
involves too many intricate, geographically vatiegated physical and institutional interrelations to
be dictated from Washington").
50. Stewart, sufJra note 46.
51. See David Schoenbrod, Why States, Not EPA, Should Set Pollution Standards, in
ENVlRONMENTAL FEDERALISM 259, 264 (Terry Anderson & Peter J. Hill eels., 1997) ("[F]ederal
mandates give federal legislators and the president the means to take credit for the benefits of
environmental programs while placing the blame for any ensuing costs on state and local
officials."). ft is possible that this attenuation of political accountability is one reason
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statutes adopt some measure of "cooperative federalism," albeit to differing
51J
extents.Federal environmental regulation arguably represents the most
expansive assertion of federal authority. Even where federal environmental
programs are cooperative in nature, environmental regulation calls upon
the federal government to affect, influence, and regulate a wider range of
behavior-economic and otherwise-than any other area of federal
concern. Only federal environmental regulation, for example, could
purport to regulate local activities ranging from home construction to
53
recreational behavior on private land.
Despite the ambitious sweep of federal environmental legislation, there
was little, if any, thought given to the constitutional justification for such
54
enactments. Congress adopted environmental statutes governing a wide
range of activities and phenomena never-before subject to federal regulation
without questioning whether any such legislation might exceed the scope of
55
Congress's enumerated powers. Nearly all the major environmental
statutes give a passing nod to the historic state role in addressing pollution
concerns, yet then proceed to expand the federal government's reach into
cooperative federalism is popular. See Michael S. Greve, Against Coopemtive Federalism, 70 MISS.
(2000).
52. See, e.g., Bragg v. W.Va. Coal Ass'n, 248 F.3d 275, 294 (4th Cir. 2001) ("The statutory
federalism of SMCRA is quite unlike the cooperative regime under the Clean Water Act .... ").
53. See, e.g., 58 Fed. Reg. 45,008, 45,020 (Aug. 25, 1993) (giving the U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers authority to regulate "walking, bicycling or driving a vehicle through a wetland"
because such activities could result in the "discharge of dredged material").
54. See Denis Binder, The Spending Clause as a Positive Source of Environmental Protection: A
Primer, 4 CHAP. L. REV. 14 7, 147 (2001) ("As the number of statutes approach the century mark,
little tl1ought has been given by Congress to the constitutional basis of the legislation."); id. at
148 ("[W]hen the statutes were adopted, t11e underlying assumption was tllat tlle Commerce
Clause grants '~rtually carte blanche authority to legislate for environmental protection.");
Philip Soper, The Constitutional Fm17U'tuo1·k of Envimnmmtal Law, in FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL
LAw 20, 24 (Erica L. Dolgin & Thomas G. P. Guilbert eds., 1974) (observing that applying
contemporary Commerce Clause jmispruclence "to the environmental context results in a
picture of congressional power that appears practically unbounded at least as far as concerns
control over the typical areas of pollution"). But see id. at 21-22 (citing commentators who
argued, in the 1960s, tllat some environmental concerns may lie beyond tlle scope of federal
power).
55. Insofar as policy makers gave any consideration to constitutional limits on federal
em~ronmental legislation, they were concerned that some regulations controlling land use
could result in compensable takings under the Fifth Amendment. See, e.g., FRED BOSSELMAN ET
AL., THE TAJUNG ISSUE (1973) (detailing the potential constitutional limits on environmental
regulation posed by the "takings clause" of the Fifth Amendment). Congress considered, and
rejected, explicit federal controls on land use in 1973. See geneml~v. Robert H. Nelson, Federal
Zoning: The New Era in Environmental Policy, in LAND R.IGHTS: THE 1990s PROPERTI' R.IGHTS
REBELLION 295 (Bruce Yandle eel., 1995). Despite the defeat of this proposal, the cumulative
impact of federal em~ronmental statutes has been the imposition of substantial federal controls
on private land use. !d. at 297 ("The full land-use consequences of the em~ronmental
legislation of the early 1970s, as subsequently amended, are only now coming to be more widely
realized.").

LJ. 557, 559
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56

such terrain. Because federal environmental programs are so expansive,
environmental regulation may be particularly vulnerable to federalism
constraints on federal power. Insofar as courts restrict the scope of federal
regulatory authority due to federalism concerns, this may have a particular
effect on environmental regulation.

II.

THE SUPREME COURT's FEDERALISM

Central to the Supreme Court's revived federalism jurisprudence is the
idea that the structure of the Constitution creates a system of "dual
sovereignty" in which both the federal government and the states are
57
sovereigns. Although often characterized as a "States rights" philosophy,
"dual sovereignty" is supposed to operate for the benefit of citizens, not
58
states. Much as the horizontal separation of powers prevents any single
branch of government from accumulating too much power, the division of
authority between the federal and state governments protects liberty from
59
government encroachment. "The different governments will control each
other, at the same time that each will be controlled by itself," explained
60
James Madison in Federalist No. 51. If the limits of federal power are
respected, and the appropriate balance between the federal and state
governments is maintained, inteijurisdictional competition restrains state
governments from imposing unnecessary burdens upon their citizens. 61 The
beneficiaries of this arrangement are not the state governments, as such, as

56. See, e.g., Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. § 1531 (c) (2) (2000) ("It is further
declared to be the policy of Congress that Federal agencies shall cooperate with State and local
agencies to resolve water resource issues in concert with conservation of endangered species.");
Federal Water Pollution Control Act (Clean Water Act), 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (b) (2000) ("It is the
policy of the Congress to recognize, preserve, and protect the primary responsibilities and
rights of States .... "); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7402(a) (2000) ("The Administrator shall
encourage cooperative activities by the States and local governments ... and encourage the
making of agreements and compacts between States for the prevention and control of air
pollution.").
57. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 457 (1991).
58. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, lSI (1992) ("The Constitution does not
protect the sovereignty of States for the benefit of the States or state governments as abstract
political entities .... To the contrary, the Constitution divides authority between federal and
state governments for the protection of individuals."); see also John 0. McGinnis & Ilya So min,
Federalism vs. States' Rights: A Defense of judicial Reviw in a Federal System, Nw. U. L. REv.
(forthcoming) (arguing that federalism allocates power between the state and federal
governments for the benefit of the people of the nation and for the benefit of states qua states).
59. As the Court explained in Gregmy: 'Just as the separation and independence of the
coordinate branches of Federal Government serve to prevent the accumulation of excessive
power in any one branch, a healthy balance of power between the States and the Federal
Government will reduce the risk of tyranny and abuse from either front." 501 U.S. at 458.
60. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 323 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961 ).
61. See generally MICHAEL GREVE, REAL FEDERALISM: WHY IT MATTERS, How IT CAN HAPPEN
(1999).
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they are forced to compete with one another for the loyalty of their citizens,
but the people. Maintaining this balance is the purpose of federalism.
The Supreme Court's recent federalism jmisprudence has two distinct
strains. The first focuses on the federal government's enumerated powers.
These cases ask whether a given federal statute represents a proper exercise
of one of Congress's enumerated powers. In these cases, the Court has held
that the enumeration of distinct federal powers places affirmative limits on
Congress's power. Some matters-those not within the bounds of the
enumerated powers-are simply beyond the reach of federal hands. The
second centers on protecting state sovereignty. The focus in these cases is
the extent to which residual state sovereignty immunizes states from federal
efforts to direct or otherwise influence state resources and policy decisions.
Together, these two jurisprudential strains limit both what Congress may do
and how Congress may do it.
A.

ENuMERATED POWERS

From its inception the federal government has been a government of
enumerated powers. As the Court declared in Marbury v. Madison, "The
powers of the legislature are defined and limited; and that those limits may
not be mistaken or forgotten, the constitution is written." 62 Those powers
not delegated to the federal government are, in the words of the Tenth
63
Amendment, "reserved to the States, respectively, or to the people." The
bulk of Congress's powers are enumerated in Article I, section 8 of the
Constitution, though others are scattered through the document, including
the enforcement power contained in section 5 of the Fourteenth
Arnendment. 64 To the Court's current majority, it is a matter of "first
principles" that congressional authority is limited to these powers. 55 United
7
States v. Lopez66 and City of Boerne v. Florel make clear that even Congress's
broadest powers-to regulate commerce and protect civil liberties under the
Fourteenth Amendment-have distinct and defined limits beyond which
Congress's reach may not extend. Several of the Supreme Court's recent

62. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137,176 (1803).
63. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
64. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (granting Congress the power to determine the effect
of the Full Faith and Credit Clause); id. § 3, cl. 2 ("The Congress shall have Power to dispose of
and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property
belonging to the United States .... ); U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 2 (granting Congress the
power to enforce the Thirteenth Amendment); U.S. CONST. amend. XV,§ 2 (granting Congress
the power to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment); U.S. CONST. amend. XVI (granting Congress
the power to levy an income tax).
65. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 552 (1995).
66. 514 u.s. 549 (1995).
67. 521 u.s. 507(1997).
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federalism cases have sought to define d1e outer limits of federal
enumeratecl powers .m th ese two areas. 68
I.

Commerce Clause

Article I, section 8 of the Constitution grants Congress numerous
powers, including the power " [ t] o regulate Commerce . . . among the
69
several States." As explained by Chief Justice John Marshall, this clause70
the Commerce Clause -grants Congress "the power to regulate; that is, to
71
prescribe the rule by which commerce is to be govemed." This, by its own
terms, is a rather expansive power. It, "like all others vested in Congress, is
complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges
no limitations, other than are prescribed in the constitution." 72 Yet as broad
73
as the commerce power may be, it is not without limits. In Marshall's
words, there remains an "immense mass of legislation, which embraces every
thing within the territory of a State, not surrendered to the general
,7-l
government.
For most of the latter half of the twentieth century, the notion that
there were justiciable limits on the scope of Congress's Commerce Clause
75
power was a dead letter. In the name of regulating commerce, Congress

68. Explicit in the Court's enumerated powers decisions is the holding that constitutional
limitations on federal enumerated powers are judicially cognizable and represent appropriate
subjects of judicial review. This has not always been universal. See, e.g., Garcia v. San Antonio
Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 552 (1985) (holding that "political safeguards" for state
interests are sufficient and obviate the need for judicial enforcement of federalism); see also
Jesse H. Choper, The Scope of National Power Vis-a-vis the States: The Dispensability ofjudicial Review,
86 YALE LJ. 1552, 1557-60 (1977); Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safegum·ds of Federalism: The
Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of the National Govemment, 54 COLUM. L. REv. 543,
558-59 (1954); if. John C. Yoo, The judicial Saftguards ofFederalism, 70S. CAL. L. REV. 1311, 132157 (1997) (documenting the Court's subsequent rejection of the "political safeguards"
approach to federalism).
69. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
70. Although this clause is commonly referred to as the "Commerce Clause," perhaps it
would be more appropriate to refer to it as the "Interstate Commerce Clause" as it vests
Congress the power to regulate commerce "among the several states" and not commerce
generally. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 1, 194 (1824) ("Comprehensive as the word
'among' is, it may very properly be restricted to that commerce which concerns mm·e States
than one."); see also Lopez, 514 U.S. at 587 n.2 (Thomas,]., concurring) ("Even to speak of 'the
Commerce Clause' perhaps obscures the actual scope of that Clause.").
71. Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 v\Theat) at 196.
72. Id.
73. As stressed in Marbwy v. Madison, the whole purpose of explicitly enumerating
legislative powers was to provide limits on their scope. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803) ("To
what purpose are powers limited, and to what purpose is that limitation committed to writing, if
these limits may, at any time, be passed by those intended to be restrained?").
74. Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) at 203.
75. See, e.g., BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE-VOL. 1: FOUNDATIONS 105 (!991) (noting
that after the New Deal "[a) commitment to federalism ... was no longer thought to require a
constitutional strategy that restrained the national government to a limited number of
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76

could regulate just about anything. As then:Justice William Rehnquist
observed in 1981, "[O]ne could easily get the sense from this Court's
opinions that the federal system exists only at the sufferance of Congress. "77
Although the Supreme Court had repeatedly reaffirmed the limited scope of
the Commerce Clause power in its opinions, for decades it only honored
78
these limitations in the breach. Beginning in 1937, with the Court's
decision in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. to uphold the regulation of
intrastate actiVIties that have a "substantial relation to interstate
79
commerce," the Court would not look favorably upon another Commerce
Clause challenge to federal legislation for almost sixty years.
In 1995, the Supreme Court reversed the conviction of Alfonso Lopez,
Jr. for carrying a concealed handgun to school in violation of the federal
80
Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 ("GFSZA"). In United States v. Lopez, the
Court held that a federal statute prohibiting the knowing possession of a
gun within one thousand feet of a school exceeded the scope of the
commerce power. Stressing that "the Constitution creates a Federal
8
Government of enumerated powers," I the Lopez majmity rejected the
argument that Congress could regulate intrastate activities with only a
tenuous connection to interstate commerce. Five years later, the Supreme
82
Court reaffirmed this holding in United States v. Morrison, striking down
provisions of the Violence Against Women Act ("VAWA") that, like the
GFSZA, had only a hypothesized relationship to interstate commerce.
Under Lopez, the Constitution grants Congress the power to regulate in
three areas: (1) "the use of the channels of interstate commerce;" (2) "the
instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things in interstate
commerce;" and (3) "those activities that substantially affect interstate
83
commerce." The first two categories are rather unambiguous. If an item is
used or sold in interstate commerce, it may be regulated, as may the
channels through which such items flow. Thus, for example, Congress may
enumerated powers over economic and social life"). This presumption is common within the
environmental law literature. See, e.g., Holly Doremus, Patching the ATk: Improving Legal Protection
of Biological Diversity, 18 ECOLOGY L.Q. 265, 293 (1991) ("As currently interpreted, the
Commerce Power has a virtually unlimited sweep.").
76. As one federal judge observed, federal courts treated tl1e commerce clause as the
"Hey, you-can-clo-whatever-you-feel-like Clause." Alex Kozinski, Introduction to Volume Nineteen, 19
HARV.j.L. & PUB. POL'Y 1, 5 (1995).
77. Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 308 (1981)
(Rehnquist,J., concurring).
78. See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 30 (1937) ("That distinction
between what is national and what is local in the activities of commerce is vital to tl1e
maintenance of our federal system.").
79. !d. at 37.
80. 514 u.s. 549 (1995).
81. !d. at 552.
82. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
83. LojJez, 514 U.S. at 558-59.
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regulate or prohibit the sale of driver's license information and other
personal data collected by public and private entities because such
84
information is a product sold in interstate commerce. The contours of tl1e
"substantial effects" test, on tl1e oilier hand, are less obvious.
As described and applied in Lopez and Morrison, the "substantial effects"
test is more qualitative ilian quantitative. It is more concerned with the
nature of the regulated activity or ilie regulatory scheme in question than
wiili the aggregate economic impact of the regulated activity alone, or in
combination with oilier similarly regulated activities. The key question is
whether the activity subject to federal regulation is itself related to
'"commerce' or any sort of economic enterprise" or whether the regulation
is "an essential part of a larger regulation of economic activity, in which ilie
regulatory scheme could be undercut unless the intrastate activity were
85
regulated." Thus, Congress may regulate activities that are "economic in
86
. d ustna
. I mtmng
. . 87 or Ioan-s l1arzmg.
l . 88 A t tl1e same ttme,
.
nature, " sue h as m
Congress may reach relatively minor intrastate activities through broad
economic regulatory schemes, such as a price maintenance regime for
89
agricultural products. That a given activity-whether domestic violence,
90
the possession of a gun near a school, or insomnia -might have a
substantial economic impact, even when aggregated with all other instances
of like conduct, is insufficient. The Court explicitly rejected "the argument
that Congress may regulate noneconomic, violent criminal conduct based
.
so le Iyon tl1at cond uct ' s aggregate e fT1ect on mterstate
commerce. ,lJI
·
In Morrison, the Court identified four factors to consider when
evaluating whetl1er a given activity "substantially affects" interstate
commerce. The first, and perhaps most important factor, is the economic or
commercial nature of the activity in question. While the Jl;fonison Court

84. See Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. liS (2000) (upholding rhe Otiver's Privacy Protection
Act as a proper exercise of Congress's Commerce Clause power).
85. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561.
86. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 613.
87. See generally Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981)
(holding the Surface Mining and Refonnation Act constitutional under the Commerce Clause).
88. See generally Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971) (holding that the loansharking
portion of the Consumer Credit Protection Act is constitutional under the Commerce Clause).
89. See generally Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. Ill (1942) (upholding the application of
agricultural production quotas to production for a fanner's own use because allowing such
production would undermine the national price control scheme created by the Agricultural
Adjustment Act of 1938); Lopez, 514 U.S. at 556 ("Even if appellee's activity be local and ... not
be regarded as commerce, it may still ... be reached by Congress if it exerts a substantial
economic effect on interstate commerce, ... irrespective of whether such effect is what might at
some earlier time have been define? as 'direct' or 'indirect."' (citing vl'ickard, 317 U.S. at 125)).
90. See Brzonkala v. Va. Polytechnic Inst., 169 F.3d 820, 839 (4th Cir. 1999) (en bane)
(citing estimates that insomnia has an estimated $92.5 to .$107.5 billion annual impact on the
U.S. economy), affd sub nom, United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
91. Monison, 529 U.S. at 617.
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eschewed adopting a "categorical rule against aggregating the effects of any
noneconomic intrastate activity," it noted "thus far in our Nation's history
our cases have upheld Commerce Clause regulation of intrastate activity
92
only where the activity is economic in nature." It is important to note that
the Court is using "economic" and "noneconomic" in a generalized,
93
colloquial sense.
"Economic" activities are those that involve the
production, distribution, or exchange of goods and services, as well as those
activities undertaken for the purpose of such activities. That economists
might describe an activity as "economic," insofar as these activities (like all
human conduct) can be described in economic terms, does not make it
"economic" for purposes of Commerce Clause analysis under Lopez and
94
Morrison.
The second factor is whether Congress included a jurisdictional
element in the challenged statute that can serve to "limit its reach to a
95
discrete set" of activities that substantially affect commerce. For instance, in
95
Jones v. United States, a unanimous court interpreted the federal arson
statute to cover "only property currently used in commerce or in an activity
affecting commerce" so as to avoid a potential Commerce Clause issue. By its
terms, the statute only reached those activities within Congress's Commerce
Clause authority. Such a jurisdictional element does not ensure a statute's
97
constitutionality, but it can provide courts with a basis upon which to
construe a statute so as to keep it within constitutional limits. Specifically,
where a statute appears to stretch the outer bounds of Congress's
Commerce Clause authmity, courts can construe the jurisdictional element
98
narrowly so as to avoid the constitutional concern.
The third factor is whether Congress adopted legislative findings
regarding the regulated activity's alleged substantial effect on interstate
commerce. 99 As with a jurisdictional element, the adoption of legislative
92. Jd. at 613; see also Jim Chen, The Story ofWickard v. Filburn: Agriculture, Aggregation, and
Congressional Power over Commerce, in CONSTITUTIONAL LAW STORIES 69, 104 (Michael C. Dorf
ed., 2004) ("The aggregation principle remains nominally good law, but it operates only when
the actors or activities at issue are commercial.").
93. See Deborah Jones Merritt, Commerce!, 94 MICH. L. REV. 674, 694-95 (1995); see also
Jonathan H. Adler, Wetlands, Watmfowl, and the Menace of Mr. Wilson: Commerce Clause
Jun:spntdence and the Limits ofFede?·al Wetland Regulation, 29 ENVTL. L. 1, 12-14 ( 1999).
94. But see Allan Ides, Economic Activity as a Proxy for Federalism: Intuition and Reason in
United States v. Morrison, 18 CONST. COMMENT. 563, 570-73 (2001) (arguing the economic,
non-economic distinction is analytically incoherent).
95. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549,562 (1995).
96. 529 U.S. 848 (2000).
97. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 612 (noting the jurisdictional element "may" establish the
constitutionality of a given statute under the Commerce Clause).
98. jones, 529 U.S. at 857 (stating that "where a statute is susceptible of two constructions,
by one of which grave and doubtful constitutional questions arise and by the other of which
such questions are avoided" a court's "duty is to adopt the latter").
99. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 612.
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findings does not ensure a statute's constitutionality. ° Congress adopted
legislative findings concerning the alleged effects of gender-motivated
violence on interstate commerce, but the Supreme Court struck down the
101
challenged VAWA provisions in Niorrison nonetheless. But the adoption of
such findings can assist a court in identifying a given activity's effect on
102
interstate commerce, particularly if the effect is nonobvious.
Findings
alone will not protect a statute from Commerce Clause scrutiny, however.
Jvforrison makes clear that the Court will independently evaluate
congressional findings that purport to demonstrate that an otherwise noncommercial, intrastate activity substantially affects interstate commerce.
The fourth and final factor is the nexus between the regulated activity
and the alleged substantial effect on interstate commerce. Where the
relationship between the activity and the effect is "tenuous," a statute will not
103
be upheld.
That tl1e presence of guns in schools could disrupt the
education process, thereby reducing the educational system's ability to
produce a more educated, and presumably more productive, workforce and
that this could well have a substantial impact on the economic well-being of
the country, does not establish the sort of connection necessary to uphold a
statute under the Commerce Clause. This sort of attenuated effect on
104
commerce was hypothesized-and explicitly rejected-in Lopez. To accept
highly attenuated connections of this type between intrastate activities and
ir1terstate commerce as tl1e basis for Commerce Clause jmisdiction would
make the courts "hard pressed to posit any activity by an individual that
105
Congress is without power to regulate."
To date, the consideration of these factors has not led to the
106
invalidation of many federal statutes, environmental or otherwise. Indeed,
federal appellate courts have been extremely reluctant to strike clown any
federal statute on Commerce C lause grounds. 107 concerns about the scope
10

100. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 557 n.2 ("[S]imply because Congress may conclude that a particular
activity substantially affects interstate commerce does not necessarily make it so." (quoting
Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264,311 (1981)).
!OJ.
Aforrison, 529 U.S. at 614-15.
102. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at563.
103. Id. at 563-64.
104. Id. at 565; cf id. at 618-20 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing that "as long as one views
the commerce connection, not as a 'technical legal conception,' but as 'a practical one,"'
Congress had a "rational basis for finding a significant (or substantial) connection between gunrelated school violence and interstate commerce," clue to the "widespread" and "extremely
serious" problem of guns in schools and the effect of education on interstate commerce).
105. Id. at 564; see also Michell N. Berman, Guillen and Gullibility: Piercing the Swjace of
Commerce Clause Doarine, 89 IOWA L. REV. 1487, 1528 (2004) ("If the Rehnquist Court's
developing Commerce Clause doctrine is driven by a single impulse, it is the insistence that the
docttine not amount to a blank check.").
106. The relevant environmental cases are discussed infra Part III.A.l.
107. See Brannon P. Denning & Glenn H. Reynolds, Rulings and Resistance: The New
Commerce Clause jurisprudence Encounters the Lower Cowts, 55 ARK. L. REv. 1253, 1256 (2003);
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of Commerce Clause authority have prompted some courts to narrow the
108
scope of federal statutes containing jurisdictional elements.
In addition,
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has looked favorably on "as
applied" challenges, whereby federal statutes are upheld, but nonetheless
declare<:l unconstitutional as applied to a given plaintiff due to the
109
noneconomic, intrastate character of the conduct at issue.
Yet while
application of Lopez and Morrison has divided several circuits, thus far federal
statutes have remained largely immune from Commerce Clause
llO
challenges.
2.

Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment

While the Commerce Clause cases are the most important enumerated
powers cases for the future of environmental protection, a second line of
cases merits a brief discussion. These cases address the reach of federal
power under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. As generally
recognized, the primary purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was to
provide freed slaves and other Mrican-Americans greater federal protection
from arbitrary exercises of state power.lll Am'ong other things, the
Amendment prohibits states from abridging the "privileges or immunities"
of U.S. citizens, depriving any person of "life, liberty, or property without
due process of law," and denying "equal protection of the laws" to any

Glenn H. Reynolds & Brannon P. Denning, Lower Cou1t lliadings oJLopez, o1· What if the Supmne
Cowt Held a Constitutional Rl!Volution and Nobody Came?, 2000 WIS. L. REv. 369, 392-93 (2000).
108. See, e.g., United States v. Lamont, 330 F.3d 1249, 1254-55 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding that
the defendant's action did not fall within the jmisdictionallimits of the federal arson statute);
United States v. Perrotta, 313 F.3d 33, 36 (2d Cir. 2002) (same, but under Hobbs Act); United
States v. Ballinger, 312 F.3d 1264, 1276 (11th Cir. 2002) (same, but under Church Arson
Prevention Act); United States v. Rea, 300 F.3d 952, 961-62 (8th Cir. 2002) (same, but under
federal arson statute); United States v. Carr, 271 F.3d 172, 179-80 (4th Cir. 2001) (same);
United States v.Johnson, 246 F.3d 749, 752 (5th Cir. 2001) (same).
109. See Raich v. Ashcroft, 352 F.3d 1222, 1222 (9th Cir. 2003) (upholding an as-applied
commerce clause challenge to the application of the federal Controlled Substances Act to
medical marijuana); United States v. Stuart, 348 F.3d 1132, 1142 (9th Cir. 2003) (upholding a
commerce clause challenge to federal prohibition of possession of fully-automatic weapons as
applied to a home-made firearm); United States v. McCoy, 323 F.3d 1114, 1140-41 (9th Cir.
2003) (upholding a commerce clause challenge to federal prohibition on possession of child
pornography as applied to a family photo).
110. See GDF Realty v. Norton, 362 F.3d 286, 289 (5th Cir. 2004) (denial of an en bane
petition); Rancho Viejo, LLC v. Norton, 334 F.3d 1158, 1158 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (denial of an en
bane petition); United States v. McFarland, 311 F.3d 376, 424 (5th Cir. 2002) (en bane)
(upholding a Hobbs Act conviction); United States v. Faasse, 265 F.3d 475, 479 (6th Cir. 2001)
(en bane) (upholding the Child Support Recovery Act of 1992 on Commerce Clause grounds);
United States v. Hickman, 179 F.3d 230, 231 (5th Cir. 1999) (en bane) (upholding a Hobbs Act
conviction).
11 l. See RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, 2 TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
SUBSTANCE & PROCEDURE§ 15.2 (2d ed. 1999).
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112

person within the state. Section 5 of the amendment grants Congress the
"power to enforce" these prohibitions and the remainder of the Fourteenth
Amendment's guarantees "by appropriate legislation. "113
114
Section 5 is an affirmative grant of legislative power to Congress. Yet
like the powers enumerated in Article I, section 8, this power is subject to
judicially enforceable limits. Specifically, the Court held in City of Boerne v.
Flores that Congress's section 5 power "extends only to 'enforcing' the
115
provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment." The power is "remedial" in
117
. d to controI state action.
.
Wh"l
.
nature 116 an d may onIy b e exercise
I e section
5 grants Congress the power to proscribe "conduct which is not itself
unconstitutional" so as to deter or remedy violations of the Fourteenth
Amendment's substantive guarantees, Congress does not have the "power to
decree the substance of the Fourteenth Amendment's restrictions on the
118
states." Thus, in City of Boerne the Court struck down Congress's effort to
force state and local governments to provide greater accommodations for
religious practice than are required by the Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment. ug
Where Congress enacts legislation that extends beyond the prohibition
of actual constitutional violations, the Court requires "congruence and
proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the
120
means adopted to that end."
In practice, this means that Congress may
adopt prophylactic legislation to guard against potential constitutional
violations. 121 The nature and scope of the proscribed conduct must be
related to the violation Congress wants to prevent. Under the current
understanding of section 5, Congress's ability to identify and address state
violations of Fourteenth Amendment rights independent of judicial findings
122
of such violations is fairly limited.
112. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,§ 1.
113. Id.
114. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 619 (2000) ("Section 5 is 'a positive grant of
legislative power."' (quoting Katzen bach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 (1966)) ).
115. 521 U.S. 507, 519 (1997) (quoting U.S. CONST. amend XIV,§ 5).
116. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301,326 (1966).
117. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 621 ("[T]he Fourteenth Amendment, by its very terms, prohibits
only state action.").
118. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 519 (striking down the Religious Freedom Restoration Act for
exceeding Congress's power under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment); see also id.
("Congress does not enforce a constitutional right by changing what the right is. It has been
given the power 'to enforce,' not the power to determine what constitutes a constitutional
violation." (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,§ 5)).
119. Id. at 536 (striking down the Religious Freedom Restoration Act for exceeding
Congress's power under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment).
120. I d. at 520; see also Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 81 (2000).
121. Nev. Dept. of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 728 (2003).
122. See generally, Evan H. Caminker, ''Appropriate" Means-Ends Constraints on Section 5 Powers,
53 STAN. L. REV. 1127 (2001) (discussing the Court's narrowing of Congress's ability to regulate
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STATE SOVEREIGNTY

The enumeration of Congress's delegated powers is not the only limit
on the scope of federal power. There are constitutional limits on the
exercise of federal power, both explicit (as in the Bill of Rights) and implicit
(as in those found in the Constitution's history and structure). The Supreme
Court has found within the Constitution significant structural limits on the
exercise of federal power that arise from the residual "sovereign" status of
state governments. Building on the concept of "dual sovereignty," the Court
has invalidated federal actions that impede upon, or affront the "dignity" of,
123
In particular, the Court has held that the federal
states qua states.
government may neither command states to participate in or implement a
124
federal regulatory program,
nor may the federal government abrogate
state sovereign immunity from suits for money damages save in limited
125
circumstances. These doctrines are not derived from the Constitution's
text, but rather from structural considerations and unspoken assumptions in
the document. They are nonetheless key components of the contemporary
Court's federalism jurisprudence.
l.

Commandeering

The first structural limitation is the "anti-commandeering" p1inciple.
Specifically, "the Federal Government may not compel the states to
implement, by legislation or executive action, federal regulatory
126
programs." In 1992, New York State challenged portions of the Low-Level
127
Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985, which threatened to
require states with inadequate waste disposal capacity to take title to, and
assume liability for, low-level radioactive waste generated within the state. In
128
striking down the measure in New York v. United States, tl1e Court held that
state conduct under section 5, and arguing that the Court's congruence and proportionality
test is the wrong test); Samuel Estreicher & Margaret H. Lemos, The Section 5 Mystique,
Morrison, and the Future ofFederal Antidiscrimination Law, 2000 SUP. CT. REv. 109 (2000) (same);
Marci Hamilton & David Schoenbrod, The Reaffirmation of Proportionality Analysis under Section 5
of the Fourteenth Amendment, 21 CARDozo L. REv. 469 (1999) (discussing the Court's narrowing of
Congress's ability to regulate state conduct under section 5, but arguing that the Court's
congruence and proportionality test is the correct test).
123. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 749 (1999); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 58
(1996) (noting sovereign immunity serves, in part, "to avoid 'the indignity of subjecting a State
to the coercive process of judicial tribunals at the instance of private parties"' (quoting P.R.
Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 146 (1993) ).
124. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997) ("The Federal Government may
neither issue directives requiring the States to address particular problems, nor command the
States' officers, or those of their political subdivisions, to administer or enforce a federal
regulatory program.").
125. See, e.g., Alden, 527 U.S. at 706.
126. Printz, 521 U.S. at 925.
127. Pub. L. No. 99-240, 99 Stat. 1842.
128. 505 u.s. 144 (1992).
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"while Congress has substantial power under the Constitution to encourage
States to provide for the disposal of the radioactive waste generated within
their borders, the Constitution does not confer upon Congress the ability
129
simply to compel the States to do so." Writing for the majmity in New York,
Justice O'Connor explained, "[T]he Constitution has never been
understood to confer upon Congress the ability to require the States to
130
govern according to Congress's instructions."
To hold otherwise, the
Court explained, would be to reject the idea that the states themselves retain
substantial sovereignty within the federal system. It would also undermine
131
accountability within the federal system.
The Court's holding laid out simple ground rules for federal efforts to
enlist State assistance in regulatory programs: "The Constitution enables the
Federal Government to pre-empt state regulation contrary to federal
interests, and it permits the Federal Government to hold out incentives to
the States as a means of encouraging them to adopt suggested regulatory
schemes. It does not, however, authorize Congress simply to direct the
132
States" to adopt Congress's policy prescriptions.
In simple terms:
"Whatever the outer limits of [State] sovereignty may be, one thing is clear:
The Federal Government may not compel the States to enact or administer a
133
federal regulatory program."
This limitation applies equally to efforts to commandeer a state or local
government executtve as a state 1egts1ature. 134 c ongress IS no more a bl e to
direct the activities of local law enforcement than it is a state senate. To hold
otherwise would enable Congress to sidestep New York by directly ordering
state officials to implement federal measures, bypassing the state legislature
in the process. 135 Such federal power to direct state executive officials would
136
infringe upon state legislatures' ability to control state policy.
For this
reason, the Supreme Court in Printz v. United States invalidated portions of a
federal statute directing state law enforcement officials to perform
background checks for handgun purchases. That the background-check
requirement was arguably little more than a ministerial obligation, and did
0

0

0

129. Id. at 149 (emphasis added).
130. Id. at 162.Justice O'Connor found support for her opinion in the language of Hodel v.
Virginia Smface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, concluding that Congress cannot "commandeer[)
the legislative processes of the States by directly compelling them to enact and enforce a federal
regulatory program." 452 U.S. 264, 288 (1981).
131. N= York, 505 U.S. at 168-69 (stating that federal mandates on state governments
diminish political accountability at both the state and local level).
132. Id. at 188.
133. Id.
134. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898,935 (1997).
135. Id. at 929-30.
136. The anti-commandeeting ptinciple does not, however, apply to state judiciaties due to
the express language of the Supremacy Clause. See generally Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 ( 194 7).

JUDICIAL FEDERAliSM AND ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION

399

not impose a substantial burden on the local law enforcement officers, was
137
deemed immaterial.
New York and Printz did not limit Congress's ability to regulate interstate
commerce or other matters identified in Article I of the Constitution. These
cases place no limitation on Congress's ability to regulate directly those
matters within its control. Instead, the anti-commandeering rule proscribes
the methods that Congress may use to effect such regulation. It is a
structural banier limiting the federal government's ability to reorient state
p1i01ities and resources. Of course, Congress is not always interested in
authorizing direct regulation. Administering programs through state
governments may obscure tl1e source of regulatory edicts and blunt any
138
political backlash over unpopular rules. Much as unbounded delegations
to regulatory agencies enable Congress to posture about achieving
important public ends without accounting for the costs entailed by federal
139
.
.
I ementatwn
.
c d eraI programs may serve
programs, · man d atmg
state Imp
o f 1e
Congress's institutional interests by obscuring federal responsibility for given
regulatory requirements. Thus, in many cases Congress would prefer to
regulate through the states. 140
Where Congress is unwilling to instruct tl1e federal executive to regulate
directly, it may seek to induce voluntary state participation in a federal
scheme. 141 The most obvious means of accomplishing tl1is is to offer funds to
the states with conditions attached, or to threaten to cut off an existing
142
funding stream if specified conditions are not met. Such encouragement
has significant force, but it also has constitutional limits. Indeed, the
structural constraints on federal power imposed by New York and Printz imply
such limits on tl1e use of federal funds. As discussed below, Congress's
spending power can no more authorize infringements upon state
governments than can the power to regulate interstate commerce. 143 Both
must be subject to federalism restraints. While New Ymk and Printz did not
impose substantive restraints upon Congress's power, they did place
structural impediments to the enactment of laws that would excessively

137. Printz, 521 U.S. at 935 ("[N]o case-by-case weighing of the burdens or benefits is
necessary; such commands are fundamentally incompatible with our constitutional system of
dual sovereignty.").
138. In this fashion, commandeering can blur both the line of credit as well as that of
blame.
139.
See generally DAVID SCHOENBROD, POWER WITHOUT RESPONSJBILIIT: HOW CONGRESS
ABUSES THE PEOPLE THROUGH DELEGATION ( 1993).

See Greve, supra note 51, at 614-15.
The Court noted that there are "a variety of methods, short of outright coercion, by
which Congress may urge a State to adopt a legislative program consistent with federal
interests." New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 167 (1992).
142. !d. ("[U]nder Congress's spending power 'Congress may attach conditions on the
receipt of federal funds."' (quoting South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206 ( 1987)).
143.
See infra Part IV.
140.
141.
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intrude into the states' sovereign realms and thereby threaten individual
liberty.
It is important to note that the contemporary anti-commandeering
principle stands in contrast to the Court's prior effort to protect state
sovereignty by preventing federal regulation in National League of Cities v.
144
Use~y.
In National League of Cities the Court held that generally applicable
federal regulations did not apply to state governments insofar as they
infringed upon state sovereignty or impeded "traditional governmental
functions." 145 On this basis the Court held that the minimum wage and
overtime provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA") did not apply
146
to state governments, though the law did apply to private employers.
National League of Cities was explicitly overruled in 1985 by GaTcia v. San
Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, which upheld the application of the
147
FLSA to state government employers. Under Garcia, states are subject to
neutral regulatory measures adopted by Congress to regulate the actions of
148
public and private parties alike.
Federal statutes that regulate state
conduct are permissible so long as they do not regulate states as states, but
rather only regulate states as private actors, such as employers or owners of
149
databases.
2.

Sovereign Immunity

Just as the federal government may not commandeer state
governments, the federal government is generally precluded from
abrogating state sovereign immunity. In 1996, in Seminole Tribe of Florida v.
150
Florida,
the Supreme Court held that Congress may not subject a state to
suit for money damages in federal court pursuant to an otherwise valid
exercise of the Congress's enumerated powers in Article I, section 8. Three
151
years later, in Alden v. Maine,
the Court held that Congress was similarly
barred from abrogating state sovereign immunity in state court. In 2002, in

144. 426 U.S. 833 ( 1976). For a brief discussion of the historical development of the
Court's federalism jurisprudence in this area, see Adler, supm note 45, at 582-89.
145. Nat'! League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 841, 852.
146. !d.
147. 469 u.s. 528 (1985).
148. See also Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141, 151 (2000) (upholding the application of the
Driver's Privacy Protection Act to state governments as the owners of commercially valuable
databases). Note, however, that subsequent cases reject the underlying doctrinal rationale of
Garcia, namely that states are sufficiently influential in the legislative process to obviate any
need for judicial resolution of federalism concerns. See Yoo, supra note 68.
149. See Reno, 528 U.S. at 151 ("(T]he DPPA does not requ:.-e the States in tl1eir sovereign
capacity to regulate their own citizens. The DPPA regulates the States as the owners of data
bases.").
150. 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
151. 527 u.s. 706 (1999).
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Federal Maritime Commission v. South Camlina State Pmts Authority, 152 the Court
further held that states are likewise immune to federal administrative
proceedings initiated by private parties.
The Court's sovereign immunity cases are typically characterized as
"Eleventh Amendment" cases, as this amendment is the only potential
textual basis for state sovereign immunity. Yet this is "something of a
153
misnomer. " The text of the Amendment reads: "The Judicial power of the
United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity,
commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of
another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." 154 Enacted to
155
overturn Chisholm v. Georgia,
the Amendment appears to prohibit only
those suits against states initiated by citizens of other states, not citizens of the
156
157
state to be sued. Yet since Hans v. Louisiana, in 1890, the Court has held
that states are also immune from suits by their own citizens.
In Alden the Court made explicit what had been implicit in its prior
sovereign immunity holdings: the source of state sovereign immunity is not
constitutional text, but the Constitution's structure and the states' preexisting status as sovereign entities. Drawing upon a heavily contested
158
interpretation of miginal intent with regard to state immunity from suit, as
159
well as longstanding Court precedent, the Court explained, "The Eleventh
Amendment confirmed, rather than established, sovereign immunity as a
160
constitutional principle." State sovereign immunity is presumed to have

152. 535 U.S. 743 (2002). Other recent cases limiting Congress's ability to abrogate state
sovereign immunity include Bd. of TTs. of Univ. of Ala. v. GmTett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001); Kimel v.
FZa. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000); Coil. Sav. Ban/1 v. FZa. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense
Bd., 527 U.S. 666 (1999). Cf Tennessee v. Lane, 124 S. Ct. 1978 (2004) (upholding abrogation
of state sovereign immunity under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act); Nev. Dep't of
Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003) (upholding abrogation of sovereign immunity under
the Family and Medical Leave Act).
153. Alden, 527 U.S. at 712.
154. U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
155. 2U.S.419(1793).
156. Note, however, that the actual language of the Amendment reads as a rule of
construction-the judicial power is not to be "construed" in a particular manner-rather than a
substantive limitation or guarantee.
157. 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
158. See l LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERJCAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 529-30 (3d. ed. 2000)
(noting that most scholars believe that "the Eleventh Amendment operates only to restrict
federal jurisdiction"); see also id. at 529 n.70 and sources cited therein. See generally MELVYN
DURCHSLAG, STATE SOVEREIGN lMMUNI1Y: A REFERENCE GUIDE TO THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION (2002) (surve}~ng history, scholarship, and application of the Eleventh
Amendment).
159. See Hans, 134 U.S. at 12 (holding that Chisholm v. Georgia was contrary to tl1e
Constitutional Framers' intent).
160. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 728-29 (1999); see also Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. S.C. State
Ports, 535 U.S. 743 754 (2002) ("[T]he sovereign immunity enjoyed by the States extends
beyond the literal text of the Eleventh Amendment.").
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preexisted the ratification of the Constitution, and individual states "entered
161
the Union 'with their sovereignty intact. "' This immunity lies "beyond the
162
congressional power to abrogate by Article I legislation" and extends to
163
both state and federal courts, as well as to administrative proceedings.
State sovereign immunity is not absolute. Under the Court's sovereign
immunity decisions, citizens retain substantial ability to ensure that states
comply with applicable federal laws without violating state sovereign
immunity. First, and perhaps most important, Congress may abrogate state
sovereign immunity pursuant to a proper exercise of its powers under
section 5 of the Fourteenth Arnendment. 164 Enacted after the Eleventh
Amendment, and well after the Founding period, the Fourteenth
Amendment is presumed to authorize the abrogation of state sovereign
immunity whereas the congressional powers enumerated in Article I, section
8 do not. Moreover, the Fourteenth Amendment was expressly adopted to
vindicate individual rights as against state power, and therefore, may be
presumed to impinge upon state sovereignty to a far greater degree than the
provisions of Article 1. 165 Where an abrogation of state sovereign immunity is
predicated on a proper exercise of Congress's power to "enforce" the
provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment-itself a matter the Court's
166
federalism jurisprudence addresses -Congress may subject states to such
suits.The Fourteenth Amendment is not the only check on state sovereign
immunity. Notwithstanding the holdings of Seminole TTibe and Alden,
individuals may sue state officials directly under the Ex Parte Young167
doctrine to seek injunctive relief, such as a court order requiting that state
officials comply with applicable federal laws. The federal government
further retains the authority to take such actions as are necessary and
168
appropriate to directly enforce federal law. Sovereign immunity is no bar
to such actions, though it does bar private suits to enforce federal law. 169
State sovereign immunity also does not extend to municipal and other local
170
governments. While states, like the federal government, retain sovereign
161. Fed_ Mar. Comm'n, 535 U.S. at 752 (quoting Blatchford v. Native VilL of Noatak, 501
U.S. 775,779 (1991))_
162. Alden, 527 U.S. at 754.
163. See Fed. j\IIar. Comm 'n, 535 U.S. at 743.
164. See, e.g., Nev. Dep'tofHuman Res. v. Hibbs,538 U.S. 721,726 (2003).
165. !d. at 726-27.
166. See inji·a Part II.A.2.
167. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
168. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 755-56 (1999).
169. !d. at 755 ("A suit which is commenced and prosecuted against a State in the name of
the United States by those who are entrusted with the constitutional duty to 'take Care that the
Laws be faithfully executed,' differs in kind from the suit of an individual .... " (quoting U.S.
CONST. art. II, § 3)).
170. !d. at 756; Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp. v. Feeney. 495 U.S. 299, 313 (1990).
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immunity, this immunity may be waived or otherwise relinquished
171
voluntarily.
Much as the federal government consents to suit in many
instances, so too can states agree to give up their immunity from certain
172
types of suits.
Finally, it is important to recognize that good-faith
compliance with federa) law is the norm in most states most of the time. 173
In summary, under the Court's sovereignty-oriented holdings, the
federal government may require all employers, public and private, to pay the
federal minimum wage or otherwise comply with federal labor standards. 174
It can also create a private right of action so employees can sue p1ivate
employers that do not comply. 17"" Such measures would be proper and
constitutional exercises of the federal power to regulate interstate
commerce. The federal government may not create a private cause of action
for public employees to sue states for minimum wage violations, however. 176
Except where the federal statute in question is enacted pursuant to section 5
of the Fourteenth Amendment to enforce the Constitution's guarantee of
fundamental liberties or equal protection, such efforts to subject states to
suits for money damages without their consent will be unavailing.

III.

jUDICIAL FEDERAliSM & FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION

Some academic and political commentators fear the Supreme Court's
more aggressive stance toward broad assertions of federal power could
177
negatively affect environmental regulation. A federal government of truly
limited powers may be unable to achieve certain environmental goals, or
unable to implement certain desired environmental policies. Limited by
federalism principles, the federal government may be unable to ensure
adequate levels of environmental protection.
These fears have a reasonable foundation. There is no doubt that the
doctrinal logic underpinning some of the federalism decisions challenges
the traditional environmental paradigm and threatens at least some existing
environmental programs. Most of these statutes were adopted when there
178
was little consideration of constitutional limits on federal power. These
laws are vulnerable to a more restrictive federalism jurisprudence. Despite
the risks to federal environmental statutes, federal appellate courts have

171. Alden, 527 U.S. at 755.
172. Id. ("Many States, on their own initiative, have enacted statutes consenting to a wide
variety of suits.").
173. See Steven R. McAllister & Robert L. Glicksman, State Liability for Envimnmental
Violations: The U.S. Supreme Court's "New" Federalism, 29 ENVTL. L. REP.10,665, 10,669 (1999).
174. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 555 (1985).
175. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2000) (providing for a private cause of action for
violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act).
176. Alden, 527 U.S. at 712.
177. See supra notes 5-8 and accompanying text; see also infra Part V.
178. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
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resisted most opportumlles to impose federalism consu·aints on federal
environmental regulation. While federal power has been clipped on the
margin, federalism principles have not had a particularly significant impact
on the scope of federal environmental regulation to date.

A. ENuMERATED POWERS
Enumerated powers claims represent the most direct challenge to
federal environmental regulatory power. Such claims strike not at the
specific regulatory means employed by the government to reach a particular
end, but at the federal government's ability to regulate a given subject
matter at all. As such, insofar as the doctrine of enumerated powers
affirmatively limits federal environmental regulatory authority, it could
threaten to limit significantly the federal government's ability to regulate
environmental concerns directly.
1.

Commerce Clause

The scope of federal power under the Commerce Clause is of particular
importance because most federal environmental statutes are premised upon
C ongress ' s power to regu late " [c ] ommerce ... among t h e several states. ,179
Indeed, when the various environmental statutes were adopted, the
underlying assumption was that the Commerce Clause "grants virtually carte
blanche authority to Congress to legislate for environmental protection." 180
Judicially imposed limits on the scope of the commerce power will constrain
the federal government's ability to regulate environmental concerns
directly. Although most activities subject to federal environmental
regulations can be considered "commercial" or "economic," in some sense,
it is not clear that all such activities fall within the scope of the commerce
power. Academic commentators were immediately aware that Lopez and
Morrison, if applied aggressively to environmental statutes, could shake the
181
foundations of federal environmental law.
Many environmental laws
179. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; see McAllister & Glicksman, supra note 173, at 10,665
("[F]ederal environmental laws generally are premised on Congress's Article I power to
regulate interstate commerce .... ").
180. Binder, suj>ra note 54, at 148.
181. See Richard Lazarus, Corps Slij1s on Lopez, FWS Wins, ENVTL. F., Mar.-Apr. 1998, at S
(noting that the Corps's wetlands regulations were "clearly" constitutional p1ior to Lopez., but
unconstitutional afterwards); Lori J. Warner, The Potential Impact of United States v. Lopez on
Environmental Regulation, 7 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'YF. 321,364-65 (1997);]. Blanding Holman
IV, Note, After United States v. Lopez: Can the Clean Water Act and the Endangered Species Act
Survive Commerce Clause Attack? 15 VA. ENVTL. LJ. 139, 211 (1995); David A. Linehan, Note,
Endangered Regttlation: Why the Commerce Clause May No Longer Be Suitable Habitat for Endangered
Species and Wetlands Regulation, 2 TEX. REv. L. & POL. 365, 426-27 (1998). But see Steven M.
Johnson, United States v. Lopez: A Misstep, But Hardly Epochal for Federal Enviromnental
Regulation, 5 N.Y.U. ENYfL. LJ. 33, 67-74 (1996) (arguing that federal wetlands regulation will
survive the inevitable Commerce Clause challenges); Bradford C. Mank, Protecting Intrastate
Threatened Species: Does the Endangered Species Act Encroach on Traditional Stale Authority and Exceed
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regulate intrastate activities irrespective of their economic nature or impact
on interstate commerce. Few environmental statutes contain jurisdictional
elements or other provisions to keep their jurisdiction within constituticnal
182
limits.
Thus far, federal appellate courts have uniformly rejected Commerce
Clause challenges to the scope of federal environmental regulation.
183
Constitutional challenges to the application of the Clean Air Act; Clean
185
184
Water Act; Endangered Species Act; and Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act ("CERCLA") 186 to intrastate
activities have all failed thus far. In many of these cases, federal regulatory
authority was upheld because the statute or regulations in question
187
regulated explicitly industrial or commercial activity.
In United States v.
188
Ho, for example, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fiftl1 Circuit upheld
provisions of the Clean Air Act establishing work practice standards for
asbestos removal. Considering the four factors identified in Lopez and
189
Morrison, the court held that the rules in question satisfied the Commerce
Clause requirement as "the regulated intrastate activity, asbestos removal, is
19
very much a commercial activity in today's economy." ° For the most part,
the result in district courts has been the same, upholding federal
environmental statutes and regulations in the face of Commerce Clause

the Outer Limits of the Commerce Clause?, 36 GA. L. REv. 723, 723-24 (2002) ("Because federal
environmental statutes rely on the Commerce Clause as the basis for congressional authority, a
broad reading of Lopez. and Morrison might call into question the constitutionality of at least
some environmental statutes or regulations.").
182. One prominent exception is that the Clean Water Act only applies to "navigable
waters" of the United States. This provision enabled the Supreme Court to read the scope of
federal authority under the CWA narrowly so as to avoid potential Commerce Clause concerns.
Solid Waste Agency v. United States Army Corps ofEng'rs, 531 U.S. 159, 166-68 (2001); see infra
Part III.A.l.b.
183. See generally Allied Local & Reg'! Mfrs. Caucus v. EPA, 215 F.3d 61 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
184. See generally United States v. Deaton, 332 F.3d 698 (4th Cir. 2003); Solid Waste Agency
v. U.S. Army Corps ofEng'rs, 191 F.3d 845 (7th Cir. 1999). Appellate courts have, on the other
hand, adopted narrowing constructions of federal environmental statutes so as to avoid
potential Commerce Clause concerns. See United States v. Wilson, 133 F.3d 251, 254 (4th Cir.
1997) (finding federal wetland regulations to be "unauthorized by the Clean Water Act as
limited by the Commerce Clause").
185. See generally GDF Realty Invs., Ltd. v. Norton, 326 F.3d 622 (5tl1 Cir. 2003); Rancho
Viejo, LLC v. Norton, 323 F.3d 1062 (D.C. Cir. 2003); Gibbs v. Babbitt, 214 F.3d 483 (4th Cir.
2000); Nat'! Ass'n of Home Builders v. Babbitt, 130 F.3d 1041 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
186. See generally Freier v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 303 F.3d 176 (2d Cir. 2002); United
States v. Olin Corp., 107 F.3d 1506 (11th Cir. 1997).
187. See Johnson, supra note 181, at 65 ("[M]ost of the central provisions of the major
federal environmental laws regulate industrial or commercial activity.").
188. 311 F.3d 589 (5th Cir. 2002).
189. See supra notes 92-105 and accompanying text.
190. Ho, 311 F.3d at 602.
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challenges. 191 This phenomenon is not isolated to environmental law.
Federal courts, generally, have been reluctant to apply Lopez and Morrison so
192
as to curtail the reach of federal Commerce Clause authority.
Despite this pattern, it seems likely that some environmental statutes
exceed the scope of the Commerce Clause power delineated in Lopez and
193
Morrison. Most vulnerable are the Endangered Species Act ("ESA")
and
194
portions of the Clean Water Act ("CWA"). Neither the ESA nor the CWA
explicitly regulate commercial activities, as such. Under the ESA, any and all
actlVlt:Ies that harm endangered species, including modest habitat
modification, are potentially subject to federal regulation. Regulation under
the CWA is confined to "navigable waters," which the federal government
has defined to include all waters and wetlands irrespective of their
195
navigability or relationship to interstate commerce.
In each case, the
federal government may have asserted regulatory authority beyond that
autl10rized by the Commerce Clause.
a.

Endangered Species Act

Several circuit courts have considered Commerce Clause challenges to
196
the ESA's prohibition on the "taking" oflisted species on private land. The
Commerce Clause claim has been rejected each time, yet the rationales
adopted. by the courts have varied a great deal and are fundamentally
mutually inconsistent-a point noted by dissenting judges in several circuits.
There is substantial tension between the logic of Lopez and Morrison, on the
one hand, and the appellate holdings in these cases on the other.

191. See generally FD&P Enter., Inc. v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 239 F. Supp. 2d
509 (D.NJ. 2003) (upholding federal wetland regulations); United States v. Domenic Lombardi
Realty, 204 F. Supp. 2d 318 (D.R.I. 2002) (upholding CERCLA); United States v. Red Frame
Parasail, 160 F. Supp. 2d 1048 (D. Ariz. 2001) (upholding the Airborne Hunting Act); United
States v. Glidden Co., 3 F. Supp. 2d 823 (N.D. Ohio 1997) (upholding CERCLA); United States
v. NL Indus., 936 F. Supp. 545 (S.D. Ill. 1996) (upholding CERCLA); Nova Chems., Inc. v. GAF
Corp., 945 F. Supp. 1098 (E.D. Tenn. 1996) (upholding CERCLA). But see United States v. Olin
Corp., 927 F. Supp. 1502, 1532-33 (S.D. Ala. 1996) (invalidating CERCLA for inter alia
exceeding the scope of Congress's Commerce Clause power}, reu'd, 107 F.3d 1506 (llth Cir.
1997).
192. See Reynolds & Denning, supra note 107, at 385-89 (observing tl1at federal courts have
been reluctant to strike down federal statutes on Commerce Clause grounds across the board).
193. 16 u.s.c. §§ 1531-1544 (2000).
194. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2000). The Clean Water Act is formally known as the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act.
195. Federal jurisdiction under the Clean Water Act extends to all "navigable waters,"
defined simply as "waters of the United States." Id. § 1362(7). Regulations issued by the U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers and the Environmental Protection Agency define such waters to
include all interstate waters and wetlands, 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a) (2) (2004), all tributaries and
impoundments of such waters, id. § 328.3(a)(4}, (5), and all waters and wetlands "the use,
degradation, or destruction of which could affect interstate or foreign commerce," id. §
328.3(a) (3) (emphasis added), and wetlands adjacent to such waters, id. § 328.3(a} (7).
196. 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a).
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The first federal appellate court to address the constitutionality of the
ESA's prohibition on "taking" endangered species post-Lopez was the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit in National Ass'n of Home Builders v.
197
Babbitt. A sharply divided court upheld the application of the ESA to the
Delhi Sands flower-loving fly, an endangered insect of negligible commercial
198
value found only in a handful of counties in a single state. The first three
judges to consider the constitutionality of ESA regulations post-Lopez
adopted three different rationales. The two judges in the majority adopted
199
quite different rationales, while the third judge wrote a powerful dissent.
Judge Wald found that taking the endangered fly substantially affected
interstate commerce because -the regulation of such activity "prevents the
destruction of biodiversity and thereby protects the current and future
interstate commerce that relies upon it" and "controls adverse effects of
200
interstate competition." SpeCifically; Judge Wald reasoned that while the
loss of any single species might have a negligible or indeterminate effect on
interstate commerce, the loss of multiple species, in the aggregate, is certain
to have some effect on commerce as biodiversity declines and the natural
201
resource base that it represents dwindles. Additionally, relying upon the
1981 Hodel cases upholding the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation
202
Act, Judge Wald found the ESA take prohibition to be a reasonable
congressional response to concerns that interstate competition for economic
activity would result in a "race-to-the-bottom" and suboptimal levels of
203
environmental protection. Such regulation is constitutional, Judge Wald
found, because "Congress has the power under the Commerce Clause to
prevent destructive interstate commerce similar to that at issue in this
case." 204
Judge Henderson, while concurring in the result in National Ass 'n of
Home Builders, embraced somewhat different rationales for upholding the
application of the ESA's take prohibition to activities threatening the Delhi
fly. Whereas Judge Wald focused on the aggregate impact of species loss on

.197. 130 F.3d 1041 (D.C. Cir. 1997). Prior to the Nat'/ Ass'n of Home Builders case, the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit upheld the Eagle Protection Act against a Commerce
Clause challenge. See generally United States v. Bramble, 103 F.3d 14 75 (9th Cir. 1996).
198. Nat'! Ass'n of Home Builders v. Babbitt, 949 F. Supp. 1, 7-8 (D.D.C. 1996).
199. While Judge Wald claimed to find her "reasoning to be substantially similar" to that of
Judge Henderson's concurrence, Nat'/ Ass'n of Home Builders, 130 F.3d at 1046 n.3, Judge
Henderson wrote she could not "agree entirely with either of Qudge Wald's] grounds for
reaching the result· and instead arrive by a different route." Id. at 1057 (Henderson, ].,
concurring).
200. I d. at 1052. Judge Wald, alone, also found the regulation was a constitutional exercise
of Congress's power to regulate the channels of interstate commerce. !d. at 1046.
201. Id. at 1053, n.14.
202. Hodel v. Virginia, 452 U.S. 264 (1981); Hodel v.lndiana, 452 U.S. 314 (1981).
203. Nat'lAss'n of Home Builders, 130 F.3d at 1054-57.
204. Id. at 1057.
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interstate commerce, Judge Henderson stressed that "the loss of biodiversity
itself has a substantial effect on our ecosystem" and therefore has a
205
substantial effect on interstate commerce. For Judge Henderson, the key
factor was not the aggregate impact of species loss so much as it was the
"interconnectedness of the various species and the ecosystems" and that the
loss of any one species necessarily has broader ecological impacts that will, in
turn, have a ripple effect upon "land and objects that are involve,d in
206
interstate commerce." Judge Henderson also noted that the regulations
themselves, insofar as they regulate economic activity, have a substantial
207
effect on interstate commerce.
Judge Sentelle dissented on the grounds that Congress's power to
regulate interstate commerce cannot extend to those activities-in this case
disturbing the habitat of an intrastate species-that are neither interstate
208
909
N ollng
.
th e . d"IVIswns
. .
nor commerce.
among h"rs co11 eagues,- Ju d ge
Sentelle stressed that the actual regulated activities-killing or otherwise
disturbing flies-was not commercial in nature. 210 He further noted that the
underlying logic of his colleagues' opinions would grant Congress nearunlimited power to regulate any activity that could potentially affect some
item that could conceivably affect land or things involved in interstate
commerce, either alone or in the aggregate, or to adopt any regulation that
would, ·itself, have a substantial effect on commerce. 2ll This sort of power
without limits is precisely the sort of commerce power the Supreme Court
rejected in Lopez.
Mter Morrison, the D.C. Circuit again upheld the ESA's constitutionality
against a Commerce Clause challenge in Rancho Viejo v. Norton, a case

205. ld. at 1058 (Henderson,]., concurring).
206. !d. at 1059 (Henderson, J., concurring); see also EDWARD 0. WILSON, THE DIVERSITY OF
LIFE 308 (1992) (noting the interconnectedness of species within ecosystems); Myrl L. Duncan,
Property as a Public Conversation, Not a Lockean Soliloquy: A Rnle for Intellectual and Legal History in
Takings Analysis, 26 ENVTL. L. 1095, 1129 (1996) ("[S]cientists have rediscovered that the world

cannot meaningfully be broken down into isolated parts, that every part is connected to every
other part."); Johnson, supra note 181, at 81 ("It is a fundamental principle of ecology that
ecosystems are composed of interdependent parts that play vital roles in preserving the
ecosystem.").
.
207. Nat'l Ass'n of Home Builders, 130 F.3d at 1058 (Henderson,].: concurring).
208. ld. at 1061 (Sentelle,J., dissenting).
209. But see id. at 1065 (Sentelle, J., dissenting) (finding Judge Henderson's biodiversity
rationale "indistinguishable in any meaningful way from that ofJudge Wald").
210. ld. at 1064 (Sentelle,J., dissenting).
211. I d. at 1065 (Sentelle, J., dissenting); see also John Copeland Nagle, The Commerce Clause
Meets the Delhi Sands Flower-Loving Fly, 97 MICH. L. REV. 174, 180 (1998) ("If Congress can treat
all endangered species alike and thereby regulate every species despite its lack of any
connection to interstate commerce, then the scope of the Commerce Clause will be truly
unlimited."); id. at 192 ("[T]he aggregation of all endangered species and the reliance upon
the Fly's unknown future effect on interstate commerce become problematic because both
arguments would justifY any federal legislation.").
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involving the Arroyo toad, a species found in parts of Southern California
212
and Mexico. Here the D.C. Circuit settled on the rationale, drawn from
Judge Henderson's concurrence in National Ass'n of Home Builders, that the
regulation was constitutional because the protection of the Arroyo toad itself
"regulates and substantially affects commercial development activity which is
213
plainly interstate."
Specifically, Judge Garland's opinion for the court
noted that the regulated activity in question-"the construction of a 202
acre commercial housing development"-was "plainly an economic
enterprise" and could therefore be regulated despite its intrastate
214
character. Because the ESA take prohibition, as applied to Rancho Viejo's
development activities, "regulates and substantially affects commercial
development activity," the regulation substantially affects commerce, and is
215
therefore constitutional.
A fundamental problem with the D.C. Circuit's analysis in Rancho Viejo is
that it focuses on the economic effect of the government regulation-itself; rather than that of the regulated activity. This suggests that any federal
regulatory statute of broad sweep will be constitutional because of the range
of activity it regulates; the more activity a regulation covers, the more likely it
is that the regulation itself will have an economic impact, even if the
regulated activities are themselves non-economic. In application, this
holding produces the perverse result that more expansive federal regulatory
216
statutes are less constitutionally suspect than those of more modest reach.
The Rancho Viejo analysis is also in severe tension with Lopez. Under the
D.C. Circuit's reasoning, Alfonso Lopez's conviction should have been
upheld under the Gun Free School Zones Act ("GFSZA") as he had brought
212. 323 F.3d 1062, 1065 (D.C. Cir. 2003). As Professor Mank notes, "Morrison and [Solid
Waste Agency v. United States Anny Corps of Engineers] raise[d] additional doubts about whether
Judge Wald and Judge Henderson's opinions are consistent with the Supreme Court's narrow
reading of the Commerce Power and protectiveness toward traditional state authority."
Bradford C. Mank, Protecting Interstate Threatened Species: Does the Endangered Species Act Encroach on
Traditional State Authority and Exceed the Outer. Limits of the Commerce Clause?, 36 GA. L. REv. 723,
760-61 (2002).
213. Rancho Viejo, 323 F.3d. at 1067 (quoting Nat'! Ass'n of Home Builders, 130 F.3d at 1058
(Henderson, J., concurring)). Although adopting this rationale, the Rancho Viejo court sought
"not to discredit" alternative rationales, including that species regulation is substantially related
to interstate commerce because the loss of biodiversity, in itself, has a substantial effect on
commerce. Jd. at 1067 n.2. It is worth noting, however, .that this rationale is drawn almost
exclusively from Judge Henderson's concurring opinion and is not the basis upon which Judge
Wald asserted there was substantial agreement in the panel majority. Nat'lAss'n ofHome Builders,
130 F.3d at 1046 n.3 (Wald, J.) (agreeing with Judge Henderson's statements that "the loss of
biodiversity itself has a substantial effect on our ecosystem and likewise on interstate commerce"
and that federal regulation of land use under the ESA "has a plain and substantial effect on
interstate commerce").
214. Rancho Viejo, 323 F.3d at 1068. ·
215. ld. (quoting Nat'lAss'n ofHomeBuilders, 130 F.3d at 1058 (Henderson,]., concurring)).
216. See Adrian Vermeule, Does Commerce Clause Review Have Perverse Effects?, 46 VILL. L. REV.
1325, 1325 (2001).
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the gun to school as a courier in order to complete a commercial
917
•
L opez ' s possesswn
.
. I yet th e Supreme C ourt
transactiOn.was commerCia,
struck down the statute because the regulated activity-gun possession-was
not and had no more than an attenuated connection to interstate
commerce. As the Court noted, the GFSZA "by its terms has nothing to do
with 'commerce' or any sort of economic enterprise, however broadly one
218
might define those terms," and this was true regardless of whether Lopez
possessed the gun for commercial purposes.
Judge Garland's majority opinion in Rancho Viejo noted that the
undisputed commercial nature of Lopez's gun possession was not
referenced in the Supreme Court's Lopez opinion; and therefore, "the
219
Supreme Court attached no significance to it." That is precisely the point.
The Supreme Court attached no significance to the commercial nature of
the individual activity in question in Lopez when evaluating whether the
GFSZA was a valid exercise of Congress's Commerce Clause power. As noted
in Morrison, the regulated conduct-gun possession in a school zone-was
220
not commercial in character. This was true regardless of the commercial
nature of Alfonso Lopez's specific conduct.
As in Lopez, the actual regulated activities in National Ass'n of Home
Builder~ or Rancho Viejo-the take of a Delhi Sands flower-loving fly and an
Arroyo toad-are non-economic in nature, and it is unclear that such
activities, in themselves, substantially affect commerce. The regulated
conduct is that identified by the federal prohibition-possession of a gun in
a school zone, gender-motivated violence, taking an endangered speciesnot the specific character of the individual activity subject to government
221
sanction in a given case. In other words, it was not Rancho Viejo's decision
to develop property that subjected its actions to the ESA's limitations, but its
alleged take of the Arroyo toad. Non-development-related activity that
threatens Arroyo toads would remain within the Act's explicit prohibition on
unpermitted takes of endangered species. Commercial property
development on land not occupied by Arroyo toads, no matter how large,
costly, or connected to interstate commerce, would not.
The Rancho Viejo court seemed to recognize the nature of the regulated
activity when characterizing the statutes at issue in Lopez and Morrison, but
was unable to remain consistent when assessing the constitutionality of the

217. United States v. Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342, 1345 (5th Cir. 1993).
218. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995) (emphasis added).
219. Rancho Viejo, 323 F.3d at 1072.
220. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 611 (2000).
221. See Rancho Viejo, LLC v. Norton, 334 F.3d 1158, 1159 (2003) (Sentelle, J., dissenting
from denial of rehearing en bane) ("The point of Lopez, as further explained in Morrison, is not
that Congress can regulate any activity if the act of regulating catches an entity or an action that
is itself commercial independent of the noncommercial nature of the regulated entity and
activity.").
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ESA, where the regulated conduct morphs from that controlled by the ESA,
endangered species takes, to Rancho Viejo's commercial construction
222
project. As it is not Rancho Viejo's construction activities that trigger the
applicability of the ESA, but the take of an endangered species, so it is the
latter that is the regulated activity, and it is that activity that should form the
223
basis of the Commerce Clause analysis.
As the Rancho Viejo majority
224
acknowledged, "The ESA regulates takings, not toads." The court could just
as easily have said, "The ESA regulates takings, not commercial activity as
such." That is to say that the ESA, by its express terms, regulates any activity
that results in the take of an endangered species, regardless of whether the
given activity in a given case can be characterized as "commercial." The Act
applies equally to a child who catches an Arroyo toad as a pet as it does to
the commercial developer who wishes to build houses in endangered toad
habitat.
The rationale adopted in Rancho Viejo was considered, and explicitly
225
rejected, by the Fifth Circuit in GDF Realty Investments, Ltd. v. Norton. The
court noted that there is no basis in the Supreme Court's Commerce Clause
jurisprudence, let alone the Clause itself, for holding that Congress may
regulate an activity-the taking of an endangered species-"solely because
non-regulated conduct (here, commercial development) by the actor
engaged in the regulated activity will have some connection to interstate
commerce." 226 Such an approach "would allow application of otherwise
unconstitutional statutes to commercial actors, but not to non-commercial
actors" and would eviscerate any constitutional limit on Congress's authority
to regulate intrastate activities, "so long as those subjected to the regulation
were entities which had an otherwise substantial connection to interstate
227
I t a1so m1sc
. h aractenzes
.
th e nature o f C ongress ' s regu1atory
commerce. "
action. By adopting the ESA, Congress "is not directly regulating commercial
228
development" as such, but rather the taking of species. And, as already

222. See Rancho Viejo, 323 F.3d at 1076 (noting that regulated activity under the Violence
Against Women Act was "gender-motivated violence," and regulated activity in Lopez was
"possession of a gun in a local school zone," but regulated activity under the ESA for purposes
of this case was "a commercial construction project" (internal quotations omitted)).
223. See GDF Realty Invs., Ltd. v. Norton, 326 F.3d 622, 635 (5th Cir. 2003) ("While the take
provision may have prevented the hospital renovations in NAHB or the commercial
developments in the case at hand, ESA does not directly regulate these activities."); see also Stuart
Buck, Salerno vs. Chevron: What to do About Statutory Challenges, 55 ADMIN. L. REV. 427, 454
(2003); Nathaniel S. Stewart, Note, Turning the Commerce Clause on Its Head: Why Federal Commerce
Clause Statutes Demand Facial Challenges, 55 CASE W. RES. L. REV. (forthcoming).
224. Rancho Viejo, 323 F.3d at l 072.
225. 326 F.3d 622 (5th Cir. 2003).
226. I d. at 634.
"227. ld.
228. ld.
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noted, had the Supreme Court adopted such an approach m Lopez, the
229
GFSZA would have been upheld.
The inconsistency between the D.C. and Fifth Circuits' rationales-and
their tension with the Supreme Court's Commerce Clause decisions-was
noted by the dissenters from the denial of rehearing en bane in both Rancho
Viejo230 and GDF Realty. 231 Lopez and Morrison upheld facial challenges to the
statutes in question. Under the Supreme Court's test for facial challenges,
this means there is no set of facts upon which the statutes could have been
232
upheld. The GFSZA would have been no less unconstitutional if Alfonso
Lopez had been a part of a vast interstate gun-dealing ring that happened to
233
sell guns in schools.
Yet the Rancho Viejo court implied, and Judge
Ginsburg's concurrence made explicit, that the holding should be construed
such that Congress may constitutionally regulate the take of endangered
species by commercial developers, such as Rancho Viejo itself, but not by a
solitary homeowner landscaping his own property or a "lone hiker in the
234
woods." This is flatly inconsistent with the Supreme Court's approach in
Lopez.235
The Fifth Circuit's analysis in GDF Realty is not without problems of its
own, however-a point noted by the six judges who dissented from the
denial of en bane review. Rejecting the D.C. Circuit's focus on the economic
impact of the regulation itself and whether the plaintiff itself is engaged in
economic activity, the Fifth Circuit focused on whether the expressly
regulated activity-species takes-has a substantial effect on interstate
236
commerce, either in isolation or in aggregate. Acknowledging that any
relationship between commerce and the several cave-dwelling species at

229. See id. at 635 (arguing that under such an approach "regulation of gun possession near
schools, at issue in Lopez, would arguably pass constitutional muster as applied to a possessor
who was a significant gun salesman; [and t]herefore, § 922(q)(1)(A) could not have been
unconstitutional").
230. Rancho Viejo, LLC v. Norton, 334 F.3d 1158, 1159 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (Sentelle, J.,
dissenting from denial of rehearing en bane); see id. at 1160 (Roberts,]., dissenting from denial
of rehearing en bane) (noting that the panel's approach "seems inconsistent with the Supreme
Court's holdings" in Lopez and Morrison and "conflicts with the opinion of a sister circuit").
231. GDF Realty Invs., Ltd. v. Norton, 362·F.3d 286 (5th Cir.- 2004) (denial of petition for
rehearing en bane).
232. See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987); see also Buck, supra note 223, at
454-55.
233. See Rancho Viejo, 334 F.3d at 1160 (Roberts,]., dissenting from denial of rehearing en
bane).
234. Rancho Viejo, LLC v. Norton, 323 F.3d 1062, 1077 (D.C. Cir. 2003); id. at 1080
(Ginsburg, J., concurring).
235. For this reason, Judge Roberts suggested the court should reconsider sustaining the
constitutionality of the ESA on alternative grounds, such as those adopted by the Fifth Circuit in
GDF Realty. Rancho Viejo, 334 F.3d at 1160 (Roberts,]., dissenting from denial of rehearing en
bane).
236. GDF Realty Invs., Ltd. v. Norton, 326 F.3d 622, 633 (5th Cir. 2003).
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issue in GDF Realty was highly attenuated, the Fifth Circuit focused on the
commercial effect of species takes generally, aggregating the economic
238
effect of all species takes as a class. The court characterized the regulation
of cave-dwelling species as "part of a larger regulation of activity"-species
takes-that Congress could reasonably conclude are economic in nature. 239
Further, the regulation of the cave species is an "essential" part of the overall
regulatory scheme, insofar as the ESA's purpose-the preservation of species
diversity-can only be achieved if its protections extend to all endangered
240
species. On this basis, the Fifth Circuit concluded the "ESA is an economic
regulatory scheme; the regulation of intrastate takes of the Cave Species is
an 1=ssential part of it. Tl1erefore, Cave Species takes may be aggregated with
all other ESA takes." 241
This rationale, while possibly more consistent with Lopez and Morrison
than Rancho Viejo, nonetheless suggests a near unlimited federal authority to
regulate environmental concems under the Commerce Clause. Yet it is an
essential part of Lopez and Morrison that any viable Commerce Clause
242
rationale must have a stopping point. The same reasoning relied upon by
the Rancho Viejo court would justify an omnibus ecosystem protection act
regulating any and all activity with potentially significant ecological
243
impact.
It is, after all, a basic ecological postulate, noted by Judge
Henderson in National Ass'n of Home Building, that all activities have
ecological impacts and that due to such effects and interconnections,
244
everything is connected to everything else.
The same can be said of
economic interrelationships. Small changes in economic conditions, no
matter how small, can ripple through the sea of interrelationships_ and
237. The six species at issue were the Bee Creek Cave harvestman, the Bone Creek
harvestman, the Tooth Cave pseudoscorpion, the Tooth Cave spider, the Tooth Cave ground
beetle, and the Kretschmarr Cave mold beetle. ld. at 625, 638 (noting any relationship between
the Cave Species and scientific travel or research is "far too attenuated to pass muster"; the
possibility of such future effects "is simply too hypothetical and attenuated"; and "Cave species
takes are neither economic nor commerciaL There is no market for them; any future market is
conjecture").
238. I d. at 638.
239. Jd. at 638--39 ("Aside from the economic effects of species loss, it is obvious that the
majority of takes would result from economic activity."). As the en bane dissenters noted,
Congress could have passed a statute prohibiting those engaged in interstate commerce from
"taking" endangered species, but did not do so. GDF Realty Invs., Ltd. v. Norton, 362 F.3d 286,
291 n.4 (5th Cir. 2004) (denial of petition for rehearing en bane). That is not the statute
Congress enacted, however.
240. GDF Realty, 326 F.3d at 639--40 ("[O]ur analysis of the interdependence of species
compels the conclusion that regulated takes under ESA do affect interstate commerce.").
241. ld. at 640.
242. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 564 (1995) ("[I]fwe were to accept the
Government's arguments, we are hard pressed to posit any activity by an individual that
Congress is without power to regulate."); see also Berman, supra note 105, at 1528.
243. See Nagle, supra note 211, at 199.
244. See supra note 206 and accompanying text.
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exchanges that make up the modern economy. Yet this fact did not justify a
245
broader Commerce Clause power under Lopez.
If some economic
relationships-such as that between school safety and education, on the one
46
hand, and future productivity, on the othel -are too attenuated to satisfy
the requirements of the Commerce Clause, similarly attenuated ecological
connections-such as that between the disturbance or even extinction of a
marginal, intrastate species and broader economic impacts-are that much
farther beyond Congress's reach. It is incongruous that threats to nearly
extinct species have a greater relationship to interstate commerce than
247
threats to human life. Yet that is the net result of GDF Realty.
The Commerce Clause does not authorize such an all-encompassing
248
regulatory power. There is no doubt that ecological conditions can affect
commerce substantially and that many (if not most) actiVities that have a
significant ecological impact are motivated by economic considerations.
Such an all-encompassing statute could be viewed as an "economic
regulatory scheme" as easily as the ESA. Regulation of even relatively small,
isolated and intrastate activities would be just as "essential" to the overall
regulatory scheme as the regulation of isolated, intrastate species is to the
ESA. Yet the Commerce Clause does not reach that far.
Although the Fifth Circuit denied the reasoning of its opinion would
"allow Congress to regulate general land use or wildlife preservation," it
offered no rationale for why endangered species regulation is somehow
more commercial or related to interstate commerce. 249 Given the substantial
interstate markets in wildlife and wildlife-related activities, 250 it would seem
245.
246.
247.

See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 557; cf. id. at 616-17 (Breyer,]., dissenting).
See id. at 620 (Breyer,]., dissenting).
This point is made directly in the GDF Realty dissent from denial of rehearing en bane:
Chief Justice Marshall stated in Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 5 L. Ed.
257 (1821), that Congress has no general right to punish murder or felonies
generally. Surely, though, there is more force to an "interdependence" analysis
concerning humans, and thus a more obvious series of links to interstate
commerce, than there is to "species." Yet the panel's "interdependent web" analysis
of the Endangered Species Act gives these subterranean bugs federal protection
that was denied the school children in Lo-pez and the rape victim in Morrison.

GDF Realty Invs., Ltd. v. Norton, 362 F.3d 286, 287 (5th Cir. 2004) (Jones, J., dissenting from
denial of rehearing en bane).
248. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 580 (Kennedy,]., concurring) ("In a sense any conduct in this
interdependent world of ours has an ultimate commercial origin or consequence, but we have
not yet said the commerce power may reach so far.").
249. GDF Realty Invs., Ltd. v. Norton, 326 F.3d 622, 640 (5th Cir. 2003).
250. Justice Stevens noted in Solid Waste Agency v. United States Army Corps ofEngineers:
In 1984, the U.S. Congress Office of Technology Assessment found that, in 1980,
5.3 million Americans hunted migratory birds, spending $638 million. More than
100 million Americans spent almost $14.8 billion in 1980 to watch and photograph
fish and wildlife. Of 17.7 million birdwatchers, 14.3 million took trips in order to
observe, feed, or photograph waterfowl, and 9.5 million took trips specifically to
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that regulation of wildlife preservation generally would fit more easily within
the bounds of the Commerce Clause, post-Lopez, than the regulation of
251
species for which such markets do not exist. If "the link between species
252
loss and a substantial commercial effect is not attenuated," then neither is
the link between the taking commercially valuable, but non-endangered,
wildlife and a substantial commercial effect, nor is the link between
ecological degradation generally and a substantial commercial effect. As in
Rancho Viejo, the logic of the court's opinion either obliterates the limited
nature of Congress's commerce power, or it creates an implicit
environmental exception for the Clause's otherwise justiciable limits.
The opinion of the U.S. Courtof Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in Gibbs
53
v. BabbitC can similarly be read to justify an ecological exception to the
limits of Congress's enumerated power to regulate commerce "among the
several states." From the outset, Judge Wilkinson's majority opinion framed
the question as "whether the national govemment can act to conserve scarce
natural resources of value to our entire country," rather than as whether a
given regulatory measure-in this case the ESA's take prohibition as applied
to experimental populations of red wolves reintroduced into North
254
Carolina-is authorized by the Commerce Clause.
Gibbs held that "the
regulated activity substantially affects interstate commerce and . . . the
regulation is part of a comprehensive federal program," 255 but the decision
also repeatedly emphasized the need for federal environmental regulationto the point of wrongly suggesting that to invalidate the ESA take
prohibition would limit federal species-protection efforts to the
management of federal lands and leave other environmental concerns to
256
state tort law.
On the one hand, Gibbs can be read narrowly, standing only for the
proposition that the prohibition against taking red wolves was within
Congress's Commerce Clause power because red wolves have a substantial

view other water-associated birds, such as herons like those residing at petitioner's
site.
531 U.S. 159, 195 n.17 (2001) (Stevens,]., dissenting) (citations omitted).
251. Nat'! Ass'n of Horne Builders v. Babbitt, 130 F.3d 1041, 1064 (D.C. Cir. 1997)
(Sentelle,J., dissenting).
252. GDF Realty, 326 F.3d at 640.
253. 214 F.3d 483 (4th Cir. 2000).
254. /d. at 486.
255. /d. at 487.
256. /d. at 504, 502. Contrary to Judge Wilkinson's claims, the federal government would
retain authority to directly fund or otherwise encourage species conservation through the
spending power and state environmental regulations would be unaffected by judicial limits on
the federal commerce power. See infra Part V (discussing impact of federalism decisions on
environmental protection).
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257

relationship to interstate commerce. Wolves are the subject of substantial
scientific research and tourism, wolf pelts are a valuable commodity (at least
when trade in pelts is permitted), and the motivation for taking wolves-the
258
protection of livestock-is economic.
On the other hand, Judge
Wilkinson's Gibbs opinion repeatedly suggests that environmental regulation
259
itself necessarily meets the Commerce Clause requirements and that the
260
alternative is to sap "the national ability to safeguard natural resources." It
is certainly true that "the conservation of scarce natural resources is an
261
appropriate and well-recognized area of federal regulation,"
but this
observation does not, by itself, support the conclusion that all such
regulation rs authorized . by the interstate Commerce Clause. The
implications of such a doctrine are far-reaching, even if not acknowledged in
Gibbs. Responding to Judge Luttig's dissent, Judge Wilkinson wrote that the
regulation in question "applies only to a single limited area-endangered
species;" and therefore, the opinion should not be read to grant Congress
262
near-unlimited regulatory authority. This limitation is due to Congress's
failure to adopt a more expansive statute, however, and not any
constitutional limit identified in the Gibbs opinion. Like the Fifth Circuit,
Judge Wilkinson offers no reason why the rationale upon which Gibbs relies
263
would not justify more far-reaching federal regulatory measures.
While there is no doubt that the conservation of endangered species is
an important and popular public policy goal, one can reasonably conclude
that the appellate decisions upholding the ESA's take prohibition as against
Commerce Clause challenges have shied from a strict application of Lopez
264
and Morrison.
This problem· is particularly acute in the context of
257. This is also the approach taken by the en bane dissenters in GDF &alty. See GDF Realty
Invs., Ltd. v. Norton, 362 F.3d 286, 291 (5th Cir. 2004) (dissent from denial of rehearing en
bane) (noting "many £SA-prohibited takings of endangered species may be regulated, and even
aggregated, under Lopez and Morrison because they involve commercial or commercially related
activities like hunting, tourism and scientific research").
258. Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 492-95.
25.9. See, e.g., id. at 496 ("Congress is entitled to make the judgment that conservation is
potentially valuable, even if that value cannot be presently ascertained."); id. ("[I]t is for
Congress to choose between inaction and preservation, not for the courts."); id. at 498
(" [G]iven that Congress has the ability to enact a broad sche.me for the conservation of
endangered species, it is not for the courts to invalidate individual regulations.").
260. !d. at 505. Indeed, Judge Wilkinson specifically criticizes Judge Luttig's dissent for
failing to consider "the national interest in the development of natural resources" as part of his
Commerce Clause analysis. Id.
·
261. Id. at 500.
262. Id. at 503.
263. In this respect the Gibbs opinion implicitly adopts the "political safeguards" approach
to federalism that formed the basis for the Garcia opinion, but which has been explicitly
rejected by the Supreme Court's more recent federalism cases. See Yoo, supra note 68, at 131821.
264. See, e.g., Nagle, supra note 211, at 191 (noting that there are many ways to affirm
federal jurisdiction over endangered species habitats, "[b]ut only if one is willing to abandon
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endangered species because those species that are most endangered are
more likely to subsist in only one state and are least likely to be the objects of
commerce. 265 The rationales set forth by the various courts, while appealing,
are inconsistent with the Supreme Court's stated approach. At a minimum
they suggest that Commerce Clause limitations should be enforced less
stringently in the context of environmental protection. For these decisions
to stand, the Court would either need to identify an additional, and more
compelling, basis for finding such regulations within the bounds of the
Commerce Clause, or else retreat from the essential holdings of Lopez and
Morrison, even if only to create a de facto Commerce Clause exception for
environmental concerns,.
There is some reason to believe the Court might just take such a course.
Justice Kennedy, concurring in Lopez with Justice O'Connor, stressed that
the Court should be sensitive to how a more stringent application of
266
Commerce Clause limitations could upset settled expectations. He further
paid substantial attention to the potential practical effects of suiking down
the GFSZA. 267 While there is reason to believe that the environmental
impacts of judicial curtailment of the federal commerce power would be less
significant than commonly supposed, 268 this argument might not be
sufficient to assuage the concerns of at least some of the justices that have,
thus far, signed onto a reinvigoration of the Commerce Clause. As it would
take only one defector from the Lopez majority to limit the environmental
reach of the Court's current Commerce Clause doctrine, it would be
premature to predict any broader impact on environmental policy,
regardless of the doctrine's underlying force.

b.

Clean Water Act jurisdiction

While the Supreme Court has yet to address the implications of its
modern Commerce Clause jurisprudence on environmental regulation
directly, that jurisprudence has caused the court to curtail federal
jurisdiction under the Clean Water Act by adopting a narrow construction of
269
the statute itsel£.
In Solid Waste Agency '1.!· United States Army Corps of

the Court's insistence in Lopez that an appropriate test for the Commerce Clause cannot justify
federal legislation of everything").
265. ld. at 205 ("The very fact that a species has become endangered maximizes the
likelihood that the species lives in only one state and that there is no commerce in the
species."). Indeed, where species, or products derived therefrom, have substantial commercial
value, there are incentives to propagate and protect the species. See generally WILDLIFE IN THE
MARKETPLACE (Terry L. Anderson & P J. Hill eds., 1995).
266. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 574 (1995) (Kennedy,]., concurring).
267. ld. at 581 (noting that most states already prohibited guns in schools).
268. See infra Part V (discussing impact of federalisn decisions on environmental
protection).
269. 33 u.s.c. §§ 1252-1385 (2000).
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270

Engineers, a regional waste management agency challenged the extension
of federal regulatory authority over land containing permanent and seasonal
ponds. Because the waters in question were isolated, and neither adjacent to
nor hydrologically connected to navigable waters, the Solid Waste Agency of
Northern Cook County ("SWANCC") contended that the land in question
lay beyond the reach of federal regulation. The petitioners pressed their
case on both constitutional and statutory grounds. The Court only reached
the latter, citing federalism concerns-specifically the concern that a broad
interpretation of the CWA would "push the limit of congressional authority"
under the Commerce Clause271-to hold that the Act did not reach isolated,
intrastate waters. The Court refused to adopt a more expansive
interpretation of the Act absent a "clear indication that Congress intended
272
that result. " By resolving the issue on statutory grounds, the Court avoided
the need to address the extent to which Congress could regulate the use of
isolated waters were it to adopt legislation explicitly for that purpose. 273
The impact of Solid Waste Ag1mcy on federal regulation is potentially
274
significant. At the very least the decision frees isolated, intrastate waters
from federal jurisdiction, particularly where the only basis for asserting such
jurisdiction is tl1e actual or potential presence of migratory birds.
Consequently many prairie potholes and other isolated wetlands and waters
will no longer be subject to federal permitting requirements under § 404 of
275
the Clean Water Act. Yet the precise limits Solid Waste Ag1mcy imposed on
federaljurisdiction under the CWA are unclear. In January 2003, the Army
Corps and the EPA issued an advance notice of proposed rulemaking to
276
clarify the scope of regulatory jurisdiction under the CWA. They issued a
270. 531 u.s. 159 (2001).
271. Id. at 173.
272. Id. at 172. In so doing, the Court rejected the argument that the Corps of Engineers'
regulation was due deference under Chevron USA v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837
(1984). Although courts will generally defer to federal agency interpretations of ambiguous
statutory language, the Solid Waste Agency majority found such deference to be inappropriate
"where the administrative interpretation alters the federal-state framework by permitting
federal encroachment upon a traditional state power." 531 U.S. at 173.
273. The dissent, on the other hand, did address the Commerce Clause issue and found
the regulations in question to lie well within the outer limits of federal Commerce Clause .
authority. Solid Waste Agency, 531 U.S. at 181-82 (Stevens,]., dissenting).
274. See Bradford C. Mank, The Murky Future of the Clean Water Act after SWANCC: Using a
Hydrological Connection Appmach to Saving the Clean Water Act, 30 ECOLOGY L.Q. 811, 884 (2003)
{noting that Solid Waste Ag11ncy requires a "significant nexus;" and therefore, not just "any"
hydrological connection will suffice to establish federal jurisdiction under the CWA); Lance D.
Wood, Don't Be Misled: CWA jurisdiction Extends to All Non-Navigable Tributaries of the Traditional
Navigable Waters and to Their Adjacent Wetlands, 34 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,187, 10,189, 10,195 (2004)
(noting "potentially disastrous" and "catastrophic" effects of some potential interpretations of
Solid Waste Agency).
275. 33 u.s.c. § 1344 (2000).
276. Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on the Clean Water Act Regulatory
Definition of "Waters of the United States," 68 Fed. Reg. 1991 (Jan. 15, 2003).
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joint memorandum containing advance notice prohibiting the assertion of
regulatory jurisdiction over isolated waters based upon the presence of
277
migratory birds.
This announcement came under heavy criticism from
environmental organizations, which asserted that no rulemaking on the
278
extent of CWA jurisdiction was necessary.
In December 2003, the Army
Corps and EPA announced they would not issue a new rulemaking. 279 In the
meantime, there has been substantial uncertainty as to the current scope of
280
federal regulatory jurisdiction under the CWA. A study by the General
Accounting Office found that Army Corps district offices' jurisdictional
determinations have varied significantly since Solid Waste Agency. 281
Due to Solid, Waste Agency's ambiguous reach, a circuit split over the
meaning of the case rapidly emerged. Several circuits, including the Fourth,
282 .
283
284
.
SIXth, and Seventh, have read Solzd Waste Agency narrowly to preclude
only federal regulation of.isolated, intrastate, non-navigable waters. This-is
also the view adopted by the EPA and the Army Corps of Engineers. 285 The

277. ld. at 1995 app. A.
278. U.S. GAO, WATERS AND WETLANDS: CORPS OF ENGINEERS NEEDS TO EVALUATE ITS
DISTRICT OFFICE PRACTICES IN DETERMINING JURISDICTION 14 (2004) [hereinafter GAO,
Wetlands]. The GAO further reported that 99% of the comments received by EPA and the Army
Corps opposed a new rulemaking on CWAjurisdiction. ld.
279. See Eric Pianin, EPA Scraps Changes To Clean Water Act; Plans Would Have Reduced
Protection, WASH. POST, Dec. 17, 2003, at A20. One reason given by the Army Corps and EPA to
forego the rulemaking was that federal courts had narrowly interpreted Solid Waste Agency's
impact. Ironically, on the same day as the Army Corps/EPA announcement, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that such narrow interpretations of Solid Wll.)"te Agenry were
"unsustainable." Daniel Simmons, Navigating SWANCC: An Examination of the U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers' Authority Under the Clean Water Act, 34 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,723, 10,730 (2004) (citing In re
Needham, 354 F.3d 340, 345 (5th Cir. 2003)).
280. See, e.g., Federal Authority to Requi-re Wetland Dumping Permits: Hearing on H.R 5194 Before
the House Comm. on Energy Poliry, Natural Resources and Regulatory Affairs (2002) (statement of
Patrick Parenteau, Professor of Law, Vermou't Law School) ('The decision has created
substantial uncertainty regarding the geographic jurisdiction of the Clean Water Act."); PAT
PARENTEAU, AsS'N OF STATE WETLAND MANAGERS, POSITION PAPER ON CLEAN WATER AG'T
JURISDICTION DETERMINATIONS PURSUANT TO TI;IE SUPREME COURT'S JAN. 9, 2001 DECISION,
SOLID WASTE AGENCY OF NORTHERN COOK COUNTY V: U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG'R.S (2001) ("The
section 404 regulatory program has been in turmoil ever since the Supreme Court's SWANCC
decision."); Wood, supra note 274, at 10,189 (noting that Solid Waste Agenry was "ambiguous"
and courts have been "inconsistent" in their interpretations of the decision).
281. GAO, Wetlands, supra note 278, at 3 ("Corps districts differ in how they interpret and
apply the federal regulations when determining what wetlands and other waters fall within the
jurisdiction of the federal government.").
282. See United States v. Deaton, 332 F.3d 698, 709-12 (4th Cir. 2003).
283. See United States v. Rapanos, 339 F.3d 447, 453 (6th Cir. 2003).
284. See United States v. Rueth Dev. Co., 335 F.3d 598, 604-05 (7th Cir. 2003).
285. See Memorandum from Gary S. Guzy, General Counsel, U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency, & Robert M. Andersen, Chief Counsel, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, to the Assistant
Administrator for Water and Others, Supreme Court Ruling Concerning CWAJurisdiction over
Isolated Waters Qan. 19, 2001) (on file with the Iowa Law Review); see also Wood, supra note
274.
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Fifth Circuit, on the other hand, has read Solid Waste Agency more broadly to
exclude waters that are neither navigable themselves nor adjacent to
286
Specifically, in the Fifth Circuit, federal jurisdiction
navigable waters.
under the CWA does not extend to wetlands, "puddles, sewers, roadside
ditches and the like," if such waters are not truly adjacent to navigable
287
waters. According to the Fifth Circuit, the interpretation adopted by the
other circuits "is unsustainable under [Solid Waste Agency]" as the CWA is
"not so broad as to permit the federal government to impose regulations
over 'tributaries' that are neither themselves navigable nor truly adjacent to
. bl e waters. ,288
naVIga
While it is too early to evaluate the full impact of Solid Waste Agency on
federal regulatory jurisdiction, some things are clear. Solid Waste Agency
reaffirms the principle that "where a statute is susceptible of two
constructions, by one of which· grave and doubtful constitutional questions
arise," such as whether Congress can regulate a given activity under the
Commerce Clause, "and by the other of which such questions are avoided,"
289
a court's "duty is to adopt the latter."
Whereas courts once adopted
expansive interpretations offederaljurisdiction so as to effectuate the broad
purposes of federal environmental statutes, now such laws are to be
construed in a narrower fashion. Applying Solid Waste Agency to statutes that
contain a jurisdictional element-such as a requirement that the specific
activity to be regulated substantially affect interstate commerce-should
result in narrowing the scope of such statutes without questioning their
constitutionality. An explicit jurisdictional requirement can expressly limit a
statute's reach to those activities clearly within Congress's authority, thereby
insulating a statute from a potential Commerce Clause challenge.
c.

Summary

Congress retains substantial Commerce Clause authority to regulate
economic activities and their environmental impacts. Recent precedents do
not undermine federal statutes that explicitly regulate commercial or
iiJ.dustrial activity, such as mining or asbestos removal, as such. While the
logic of Lopez and Morrison suggests limitations on Congress's ability to
authorize the regulation of non-economic activity an~ the environmental
impacts of such activity, lower courts have not been eager to enforce such

286. See In re Needham, 354 F.3d 340, 345-46 (5th Cir. 2003); Rice v. Harken Exploration
Co., 250 F.3d 264, 272 (5th Cir. 2001). Although Needham and Rice specifically address the scope
of federal regulation over "waters of the United States" under the Oil Pollution Act, both
decisions note that federal jurisdiction und~r the OPA was intended to be coextensive with that
under the Clean Water Act Needham, 354 F.3d at 344; Rice, 250 F.3d at 267.
287. Needham, 354 F.3d at 345.
288. Id. Some government officials and commentators dismiss this language as dicta. See,
e.g., Wood, supra note 274, at 10,188.
289. Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848, 858 (2000).
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limits. There is no indication that the Commerce Clause opinions will be
read to curtail federal ability to regulate documented interstate
environmental impacts, such as pollution spillovers. The Commerce Clause
opinions have resulted in a narrowing of Clean Water Act jurisdiction,
however, and may result in similar narrowing interpretations of other
federal statutes with commerce-based jurisdictional requirements-though
few environmental statutes fall into this category. This would result in the
exclusion of some non·economic, intrastate activity from congressional
regulation, but is unlikely to impact efforts to directly regulate the
environmental impacts of industrial and commercial activity, as such.
2.

Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment

Judicial limits on the scope of Congress's power under section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment have had no impact on existing environmental
regulation and should not have much impact in the future. To date,
Congress has not relied upon section 5 as the constitutional basis for any
significant environmental legislation. Environmental laws are generally not
conceived as efforts to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment's equal
protection and due process guarantees. Yet even if Congress was to adopt
environmental laws predicated on the section 5 power, the substantive
limitations on this power articulated in Boerne and subsequent cases could
well constrain future efforts to enact federal environmental legislation
pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment, including efforts to abrogate state
sovereign immunity. Boerne and its progeny make the Fourteenth
Amendment an unsuitable home for existing environmental measures. 290
Perhaps the greatest potential impact of the narrowing of Congress's
section 5 power is that Congress could be less able to adopt legislation to
address "environmental justice" concerns, such as allegations that pollution
and environmentally damaging actiVIties disproportionately affect
291
communities of color.
No private plaintiff has brought a successful
290. It is possible that section 5 power could 'be used to authorize federal legislation
prohibiting state.created nuisances, as such actions could be conceived as either a deprivation
of property without due process or a taking of private property without just compensation. See
McAllister & Glicksman, supra note 173, at 10,675. While the .latter prohibition is found in the
Fifth Amendment, it is enforceable against the states via the Fourteenth. Chicago, Burlington &
Quincy R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 238-39 (1896).
291. See generally UNEQUAL PROTECTION: ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE AND COMMUNITIES OF
COLOR (Robert D. Bullard ed., 1994); Regina Austin & Michael Schill, Black, Brown, Poor and
Poisoned: Minority Grassroots Environmentalism and the Quest for Eco-]ustice, 1 KAN.J.L. & PUB. PoL'Y,
69 (1991); Robert D. Bullard, The Legacy of American Apartheid and Environmental Rncism, 9 ST.
JOHN'S]. LEGAL COMMENT. 445 (1994); Robert D. Bullard, The Threat of Environmental Rncism, 7
NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 23 (1993); Luke W. Cole, Empowerment as the Key to Environmental
Protection: The Need for Environmental Poverty Law, 19 ECOLOGY L.Q. 619 (1992). Note that the
claims are hotly contested. Vicki Been, What:r Fairness Got to Do With It?: Environmental justice and
the Siting of Locally Undesirable Land Uses, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 1001, 1009-15 (1993); Vicki Been
& Francis Gupta, Coming to the Nuisance or Going to the Barrios? A Longitudinal Analysis of
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environmental justice claim under the Fourteenth Amendment, as it is
292
exceedingly difficult to demonstrate discriminatory intent.
Prior to the
Supreme Court's recent federalism cases-and parallel cases limiting private
93
causes of action under Title VI of the Civil Rights Ace -it was conceivable
that Congress, or perhaps even a federal agency, could adopt environmental
justice measures under the Fourteenth Amendment. For example, Congress
could have prohibited state facility siting and environmental permitting
decisions that have a disproportionate harm on minority communities or
that exacerbate existing imbalances in the environmental burden of
industrial development. The Supreme Court does not recognize the
disparate impact of a government action on minority communities, in itself,
as a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection guarantee,
however. 294 For this reason, the Court would likely strike down such
legislation as in excess of Congress's section 5 power.
Insofar as section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment provides the only
enumerated power authorizing Congress to abrogate state sovereign
immunity, judicially enforced limits on the section 5 power will curtail
·Congress's ability to subject states to suits for environmental violations. 295 It
is possible that only those environmental violations, or actions taken on
environmentally related matters, that could themselves be construed as
violatiol).s of tights protected by the Fourteentl1 Amendment itself could be
subject to such suits. Although Congress may adopt prophylactic legislation
to prevent potential Fourteenili Amendment violations by state actors,
under Boerne such measures must be proportional and congruent.
B.

STATE SOVEREIGNTY

Whereas limits on Congress's enumerated powers constrain Congress's
ability to regulate certain types of environmental harms, the Supreme
Court's state sovereignty decisions largely affect the means Congress may use
to address specific environmental concerns. At one level, iliese restrictions
are significant in that they represent strict prohibitions against the adoption
of certain types of environmental measures. On the other hand, the formal ·
nature of these rules makes it easier for Congress to adopt alternative means
of addressing a given environmental concern. Whereas a Supreme Court
decision substantially curtailing Congress's commerce· power could leave

Environmental justice Claims, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 34-35 (1997); Thomas Lambert & Christopher
Boerner, Environmental Inequity: Economic Causes, Economic Solutions, 14 YAL,Ej. ON REG. 195, 195-

212 (1997).
292. See Craig Anthony Arnold, Planning Milagros: Environmental Justice & Land-Use
Regulation, 76 DENV. U. L. REv. 1, 51 (1998).
293. See generally Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (200 I).
294. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 238-39 (1976); Hernandez v. New York, 500
u.s. 352,360 (1991).
295. See infra notes 363-64 and accompanying text.
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certain activities completely beyond Congress's regulatory reach, there are
relatively few environmental programs that are threatened by the Court's
recent efforts to protect state sovereignty against federal encroachment.
1.

Commandeering

The potential commandeering of state government officials by federal
environmental regulation is not new. In the 1970s, the EPA directed states to
295
adopt specific air pollution control measures under the Clean Air Act. The
EPA maintained that it could obtain ll1JUnctive relief ordering
uncooperative state officials to adopt a particular type of vehicle emission
297
inspection program and other emission control measures. This claim was
298
. generally rejected in the ~ourts of appeals, however. The courts ultimately
relied on statvtory language to reject the EPA's claims, but noted the serious
299
constitutional questioo.s about the EPA's position. In particular, the courts
separated federal efforts to control pollution from industrial sources that
impact state-run facilities from federal efforts to directly conscript state
officers in the administration of a federal program. As the D.C. Circuit
noted, the EPA was "attempting to commandeer the regulatory powers of
tl1e states, along with their personnel and resources, for use in administering
and enforcing a federal regulatory program against the owners of motor
300
vehicles. " Upholding such an assertion of federal regulatory authority, the
Ninth Circuit noted, would have endorsed "[a] Commerce Clause power so
expanded [that it] would reduce the states to puppets of a ventriloquist
301
Congress."
Such a power "would enable Congress to control ever
increasing portions of the states' budgets. The pattern of expenditl.lres
would increasingly become a congressional responsibility." 302

296. See, e.g., Maryland v. EPA, 530 F.2d 215, 218 (4th Cir. 1975), vacated sub nom. EPA v.
Brown, 431 U.S. 99 (1977); District of Columbia v. Train, 521 F.2d 971, 977 (D.C. Cir. 1975),
vacated sub nom. EPA v. Brown, 431 U.S. 99 (1977); Brown v. EPA, 521 F.2d 827, 829 (9th Cir.
1975), vacated, 431 U.S. 99 (1977).
297. Brown, 521 F.2d at 831.
298. Maryland, 530 F.2d 2-15; Train, 521 F.2d at 971; Brown, 521 F.2d at 827. A fourth federal
appellate court found in favor of the EPA Pennsylvania v. EPA, 500 F.2d 246, 246-47 (3d Cir.
1974).
299. Brown, 431 U.S. at 102 ("AJI of the courts rested on statutory interpretation, but noted
also that serious constitutional questions might be raised if the statute were read as the United
States argued it should be.").
300. Train, 521 F.2d at 993.
301. Brown, 521 F.2d at 839.
302. Id. at 840. The Ninth Circuit further made clear that its holding clid not limit the
federal government's ability to induce state cooperation, such as through the spending power,
or to preempt state pollution control Jaws with more stringent federally enforced requirements.
Id.; see also Maryland, 530 F.2d at 228 ("Inviting Maryland to administer the regulations, and
compelling her to do so under threat of injunctive and criminal sanctions, are two entirely
different propositions."); Train, 521 F.2d at 989 (reaffirming federal power to preempt
inconsistent state regulations).
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The Supreme Court accepted petitions for certiorari to consider
whether the EPA could constitutionally commandeer state regulatory
officials pursuant to the Clean Air Act. Yet before the Court ruled on the
question, the federal government acknowledged that its regulations were
303
invalid and the decisions were vacated.
There is little doubt that if the
cases were litigated today, the EPA's effort to conscript state and local
officials would constitute unconstitutional commandeering.
The Supreme Court next considered · the constitutional limits on
commandeering in New York v. United States, 304 a challenge to the Low Level
Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act in which the Court dearly
articulated the anti-commandeering principle. Since New York, state and
local governments have raised Tenth Amendment claims with some
frequency. Although New York is the principal commandeering case, and it
.concerned environmental matters, the anti-commandeering principle it r
announced has had a minimal effect on federal environmental regulation.
The federal government rarely issues direct commands requiring state and
local government officials to implement federal regulatory programs.
Rather, state cooperation with and participation in federal regulatory efforts
is induced through promises of funding and threats of preemptionmeasures that the Court explicitly endorsed in New York. Such measures may
place substantial pressure on state and local officials to follow the federal
government's lead in environmental policy, but they are not, in themselves,
commandeering. 305 For this reason, most commandeering-based challenges
to environmental regulations have failed.
Since New York, there have been only two successful commandeering
claims brought against federal environmental regulations, both involving _
306
exceedingly peripheral federal regu1ations.
In 1993, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit invalidated provisions of the Forest Resources
Conservation and Shortage Relief Act ("FRCSRA"). 307 This law sought to
limit the export of unprocessed logs from forests in the western United
.States. 308 Yet rather than impose direct restrictions on timber exports, the
FRCSRA ordered states to adopt their own regulations restricting exports. In

303. Brown, 431 U.S. at 103-04.
304. 505 U.S. 144 (1992). During the intervening years, the Court considered Tenth
Amendment-based challenges to several federal statutes, but it did not directly address the
commandeering question. See, e.g., Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742,
743 (1982); Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Recreation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 265 (1981); see also
supra Part II.B.
305. But see infra Part IV.
306. See Ass'n of Cmty. Orgs. for Reform Now v. Edwards, 81 F.3d 1387, 1387 (5th Cir.
1996); Bd. of Natural Res. v. Brown, 992 F.2d 937, 938 (9th Cir. 1993). These decisions are
discussed in greater detail in Adler, supra note 45, at 609-12.
307. Brown, 992 F.2d at 938.
308. The FRCSRA's export restrictions only applied to government lands in the continental
United States west of the lOOth meridian. 16 U.S.C. § 620c (2000); see Brown, 992 F.2d at 941.
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Board of Natural Resources v. Bmwn, the Ninth Circuit held that these
provisions were "direct commands to the states to regulate according to
Congress's
instructions"
and
thus
constituted
unconstitutional
309
commandeering under New York.
Brown did not have a significant impact, environmental or otherwise.
Following the Ninth Circuit's decision, Congress amended the FRCSRA to
require the Secretary of Commerce to issue federal regulations directly
310
limiting the export of unprocessed logs.
Even if Congress had not
responded to Brown in this manner, the environmental effect would have
been minimal. While styled as a "conservation" measure, it is doubtful that
311
Congress enacted FRCSRA to conserve western state forests. Rather, the
FRCSRA's export provisions appear designed to protect domestic lumber
mills from foreign competition. By restricting the export of unprocessed
logs, the FRCSRA effectively mandated that local timber be processed in
local mills, even if the timber were bound for foreign markets and overseas
mills were more efficient. 312
In 1996, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit invalidated
another rather minor federal environmental provision on anticommandeering grounds. 313 The Lead Contamination Control Act
("LCCA") 314 required each state to "establish a program ... to assist local
educational agencies in testing for, and remedying, lead contamination in
315
· drinking water. " The Fifth Circuit held that this provision fell "squarely
within the ambit of New York" and was therefore unconstitutional. 316 If
Congress sought to ensure the regulation of potential lead contamination in
school water coolers, it would have to adopt legislation implementing such a

309. See Brown, 992 F.2d at 947. At the same time, the Ninth Circuit rejected claims that the
FRCSRA '~alated the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment and federal obligations to
srate land grant trusts. ld. at 942-46.
310. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 620c-620d.
311. For this reason, some may object to the characterization of Brown as an en~ronmental
case. See Percival, supra note 4, at 841 (stating that only one federal en~ronmental statute has
been successfully challenged on commandeering grounds).
312. The FRCSRA may be a particularly ob~ous example of ostensibly "en~ronmental"
legislation adopted primarily for the benefit of economic interests, but it is hardly unique. See
generally Jonathan H. Adler, Clean Politics, Dirty Profits: Rent-Seeking Behind the Green Curtain, in
POLITICAL ENVIRONMENTALISM: GOING BEHIND THE GREEN CURTAIN (Terry L. Anderson ed.,
2000) ; Todd J. Zywicki, Environmental Exte-rnalities and Political Externalities: The Political Economy of
Environmental Regulation and Reform, 73 TUL. L. REV. 845 ( 1999).
313. Ass'n ofCmty. Orgs. for Reform Nowv. Edwards, 81 F.3d 1387,1387 (5th Cir.1996).
314. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300j-21 to -26 (2000).
315. ld. § 300j-24(d).
316. Ass'n of Omty. Orgs. for Reform Now, 81 F.3d at 1394 ("Because § 300j-24(d) deprives
States of the option to decline regulating non-lead free drinking water coolers, we ... conclude
that § 300j-24(d) is an unconstitutional intrusion upon the States' sovereign prerogative to
legislate as it sees fit.").
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program at the federal level, or else provide states with a financial or other
.
. to a d opt sue h programs th emse Ives. 317
mcent:J.ve
All other commandeering challenges to federal environmental laws
318
In 1997, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
have failed.
questioned the constitUtionality of a CERCLA provision setting a "federally
required commencement date" ("FRCD") for the running of the applicable
state statute of limitations goveming personal injury claims arising from the
319
improper storage or disposal of hazardous wastes. Although not deciding
the question, in dicta, the court observed that the CERCLA provision was of
"questionable constitutionality" because it "appears to purport to change
state law" and might therefore violate anti-commandeering principles. 320 In a
subsequent case, however, this claim was raised and rejected. 321 The FRCD
does not conscript the state legislature or executive officials to implement a
322
federal regulatory program.
Rather, it simply requires state courts to
recognize that state-law toxic tort claims do not accrue before a plaintiff
323
knows, or reasonably should know, of her injury.
This is a "modest
requirement that is squarely within Congress's long established powers
under the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution. "324
While the FRCSRA and the LCCA are the only federal environmental
statutes to be successfully challenged on commandeering grounds since New
317. The Ass'n of Cmty. Orgs. for Reform Now decision also addressed an LCCA provision
requiring states to disseminate information about potential lead contamination in water
coolers. 81 F.3d at 1390-92; 42 U.S.C. § 300j-24(c). The court did not assess the
constitutionality of this provision, however, as it determined that the state had effectively
complied with this provision. Ass'n of Cmty. Orgs. for Reform Now, 81 F.3d at 1392. Even though
the requirement of this provision was largely ministerial, it would likely have been judged
equally unconstitutional had the court had cause to reach the issue.
318. See, e.g., City of Abilene v. EPA, 325 F.3d 657, 657-58 (5th Cir. 2003) (rejecting a
Tenth Amendment challenge to conditions placed on storm water discharge permits); Envtl.
Def. Ctr. v. EPA, 319 F.3d 398, 409 (9th Cir. 2003) (rejecting a Tenth Amendment challenge to
permitting requirements of small municipal storm sewer discharges); Virginia v. Browner, 80
F. 3d 869, 882-91 (4th Cir. 1996) (rejecting a Tenth Amendment challenge to Clean Air Act
.!:I'!.Qu.irements for state implementation plans); Sweat v. Hull, 200 F. Supp. 2d 1162, 177-80 (D.
Ariz. 2001) (rejecting a Tenth Amendment defense of a state's unilateral decision to terminate
pollution controls provided for in state implementation plans under the Clean Air Act);
Missouri v. United States, 918 F. Supp. 1320, 1337 (E.D. Mo. 1996) (rejecting a Tenth
Amendment challenge to Clean Air Act requirements for state implementation plans); see also
Percival, supra note 4, at 841 ("[C]ourts have had little difficulty rejecting state claims of
commandeering when federal regulatory programs are challenged.").
319. ABB Indus. Sys., Inc. v. Prime Tech., Inc., 120 F.3d 351, 360 n.S (2d Cir. 1997).
320. !d.
321. Freier v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 303 F.3d 176, 178 (2d Cir. 2002).
322. !d. at 204.
323. !d.
324. !d. The anti-commandeering principle generally does not apply to state judiciaries.
Rather, as the Supreme Court held in New York, "tl1is sort of federal 'direction' of state judges is
mandated by the text of the Supremacy Clause." New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 17879 (1992); see also Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 394 (1947).
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York, there are a handful of other environmental provisions that appear to
be quite vulnerable to similar challenges. Dissenting in Printz, Justice Stevens
identified sections of two environmental laws that mandate state
325
participation in federal regulatory schemes. In addition, the interpretation
of federal environmental statutes to impose affirmative regulatory
326
obligations on states could also raise commandeering concerris.
In this context, the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know
327
Act ("EPCRA")
is perhaps the most vulnerable federal environmental
32
statute. ~,This law is designed to inform local communities about the use,
storage, and disposal of various chemical substances and potentially
hazardous materials! as well as to ensure that local governments engage in
emergency planning to reduce the environmental risks that such materials
and industrial facilities may pose to local communities. Unlike most federal
environmental statutes that enlist state and local governments, however,
EPCRA does not follow the cooperative federalism model. Rather, it
explicitly commands each state's governor to create a "state emergency
response commission" and then imposes a series of duties upon such
comm1sswns, including the creation of local emergency planning
committees and the development of emergency response plans. 329 These
requirements contravene the principle that "[t]he Federal Government may
neither issue directives requiring the States to address particular problems,
nor command the States' officers, or those of their political subdivisions, to
. .
a d mm1ster
or en£orce a £e d era1 regu1atory program. ,330
In 1986, Congress added provisions to the underground storage tank
("UST") provisions of the federal Resource Conservation and Recoyery Act
of 1976 ("RCRA"). 331 These provisions are also vulnerable to challenge.
Whereas most of the RCRA, including the bulk of the UST provisions, adopt
a traditional cooperative federalism model, the 1986 amendments dictate to
the states. Specifically, they include a provision requiring every state to
develop inventories "of all underground storage tanks. . . containing
332
regulated substances"
and to submit these inventories to the federal
333
EPA.
Unlike the other requirements, of state UST programs, these
325. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 955 (1997) (Stevens,]., dissenting).
326. See infra notes 337-46 and accompanying text.
327. 42 u.s.c. § 11001 (2000).
328. See generally Nicholas J. Johnson, EPCRA s Collision with Federalism, 27 IND. L. REV. 549
(1994).
329. See42 U.S.C. §§ 11001(a)-(c), 11003 (e), 11022(a), 11022(e)(3).
330. Printz, 521 U.S. at 935. See also Johnson, supra note 328, at 563 ("It is difficult to avoid
the conclusion that the commission and the committees are state regulatory agencies.").
331. 42 u.s.c. §§ 6901-6902 (2000).
332. Id. § 6991a(c).
333. ld. Owners of USTs are further required to submit information to the state or local
agencies designated by the state's governor to receive such information. See id. § 6991a(a) (1),
(b) (1).
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334

provisions are not discretionary. Because they commandeer state officials
to implement federal regulatory requirements, they are unconstitutional.
Without a doubt, the relevant EPCRA provisions and RCRA's UST
inventory requirement impose no more than an incidental burden upon
state governments-and therefore it is unlikely mat a state will challenge
335
either provision in federal court.
Yet the relative unobtrusiveness of a
federal requirement does not insulate a federal provision from the anticommandeering principle. The Printz majority held that "no case-by-case
weighing of the burdens or benefits is necessary" when adjudging the
constitutionality of a federal command to a state government as it struck
336
down the background check provisions of the Brady Act. This does not bar
Congress from pursuing these policy objectives, however. As with the
provisions struck down in Ass 'n of Community Organizations for Reform Now and
Brown, it would be relatively easy for Congress to amend the relevant statutes
to achieve the same objectives, either by mandating direct federal regulation
or providing incentives for state cooperation.
In some circumstances, the application of the Endangered Species Act
("ESA") to state regulatory programs may also be vulnerable to challenge on
commandeering grounds, particularly insofar as the ESA is read to impose
affirmative regulatory obligations on state agencies. In Stmhan v. Coxe, a
federal · district court issued an injunction requiring the State of
Massachusetts to regulate gillnet and lobster pot fishing in state waters so as
337
to prevent the incidental taking of an endangered species.
The court
accepted the plaintiff's claim that the state's licensing of gillnet and lobster
pot fishing resulted in illegal "takes" of Northem Right whales in violation of
the ESA. According to the court, insofar as the state exercised "control over
the use of gillnets and lobster gear in Massachusetts waters," it could be
338
liable for the taking of whales by private fishers with state-issued licenses.

334: See id. § 6991c. The elements of an authorized state UST program are listed in §
6991c(a). ·If a state does not adopt its own UST program in accordance with federal
requirements, the EPA will regulate USTs within the state directly under § 6991b. The
notification requirement, however, is in§ 6991a(c).
335. Indeed, there have been no challenges to these provision,s in the years since Justice
Stevens and some academic commentators commented upon the constitutional vulnerability of
these provisions. See Printz, 521 U.S. at 955 (Stevens,]., dissenting); see also Adler, supra note 45,
at 613-16; Johnson, supra note 328, at 55. The burden fmposed by the background-check
requirement at issue in Printz was also relatively minimal, but was nonetheless subject to
numerous challenges prior to the Printz decision, perhaps because the underlying subject
matter-gun control-is more controversial than certain forms of environmental regulation.
336. Printz, 521 U.S. at 935. But see id. at 936 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("(T]he Court
appropriately refrains from deciding whether other purely ministerial reporting requirements
imposed by Congress on state and local authorities pursuant to its Commerce Clause powers are
similarly invalid.").
337. 939 F. Supp. 963, 992 (D. Mass. 1996).
338. Id. at 980.
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On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit upheld the
339
injunction against a federalism challenge. Although this order could be
viewed as requiring state regulatory officials to enforce a federal
regulation-the prohibition on taking endangered species-the lower
court's ruling did "not impose positive obligations on the [state] by
converting its regulation of commercial fishing operations into a tool of the
340
federal ESA regulatory scheme." Rather, the court was merely preventing
the state from allegedly taking endangered whales-albeit indirectly-by
licensing fishing activities that entail an inevitable risk of such taking.
The First Circuit's ruling is only plausible insofar as a state can be held
liable for taking an endangered species because it licenses (or refuses to
prohibit) activity that could result in a take of endangered species-activity
which is itself illegal under the ESA insofar as it results in the take of listed
341
species. In effect, Strahan holds that states have an obligation. to. administer
state regulatory programs so as to implement the federal ESA, even though
the activities to be regulated are 'themselves already illegal under federal law.
This seems to contravene the holding of New York that "even where Congress
has the authority under the Constitution to pass laws requiring or
prohibiting certain acts, it lacks the power directly to compel the States to
. or pro h"b"
reqmre
1 1t th ose acts. ,342
·
The First Circuit characterized the state's decision to issue licenses as a
cause of illegal takes because the state licenses allowed the fishing to occur.
Yet this presumes that absent a state-licensing scheme there would be no
illegal takes from gillnet and lobster pot fishing. Precisely the opposite is the
case. Were there no state licensing regime for gillnet and lobsterpot fishing,
such activities could occur, at least within state waters. Therefore, the
licensing of such activities should not be viewed as even a "but for" cause of
the endangered species takes. Insofar as fishing activities threaten Northern
Right whales, those activities are themselves illegal under the ESA and
subject to federal enforcement. It is not clear upon what basis the legal
obligation to enforce such a prohibition can be transposed onto a state
merely because it elects to adopt a licensing scheme for state waters. If the
state refrained from regulating gillnet and lobsterpot fishing altogether, the
only way to mandate state enforcement of an anti-take prohibition would be
to commandeer state officials.
The First Circuit rejected these federalism concerns on several grounds,
none of which are particularly convincing.. First, as noted above, the court
maintained that the state itself violated the take prohibition by issuing
licenses to activities that posted an inherent risk of taking endangered

339.
340.
341.
342.

Strahan v. Coxe, 127 F.3d 155, 166, 171 (1st Cir. 1997).
Id. at 164.
See 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a) (2000).
New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 166 (1992).
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species. Second, the court suggested that the holding was justified by the
Supremacy Clause and the undisputed federal power to preempt conflicting
343
state laws. Yet in this case state law was not preempted-that is, federal law
did not displace state law by imposing different standards upon the
regulated entities. Rather it acted directly upon the state entity itself in its
sovereign capacity as the regulator of state waters. The court correctly noted
that Congress may offer states the choice of regulating a given activity in
conformity with federal wishes or preempt state regulation with federal
344
rules.
Yet here the state was given no such choice. The district court
injunction specifically required Massachusetts to bring its state regulations
into conformity with federal law, and the federal take prohibition remains
applicable to gillnet and lobsterpot fishers irrespective of what actions the
state opts to take.
Acknowledging that New · York and Printz prohibit the federal
government from directing state officials to adopt a given regulatory regime,
the court nonetheless concluded that ordering revisions in the statelicensing regime was permissible because the court did not "direct[] the
state to enact a particular regulatory regime that enforces and furthers a
345
federal policy." Yet the fact that the state has an array of options to comply
with the federal requirement does not lessen the constitutional problem if
346
each option, standing alone, could not be imposed.
Strahan violates the commandeering prohibition announced in New York
and augmented in Printz. A federal requirement that a state must revise its
method of regulating private activities seems to be precisely the sort of
dictate that New York and Printz are meant to prohibit. Applying this
principle in the ESA context would not result in significant changes in ESA
enforcement. The take prohibition at issue in Strahan V\;'ould continue to
apply to private and state actors alike. The only limitationcwould be on using
this prohibition as a justification for requiring states to alter or reform
preexisting state regulatory regimes to make them more consonant with the
ESA's requirements.
2.

Sovereign Immunity

The Supreme Court's decisions upholding state sovereign immunity will
have an identifiable impact on the scope of federal environmental
regulation. Virtually every major environmental law contains citizen suit
provisions authorizing private actors to seek enforcement of environmental

343.
344.
345.
decided
at 169.
346.

Strahan, 127 F.3d at 167, 170.
!d. at 170 (citing New York, 505 U.S. at 167).
!d. at 169. It is worth noting that the Printz decision, while addressed by the court, was
after the briefing and oral argument in this case, but before the decision was issued. !d.
New York, 505 U.S. at 176.

JUDICIAL FEDERAliSM AND ENVIRONNIENTAL REGULATION

431

347

regulations in federal court. Other statutes contain provisions authmizing
the payment of damages for environmental harms or penalties for other
offenses, such as violations of whistleblower protection laws. Insofar as the
Court's sovereign immunity holdings prevent the initiation of suits against
states for money damages, p1ivate citizens will be unable to invoke tl1ese
provisions against state entities.
One immediate effect of the Court's sovereign immunity holdings is
that state governments are no longer liable to p1ivate parties for response
and cleanup costs under federal environmental statutes such as the
348
349
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act or Superfund. This protection
from liability does not extend to local governments, however, which may be
more likely defendants in a Superfund cont1ibution action because they own
350
the majmity of public waste disposal sites. Indeed, to date, suits against
351
local governments under tl1e Superfund statute have been "legion."
Where states implement environmental regulations in lieu of the
federal government, sovereign immunity also bars private suits in federal
352
court seeking to enforce the state regulatory provisions.
Under the
353
Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act ("SMCRA"), for example,
states are given the choice of regulating in accordance 1"lith federal
guidelines or accepting tl1e imposition of federal regulations within the
state. Once a state opts to regulate under SMCRA, 'and the state's regulatory
scheme is approved by the federal government, the relevant federal
regulations '"drop out' as operative Jaw" in favor of the relevant state
regulations, and private citizens may no longer sue states pursuant to
SMCRA's citizen suit provisions in federal court. 354 Even ..lf a citizen plaintiff
only seeks injunctive relief, sovereign immunit-y bars such a suit as "[a]
State's sovereign dignity reserves to its own institutions the task of keeping
355
its officers in line with tl1at Jaw." This restriction is potentially significant,
356
though it vrill rarely arise.

347. The one exception is the Federal1nsecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act. 7 U.S.C.
§§ 136-l36y (2000).
348. See generally Grine v. Coombs, 189 F.3d 464 (3d Cir. 1999) (upholding dismissal on
sovereign immunity grounds of a citizen suit seeking monetary damages from a state agency
under the RCRA).
·
349. See generall;' Burnette v. Carothers, 192 F.3d 52 (2d Cir. 1999) (dimissing on sovereign
immunity grounds a citizen suit seeking monetary damages from the state under the
Supeifund); see also Percival, supm. note 4, at 844.
350. See Percival, supra note 4, at 844.
351. McAllister & Glicksman, sujJm note 173, at 10,676.
352. See Bragg v. W.Va. Coal Ass'n, 248 F.3d 275, 297-98 (4th Cir. 2001).
353. 30 u.s.c. §§ 1201-1211, 1231-1328 (2000).
354. Bragg, 248 F.3d at 295.
355. Id. at 297.
356. SMCRA, unlike many othe1· cooperati\'e federalism statutes, expressly prm~des for
exclusive regulation by the state or federal govemment. See id. at 289; see also Mark Squillace,
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Several major environmental statutes have "whistleblower" provisions
that prevent an employer from fiting or otherwise taking an adverse
employment action against an employee for reporting or disclosing
357
environmental violations. These provisions authmize an employee to file a
complaint with the Secretary of Labor alleging retaliation for whistleblower
activity and provide for various forms of relief, including reinstatement. Yet
insofar as whistleblower actions against state agencies seek monetary
compensation, such as back pay, they are precluded by sovereign
358
immunity.
Under Federal Nfaritime Commissi01~ v. South Carolina Parts
359
Authority, it makes no difference that the initial complaint is addressed in a
federal administrative proceeding prior to potential review by a federal
360
court.
Sovereign immunity does not bar whistleblower actions that seek purely
prospective, injunctive relief from specific state officials instead of monetary
361
•
N or d oes soveretgn
.
.
.
c d eral
tmmuntty
prevent th e ~e
compensatiOn.
government from initiating its own suit against state agencies for violating
whistleblower protections, even if the suit is based upon a private complaint
and seeks monetary relief for the sanctioned employee. 362 It is also possible
that Congress could reenact the various whistleblower provisions pursuant to
its autl1ority under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment on the grounds
that whistleblower protections are necessary to safeguard state employees'
First Amendment rights against state action. 353 Yet the existing whistle blower
provisions cannot be defended on iliis ground as there is no language in the
relevant statutes suggesting that this was Congress's intent, and such intent

Cooperative Fede:ralism Under the Swface Mining Control and Reclamation Act: Is This Any Wa)• to Run a
Govrmunent?, 15 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,039, 10,039 (1985) (noting SMCRA's "unparalleled"

delegation of regulatory authority to state governments).
357. E.g., Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2622 (2000); Clean Water Act, 33
U.S.C. § 1367 (2000); Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300j-9(i) (2000); Solid Waste
Disposal Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6971 (2000); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7622 (2000); Superfund Act,
42 u.s.c. § 9610 (2000).
358. See general(y R.I. Dep't of Envtl. Mgmt. v. United States, 304 F.3d 31 (1st Cir. 2002);
Conn. Dep't of Envt'l Prot. v. OSHA, 138 F. Supp. 2d 285 (D. Conn. 2001); Florida v. United
States, 133 F. Supp. 2d 1280 (N.D. Fla. 2001); Ohio EPA v. United States Dep't of Labor, 121 F.
Supp. 2d 1155 (S.D. Ohio 2000).
359. 535 U.S. 7'13 (2002).
360. RI. Dep't of Envtl. Mgmt., 304 F.3d at 45 (noting that the Federal Jlifaritime Commission v.
South Carolina State P01ts Authority decision "disposes of any argument ... that, as a general
proposition, a S[ate's traditional immunity from suit does not extend to administrative
proceedings initiated and prosecuted by private citizens).
361. See Florida, 133 F. Supp. 2d at 1291-92 (stating that administrative proceedings may
continue insofar as it seeks prospective relief from state employees).
362. R.I. Dep't oJEnvtl. MgiiLt., 304 F.3d at 53; Ohio EPil, 121 F. Supp. 2d at 1167.
363. See RI. Dep't oJEnvtl. Mgi!Lt., 304 F.3d at 51 (noting such a possibility}.
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to abrogate sovereign immunity will be found only if Congress "mak[es] its
354
intention unmistakably clear in the language of the statute."
While the above impacts may be significant, it is important not to
overstate the effect of sovereign immunity on federal environmental law. As
Professors McAllister and Glicksman note, predictions of "dire
consequences" from these rulings "may be overstated and tend to ignore the
many other facets of federal law that effectively permit redress against the
355
states or ensure state compliance 1"lith federallaw." As noted above, there
are several alternative means of enforcing federal ·environmental
requirements on state actors, ranging from Ex parte Young suits for injunctive
356
relief against state actors to direct federal enforcement of federal rules.
INhere private plaintiffs seek injunctive or declaratory relief, such as a court
order requiring a state official's compliance with an applicable federal
environmental law, sovereign immunity is not an obstacle. Thus, Seminole
Tribe noted that citizen suits against state officials seeking Clean Water Act
361
enforcement are viable under Ex pmte Young.
Similarly, sovereigr1
immunity does not prevent a citizen from suing state officials to stop alleged
ongoing violations of the Endangered Species Act.~.~~
IV. THE NEXT FEDERALISM BATTLEGROUND?

To date, the Supreme Court's federalism jmisprudence has had
relatively little impact on federal environmental regulation, let alone a
369
multiple "whammy."
Even where federalism principles would counsel
370
curtailing federal regulatory authority, as with the Commerce Clause,
federal appellate courts have been reluctant to travel down this patl1, and

364. Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 73 (2000) (citation and quotation omitted);
see also R.I. Dep 't of Envtl. Mgmt., 304 F.3d at 51 (quoting same); Florida, 133 F. Supp. 2d at 1291
(assuming, without deciding, that Congress could abrogate state sovereign immunity from
whistleblower claims under section 5); Ohio EPA, 121 F. Supp. 2d at 1162 (same).
365. McAllister & Glicksman, supra note 173, at 10,669.
366. See su.jJm Part ILB.2 (discussing state sovereign immunity).
367. Seminole Tlibe ofFlolida v. Flmida, 517 U.S. 44, 75 (1996).
368. See, e.g., Strahan v. Coxe, 127 F.3d 155, 166 (lst Cir. 1997) (noting sovereign immunity
does not preclude "suits against state officials seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against
the state officials in tl1eir individual capacities who act in violation of federal law"); see also Waste
Mgmt. Holdings, Inc. v. Gilmore, 252 F.3d 316, 349 (4th Cir. 2001) (holding that sovereign
immunity did not bar action against state officials seeking injunctive relief against enforcement
of statutes limiting disposal of waste); cJ. Burnette v. Carothers, 192 F.3d 52, 60 (2d Cir. 1999)
(holding that environmental citizen suit provisions do not abrogate state sovereign immunity,
and plaintiffs waived claim of Ex parte Young exception).
369. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
370. See supra Part liLA (discussing the limitation of federal regulatory authority due to
enumerated powers).
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the Supreme Court, thus far, has rejected opportunities to lead the way.
vVhere the Court's federalism holdings do constrain existing environmental
laws, by and large the limitations have been minor, and Congress is able to
circumvent most such restrictions should it choose to do so.
That the revival of federalism has not yet transformed federal
environmental policy does not ensure that it will not do so in the future.
Looming on the legal horizon is at least one question of federalism that
could cause substantial change in federal environmental law-constitutional
limits on Congress's spending power, particularly Congress's authority to
372
induce state action through the use of conditional spending.
Because
conditional spending is used in many environmental laws to encourage, or
otherwise induce, state cooperation with federal regulatory efforts, the scope
of the spending power is important for federal environmental law. As the
spending power is used to supplement, or extend, existing federal authmity
over state governments, legal challenges to such use of the spending power
become more likely.
By limiting federal regulatory authority, the Court increased the
pressure on Congress to use the spending power to achieve desired
regulatory ends. The federal government can neither direct state legislatures
nor commandeer state executive officials, but it can induce state
cooperation with the promise of federal funds or the threat of direct federal
action. Pressure and encouragement are constitutional; direct commands
37
are not. g The dGtinction between the two is not always clear, however. Even
the use of conditional spending can, at some point, become "so coercive as
374
to pass the point at which pressure turns into compulsion." Under existing
precedent, it nonethel~ss appears Congress has ample authority to
circumvent the Court's federalism holdings through the use of conditional
375
spending. I\ldeed, some commentators have encouraged Congress to do
37
just that. li

371. For instance, the Supreme Court has repeatedly denied certiora1i in cases raising
direct Commerce Clause challenges to environmental legislation. See, e.g., Cargill, Inc., v.
United States, 516 U.S. 955 (1995) (denial of certiorati).
372. See Chemerinsky, supra note 3, at 105 ("The next frontier of [federalism] litigation is
sure to be the Spending Clause.").
373. See supra Part II.B (discussing the impact of state sovereign immunity).
374. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211 (1987).
375. Professors Baker & Berman note "easy to imagine" congressional responses to each of
the Court's recent federalism decisions. L;'lm A. Baker & Mitchell N. Berman, Getting Off the
Dole: Hll1y the Cotut Should Abandon Its Spending Doctrine, and How a Too-Clever Cougress Cotdd
Provoke It to Do So, 78 IND. LJ. 459, 502-04 (2003); see also Choper & Yoo, supra note 3, 857

("Given the broad sweep of the spending power as currently construed, the federal government
would quite clearly have the ability to evade the direct limits on its Commerce Clause powers.");
Engstrom, supra note 3, at 1199 (" [F]oreclosure of federal regulation of states through
Congress's otl1er enumerated powers has made the spending power a much more attractive
source of federal authmity. "). Professor Zietlow goes further to suggest that the Court "virnially
has invited Congress to use its Spending Power to circumvent Tenth Amendment limitations."
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Insofar as Congress's spending pow·er is not subject to constitutional
constraints, it threatens to swallow the state sovereignty protected by the
Court's sovereignty decisions and could be used to emasculate the
limitations on federal power established by the enumerated powers
decisions. 377 Indeed, to Professor Baker, the spending power "is, and has
long been" the "greatest threat to state autonomy" of all Congress's
378
powers.
Vlhereas states may have substantial incentive to resist
commandeering or regulatory intrusions into areas of traditional state
concern, states may be more accepting of federal requirements
accompanied by federal funds. 379
There is no particular reason to believe that coercive use of conditional
spending is any less justiciable than other intrusions upon federalist norms.
As the Court noted in Lopez, "the federal balance is too essential a part of
our constitutional structure and plays too vital a role in securing freedom for
[judges] to admit inability to intervene when one or the other level of
380
Government has tipped the scales too far." Much as it reiterated the need
for constitutional limits while upholding broad assertions of the commerce
power, the Court's most recent statement on tlt~ scope of the spending
381
power, South Dakota v. Dole,
upheld the use o('i::onditional spending to
induce state cooperation while reiterating that the spending power, however
382
broad, has some limit.
If the Court revisits the scope of the Spending
Rebecca E. Zietlow, Federalism's Paradox: The Spending Power and the Waiver of Sovereign Immunity,
37 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 141, 190-91 (2002).
376. See, e.g., Mark Tushnet, Alannism vs. Moderation in Responding to the Rehnquist Cow1, 78
IND. LJ. 47, 51-52 (2003). Other commentators suggest that such a strategy could backfire and
encourage the Supreme Court to adopt a more restrictive conditional spencling nde. See
gmwmlly Baker & Berman, supra note 375.
377. Celestine Richards McConville, Federal Funding Conditions: BuT.Sting Through the Dole
Loopholes, 4 CHAP. L. REv. 163, 164-65 (2001) ("[T]he current broad scope of the spending
power undermines the Court's recent federalism decisions because it permits an end-run
around the federalism limits imposed on other enumerated powers."). See generally Lynn A.
Baker, Conditional Federal Spending After Lopez, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1911 (1 995).
378. Lynn A. Baker, The Spending Power and the Federalist Reviva~ 4 CHAP. L. REv. 195, 195
(2001). Insofar as the "cooperative federalism" model and the use of conditional spending
foster greater federal-state interdependency, it undermines the principle of federal-state
independence that was central to the underl)~ng constitutional scheme. See generally Robert G.
Natelson, A Reminder: The Constitutional Values of SJ'mpathy and Independence, 91 KY. LJ. 353
(2003).
379. Ilya Somin, Closing Pandora. 's Box of Federalism: The Case for judicial Rest>iction of Federal
Subsidies to State Govemments, 90 GEO. LJ. 461, 484 (2002) ("vVhile state governments have
strong political incentives to resist ordinary federal legislation that inhibits their authmity, they
have incentives to accept and even lobby for conditional federal grants.").
380. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 578 (1995) (Kennedy,]., concurring).
381. 483 U.S. 203 (1987).
382. See Earl lvl. Maltz, Sovereignty, Autonomy and Conditional Spending, 4 CHAP. L. REV. 107,
108 (2001) ("[T]he Court clearly left open the possibility that it might look Jess favorably on
other attempts to use the mechanism of conditional spending to induce state compliance "~tl1
congressional "~shes.").
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Clause, and delineates the federalism limitations on Congress's conditional
spending power, the impacts on environmental law could be substantial.
Much of federal environmental law is implemented and enforced by
state governments in accordance with federal guidelines and restrictions.
States are not commandeered to implement federal environmental
regulatory programs. Rather, under the cooperative federalism model,
Congress induces state cooperation by offering funding-and threatening
.
f state enVIronment
.
al programs. 383 I n some cases, h owever,
preemption-a
the spending power is not used so much to fund qualifying state
environmental programs, as it is to threaten states with the loss of substantial
federal assistance if states do not fall into line. Under the Clean Air Act, for
example, states risk losing highway funds if they fail to adopt air pollution
control plans that meet with Congress's and the Environmental Protection
Agency's requirements. This is effective because highway moneys are an
384
"irresistible lure to the states, even with substantial conditions attached. "
Yet as the federal government imposes increasingly stringent air
pollution control requirements on states, it is increasingly likely that states
will rebel. Two states challenged the use of conditional spending under the
Clean Air Act in the 1990s. 385 In 1997, the EPA tightened federal air quality
standards, triggering an additional round of air pollution controls by state
and local governments, including many areas that were not previously
386
required to adopt federally mandated measures.
The required controls
will be· even more expensive, and controversial, than existing air pollution
control measures. 387 According to EPA Administrator Michael Leavitt,

Indeed, one could conclude that a majority of the current justices have already
indicated their willingness to enforce limitations on the spending power to prevent Congress
from "obliterat[ing] distinctions between national and local spheres of interest and power by
permitting the Federal Government to set policy in the most sensitive areas of traditional state
concern, areas which otherwise would lie outside its reach." Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of
Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 654-55 (1999) (Kennedy, J., dissenting, joined by the Chief Justice and
Justices Scalia and Thomas). Justice O'Connor, while not joining the passage above, clearly
expressed her concerns about the use of conditional spending in her Dole dissent. Dole, 483 U.S.
at 212-13 (O'Connor,]., dissenting).
383. See infra Part I.
384. Binder, supra note 54, at 160.
385. See infra Part IV.B (discussing Spending Clause challenges to the Clean Air Act).
386. Jennifer 8. Lee, Clear Skies No More for Millions as Pollution Rule Expands, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 13, 2004, at A22 (noting that "more than double" the number of counties fail to meet the
revised National Ambient Air Quality Standards for ozone than failed to meet the previous
standard).
387. Several states resisted the imposition of some requirements for state implementation
plans under the Clean Air Act in the 1990s, even though they had relatively little legal recourse.
See, e.g., Lynn Scarlett, Smogged Down-California Residents' Complaints Against the State's Smog
Check Procedures, REASON, Dec. 1996 (detailing California's objections to vehicle emission
inspection and maintenance requirements), available at http:/ /reason.com/9612/col.lynn
.shtml; EPA's Big Road Test, WALL ST. J., Apr. 6, 1995, at Al6 (noting some Clean Air Act
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"There are counties that could take all their cars off the roads, close their
388
fact01ies and clean up their power plants and still not be in attainment."
For this reason, litigation challenging the loss of highway funds would seem
likely.
The Clean Air Act sanction regime could be vulnerable even under
existing spending power doctrine. Should the Court tighten enforcement of
constitutional limits on conditional spending, perhaps along the lines
suggested by some commentators, the impact on environmental law could
389
be quite far-reaching.
A more rigorous conditional spending doctrine
could both restrict existing environmental laws and limit Congress's ability
to get around other federalism limitations on federal regulatory authority.
A.

THE SPENDING POWER

Article I, section 8 of the Constitution empowers Congress to "lay and
collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts, and Excises to pay the Debts and provide for
the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States." 390 At the
time of the founding, there was substantial debate as to the breadth of the
power authorized by this clause. As with other enumerated powers, leading
founders disagreed as to its precise scope. James Madison, for example,
argued that the clause only empowered Congress '"to pursue those ends
specifically identified in Article I. To Madison, the phrase "general welfare"
did not license Congress to pursue any end it thought in the public
interest. 391 The alternative interpretation would grant Congress a "general
power of legislation, instead of the defined and limited· one hitherto
392
understood to belong to them." Alexander Hamilton, on the other hand,
contended that there were few, if any, substantive limitations on the
spending power. 393 The power to raise money was "plenary, and indefinite"
and the range of purposes for which money could be spent "no less
394
. " so 1ong as appropnatwns
. .
compre11ens1Ve,
were " [ g] enem l an d not l oca L"
In Hamilton's view, the clause conferred an independent and distinct power

requirements created a "flash point" between the EPA and some states); Texas joins States Fighting
CAA, EPA Emission Testing Mandates, AIR WATER POLLUTION REP., Mar. 6, 1995.
388. Lee, supra note 386.
389. See infra notes 455-68 and accompan)~ng text.
390. U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 8.
391. John C. Eastman, Restoring the "General" to the General We/faTe Clause, 4 CHAP. L. REV. 63,
67 (2001).
392. 30ANNALSOFCONG.212 (1817).
393. See ALEXANDER HAMILTON, REPORT ON MANUFACTURES (1791), nprinted in 2 THE
FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION 446-47 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987). Hamilton
acknowledged that the Constitution required that duties be uniform and direct taxes
apportioned by population. Jd. at 446-47; see U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 2, amended by U.S. CONST.
amend. XN, § 2.
394. Hamilton, supra note 393, at 446.
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not limited by the other affirmative grants of power enumerated in Article I,
395
section 8.
There are reasons to suspect Madison's interpretation of the spending
power was more representative of the miginal understanding of the
clause. 396 Among other things, federal grants to the states are a modern
development. There were few such programs ptior to the Progressive Era
and the New Deal. 397 Nonetheless, the Hamiltonian view is dominant
398
99
today.
Since United States v. Butle? in 1936, the Supreme Court has
explicitly embraced a Hamiltonian interpretation of the spending power as
400
"the correct one. "
According to the Butler Court, "[T] he power of
Congress to authorize expenditure of public moneys for public purposes is
not limited by the direct grants of legislative power found in the
401
402
Constitution."
Similarly, in Helvering v. Davis,
the Court held that
Congress has broad discretion to determine whether a given incident of
403
taxation or spending is within the "general welfare." Madison's definition,
.
d In
. But leras a " mere tauto logy. "40 -1
on th eo th er h an d , was rejecte
The spending power is not merely the power to approptiate federal
money for federal purposes. As interpreted by the courts, it is also the power
to induce private or state action by attaching conditions to the expenditure
05
of federal money. As the Court noted in Fullilove v. Klutznick,.J the clause
empowers Congress to impose conditions on the use of federal funds "to
further broad policy objectives by conditioning receipt of federal moneys
upon compliance by the recipient with federal statutory and administrative
06
directives.''.J In ButleT, the Court struck down portions of the Agricultural
Adjustment Act that imposed a tax on processors of agticultural
commodities in order to subsidize reductions in farm production. The Court
invalidated this use of the spending power because it sought "to regulate

395. See United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 65 (1936) (noting "Hamilton ... maintained
that the clause confers a power separate and distinct from those later enumerated, [and] is not
restricted in meaning by the grant of them").
396. See Eastman, supra note 391, at 64-87. See genera.l~y Robert G. Natelson, The General
Welfa-re Clause and the Public Trust: An Essay in Original Understanding, 52 U. KAN. L. RE\'. I (2003).
397. Somin, supra note 379, at 492.
398. See David E. Engdahl, The Spending Power, 44 DUKE LJ. I, 5 (1994) (''No one today
candidly denies that Hamilton's view of tl1e spending power was correct.").
399. 297 u.s. 1 (1936).
400. !d. at 66. The Court also rejected the view that the Spending Clause grants an
independent power to pursue the "general welfare" apart from t<Lxing and spending. Id. at 6566.
401. !d. at 66.
402. 301 U.S. 619 (1937).
403. I d. at 640-'11.
404. Butler, 297 U.S. at 65.
405. 448 u.s. 448 (1980).
406. !d. at 474.
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and control agricultural production, a matter beyond the powers delegated
407
to the federal government."
The spending power, while broad and farreaching, could not be used to regulate matters beyond Congress's regulato'IJ'
authmity. Assuming this part of Butler's holding remains good law, it does
not substantially limit congressional authmity insofar as the scope of
Congress's regulatory powers under the Commerce Clause has expanded
408
dramatically since the 1930s, Lopez and Mon-ison notwithstanding. At the
very least, Congress may use the spending power to regulate or influence any
activity that is within the scope of Congress's other enumerated powers.
The spending power is unquestionably broad, but it is not unlimited. In
409
1987, in South Dahota v. Dole, the Supreme Court identified five restraints
upon Congress's use of conditional federal spending. First, the
approp1iation of funds must be for the "general welfare" and not for a
410
narrow special interest. In making this determination, however, courts are
411
"to defer substantially to the judgment of Congress. " Second, there can be
no independent constitutional bar to the condition imposed upon the
412
federal spending.
In other words, Congress may not seek to use the
spending power to induce states to engage in con<;Iuct that would otherwise
be unconstitutional. Third, any conditions imposed upon the receipt of
413
federal funds must be clear and unambiguous. Recipients of federal funds
must have notice of any conditions with which they must comply and the
414
scope of their obligation.
As the Court noted in fennhurst, "[T] he
legitimacy of Congress' power to legislate under the spending power ...
rests on whether the State voluntarily and knowingly accepts the terms of the
415
'contract. "' Fourth, and most significant, the conditions themselves must
be related to the federal interest that the exercise of the spending power is
itself supposed to advance. In the Court's words, "[T]he condition imposed
by Congress is directly related to one of the main purposes for which .. .
416
funds are expended." As reaffirmed in New Yorh, the "conditions must .. .

407. Butler, 297 U.S. at 68.
408. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203,216 (1987) (O'Connor,]., dissenting) ("The
erro1· in Butler was not the Court's conclusion that the Act was essentially regulatory, but rather
its crabbed \~ew of the extent of Congress' regulatory power under the Commerce Clause.").
409. 483 U.S. 203 (1987).
410. !d. at 207.
411. !d.
412. !d.
413. !d.
414. Engdahl, supra note 398, at 78 (noting that "sufficient clarity is required not only as to
the fact that an obligation is being assumed, but also as to the scope or scale of that
obligation").
415. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hasp. v. Haldennan, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981). The interpretive
rule urged in Penn!mTSt is arguably in tension with Chevron deference for agency interpretations
of ambiguous statutory language. See Engstrom, supra note 3, at 1209-16.
416. Dole, 483 U.S. at 208.
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bear some relationship to the purpose of the federal spending, ...
otherwise, of course, the spending power could render academic the
417
Constitution's other grants and limits of federal authority."
Dole also suggested a fifth limitation on the use of conditional
spending-"coercion." Specifically, the Court noted that "in some
circumstances the financial inducement offered by Congress might be so
418
coercive as to pass the point at which 'pressure turns into compulsion. "'
419
This point has been reiterated in subsequent cases. While not explaining
what amount or degree of financial inducement would be necessary for an
exercise of the spending power to become coercive, the Dole majority noted
that here Congress only conditioned "a relatively small percentage of certain
420
federal highway funds" -specifically five percent of the funds from
specific highway grant programs. Such an imposition represents "relatively
mild encouragement to the States," thereby leaving states with the ultimate
decision as to whether to conform to federal dictates and is therefore not
421
coercive. Alternatively, the coercion inquiry could turn not on the amount
of money at stake, but on whether the manner in which the conditions were
imposed "interferes with a state's sovereign accountability." 422
The Court has long recognized that "the Federal Government may
establish and impose reasonable conditions relevant to federal interest in
the project and to the over-all objectives thereof."m The problem occurs
when Congress adopts "unreasonable" conditions. One could imagine a
situation in which every payment from the federal government to states is
conditioned upon acquiescence to every jot and tittle of every mandate
contained in every federal statute. Well before the Supreme Court's
reinvigoration of federalism principles, Professor Richard Stewart warned
that "such a broad reading of congressional power would afford Congress a
way to exercise the spending power where it is not spending, by drafting
grant conditions that reach areas .in which the state has accepted no

417. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 167 (1992) (citations omitted).
418. Dole, 483 U.S. at 211 (quoting Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 590 (1937) ).
419. See, e.g., Coli. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bel., 527 U.S. 666,
687 (1999) (noting that, in some instances, "the financial inducement offered by Congress
might be so coercive as to pass the point at which pressure turns into compulsion" (quoting
Dole, 483 U.S. at 211) ); see also New York, 505 U.S. at 167 (noting the limits of federal spending
power).
420. Dole, 483 U.S. at 211.
421. !d.
422. McConville, supra note 377, at 173 ("Coercion implicates a state's ability to act as a
representative of its people, not the state's level of temptation in choosing among
alternatives.").
423. Ivanhoe Irrigation Dist. v. McCracken, 357 U.S. 275, 295 (1958). As the Court has
noted more recently, "Congress has no obligation to use its Spending Clause power to disburse
funds to the States; such funds are gifts." Coli. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. at 686---87.
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If Congress is not limited in this manner, "the spending power
could render academic the Constitution's other grants and limits of federal
authority." 425 At such an extreme, the spending power would eliminate the
judicial safeguards of federalism embodied in the Court's federalism
jurisprudence.
Although the Dole Court clearly stated that Congress's power to impose
conditions on the receipt of federal funds is limited, federal appellate courts
have been extremely reluctant to strike down federal programs for
426
exceeding the scope of the spending power. The "general welfare" prong
427
is treated as a "complete throw away," and most of the other prongs have
not fared much better. 4-8 Perhaps the relatedness prong of the Dole test has
the greatest potential for constraining the use of conditional spending. It is
repeatedly referenced by the lower courts, but rarely examined in any
429
detail.
The concept of "coercive" uses of federal spending has attracted
some attention as well, but "the coercion theory is somewhat amorphous
and cannot easily be reduced to a neat set of black-letter rules of
application." 430
The doctrinal limits on the spending power are admittedly unclear. Yet
in their rush to dismiss Spending Clause claims, some federal courts have
431
almost certainly gone too far. In Nevada v. Skinner, for example, the Ninth
Circuit held that Congress could make ninety-five percent of a state's
highway funds conditional upon that state's setting of a fifty-five miles-perhour highway speed limit. According to Judge Reinhardt's opin.ion for the
panel, the conditional grant of funds did not amount to "coercion" that
would "leave the state with no practical alternative but to comply with
432
federal restrictions." Key to the holding was the court's determination that
"Congress has the authmity" under the Commerce Clause "to compel the
9

424. Stewart, supm note 46, at 1261.
425. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 167 (1992).
426. See Kansas v. United States, 214 F.3d 1196, 1201-02 (lOth Cir. 2000) ("The Court has
never employed the [coercion] theory to invalidate a funding condition, and federal courts
have been similarly reluctant to use it."); Nevada v. Skinner, 884 F.2d 445, 448 (9th Cir. 1989)
('The coercion theory has been much discussed but infrequently applied in federal case law,
and never in favor oftl1e challenging party.").
427. Baker & Berman, supra note 375, at 464.
428. !d. ("[T]he lower courts, quite predictably, have found little use for three of the five
elements of the test."); id. at 466 (noting that the other two elements have not fared much
better, as most lower courts have read them "to be toothless, even nonjusticiable, en route to
sustaining a "~de range of conditional federal spending legislation").
429. I d. at 466-67. But see Barbour v. Wash. Metro. Area Trans. Auth., 374 F. 3d 1161, 116869 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (discussing the relatedness prong); infra notes 446-54 and accompanying
text (same).
430. West Virginia v. United States Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 289 F.3d 281, 288 (4th
Cir. 2002).
431. 884 F.2d 445 (9tl1 Cir. 1989).
432. !d. at 448.
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433

States through direct regulation to change its practices." As Skinner was
decided in 1989, years prior to New York and Printz, this may have been a
434
reasonable conclusion for the court to draw at the time. In the wake of the
anti-commandeering decisions, however, this rationale is unsustainable.
There is little doubt that Congress could directly impose a fifty-five mileper-hour speed limit on federal highways under the Commerce Clause. Such
a law would require federal enforcement, however. This makes such a law
unlikely, as Congress would only enact such a law if it concluded that the
benefits of a uniform federal speed limit were greater than the costs of
creating a federal highway patrol or otherwise diverting federal law
enforcement resources to policing the nation's highways. The Skinner court,
however, found that Congress could compel the states to impose a federal
speed limit to be enforced by state officials. 435 Unlike a true federal speed
limit, such a law would lie beyond the scope of federal power. Under New
York and Printz, Congress has power neither to compel a state legislature to
adopt such a rule nor to commandeer state law enforcement officials to
implement the federal rule. Insofar as Skinner stands for the proposition that
there is no coercion if Congress is using conditional spending to encourage
tl1e adoption and enforcement of state laws that Congress could impose on
the states directly, it can no longer be good law after New York and Printz.
Not every federal appellate court has dismissed arguments for limiting
the scope of Congress's spending power. In 1997, an en bane panel of the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held, in Virginia Depmtment of
Education v. Riley, that the Department of Education could not condition
state receipt oL federal funds under the Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act ("IDEA") on compliance with terms not explicit in the statute
itself. 435 The Department of Education had sought to withhold all of
Virginia's IDEA grants for two fiscal years-some $60 million-because
Virginia did not provide free education to disabled students who were
437
expelled or suspended for behavior unrelated to their disabilities.
According to tl1e Department, this policy contravened the statutory
requirement that state recipients of IDEA funds must, among other things,
"assure[] all children with disabilities the right to a free appropriate public
438
education. "
The en bane Fourth Circuit rejected, by a vote of 11-2, the Department's
position on the ground that the language of the IDEA did not clearly

433. Id. at 449.
434. But see note 296 and cases cited therein.
435. Skinner, 884 F.2d at 449 (stating that "if Congress has the authority under the
Commerce Clause to order a state directZv to comply with a particular standard such as a 55-mileper-hour speed law," Congress may condition the receipt of federal funds on such a condition).
436. 106 F.3d 559,579 (4th Cir. 1997) (en bane).
437. Id. at 560.
438. 20 u.s.c. § 1412(1) (2000).
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manifest Congress's intention to prohibit a state recipient from adopting the
439
policy at issue. According to the court's majority,
"Language which, at
best, only implicitly conditions the receipt of federal funding on the
fulfillment of certain conditions is insufficient to impose on the state the
440
condition sought." Since, "at most," the IDEA "only implicitly conditions
the States' receipt of funds upon the continued provision of educational
senices to students expelled for misconduct unrelated to their handicaps,"
441
the condition could not be imposed on an unconsenting state. Particularly
in an area of traditional state concern, such as education, courts must insist
on "a clear, unambiguous statutory expression of congressional intent to
442
condition the States' receipt of federal funds in a particular manner. "
While the en bane court rested its decision on Congress's failure to
impose an unambiguous condition on the receipt ofiDEA money, six judges
went further, noting a "substantial ... question" whether the Department's
policy would have constituted unconstitutional "coercion" under Dole even if
443
explicitly authorized by Congress. For the federal government to witl1hold
$60 million in IDEA funds because of Virginia',~. failure to provide a free
education to 126 of the 128,000 handicapped sthdents for whose benefit
Virginia was to receive IDEA funds would be "considerably more pernicious
tl1an the 'relatively mild encouragement' at issue in Dole." 444 Whereas in Dole
states only risked losing a small portion of federal fun,ding for failing to
adopt a higher drinking age, in Riley the Department sought to witl1hold
"the entirety of a substantial federal grant" because Virginia refused "to
fulfill their federal obligation in some insubstantial respect rather tl1an
submit to the policy dictates of Washington in a matter peculiarly within
445
their powers as sovereign states."
Six judges suggested that if anything
could be considered unduly coercive under Dole, the Department's policy at
issue in Riley would be it. To date, however, no federal appellate court has so
held.

439. It is worth noting that while eleven judges concurred in the judgment, only nine
explicitly adopted the rationale articulated by Judge Luttig. AI; one commentator noted, "Riley
was a messy affair." Engstrom, supra note 3, at 1213.
440. Riley, 106 F.3d at 561 (per curiam).
441. I d. at 563 (opinion ofLuttig,J.).
442. ld. at 566 (opinion of Luttig, ].). Like the Supreme Court in Solid Waste Agency, the
Riley majority explicitly rejected the government's contention that the Department's position
was due Chevmn deference. Id. at 567 ("It is <Ddomatic that statutory ambiguity defeats
altogether a claim by the Federal Government that Congress has unambiguously conditioned
the States' receipt of federal monies in the manner asserted."); see also supra note 267. For a
broader discussion of the Riley court's rejection of Chevron deference in the spending clause
context, see Engstrom, supra note 3, at 1212-16.
443. Riley, 106 F.3d at 561.
444. Id. at 569 (opinion ofLuttig,J.).
445. Jd. at 570 (opinion ofLuttig,J.).
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The scope of the relatedness inquiry has also recently divided a federal
5
appellate court. In Barbour v. Washington lvietropolitan Area Transit Authority,H
a divided panel of the D.C. Circuit found that Congress could condition a
state transit agency's receipt of federal funds on the waiver of sovereign
immunity under tl1e Rehabilitation Act, a federal statute that prohibits
447
disability discrimination. The panel majority joined several other circuits
in finding that Congress could impose such a condition to ensure that
federal funds were not "used to facilitate disability discrimination" and to
ensure "that federal money is used for the provision of public
448
transportation, and nothing else." Just as Congress has authmity, pursuant
to the Necessary and Proper Clause, "to see to it that taxpayer dollars
appropriated under [the spending] power are in fact spent for the general
welfare and not frittered away in graft," as the Supreme Court recently held
449
in United States v. Sabri,
the maj01ity in Barbour reasoned that Congress
could ensure tl1at federal monies do not subsidize disability
discrimination. -1 50
Judge Sentelle, in his dissent, denied that the conditions at issue m
451
Barbour complied with Dole.
While preventing discrimination may be a
valid federal interest, it is not the purpose of federal support for state transit
5
agencies."t ~ Congress can impose conditions to prevent the likelihood of
corruption because such cmTUption could prevent the expenditure of
federal funds for the congressionally determined purpose. Money "frittered
away in graft" is not available to fund mass transit. Yet whether or not transit
agencies discriminate against the disabled has no bearing on the availability
453
of funds for mass transit services. According to the dissent, "tl1e proper
test under Dole and New York is whether the condition is germane to the
interest in the 'particular national project[] or program[]," not whether
454
Congress has a generalized 'interest' in imposing the condition."
This
division in the D.C. Circuit highlights the tension between the Supreme

446. 374 F.3cl. 1161 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
447. SeeNieves-Marquez v. Puerto Rico, 353 F.3d 108, 128 (1st Cir. 2003); A.W. v.Jersey City
Pub. Sch., 341 F.3cl 234, 239 (3d Cir. 2003); Lovell v. Chandler, 303 F.3cl 1039, 1051 (9th Cir.
2002).
448. Barbour, 374 F.3d at 1168.
449. 124 S.Ct. 1941, 1946 (2004).
450. Barbow; 374 F.3d at 1169-70.
451. The dissent also rejected the argument that Congress could impose such conditions
under section 5 of the 14th Amendment. !d. at 1170-77 (Sentelle,J., dissenting).
452. Id. at 1172 ("The purpose of the federal funds wrviATA receives is to subsidize the
mass-transit services WMATA provides. They are transportation funds.").
453. Id. (rejecting the argument that "the legislature can identifY something a state does
that it does not like-in the case, discriminate on the basis of disability-and condition any
grant of funds on a state's not doing that act any more, assuming the condition is otherwise
constitutionally valid").
454. I d. at 1173 (quoting South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 (1987)).
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Court's federalism holdings and an unconstrained power to impose
conditions on federal grants. It additionally illustrates that a broad spending
power could nonetheless be subject to significant, judicially enforceable
limits.
Commentators have noted several ways in which the Supreme Court
could police the limits of the spending power. For starters, the Court could
455
simply apply the existing elements of the Dole test with more 1igor. For
instance, the relatedness prong could be read to require that the federal
spending and the imposed condition both directly advance the same
interest. 456 The conditional spending in Dole might pass this test depending
on how directly the interest must be advanced. One could argue that federal
highway funding and a reduced drinking age botl1 improve highway
457
Other conditions, however, such as that a state adopt regulations
safety.
for coal-fired power plants as a condition of receiving federal highway
money, would not. The Court could also define precisely what it means for
the federal government to "coerce" state action through conditional
458
spending. Through eiilier approach, the Gpurt "could maintain at least
nominal fidelity to the Dole test," even as it applied the test in a manner
459
suggesting the precise outcome in Dole was incorrect.
Professor Baker proposes that those conditions on the receipt of federal
funds tl1at seek to regulate tl1e states in a manner in which the federal
government could not directly regulate state activity should be presumed
invalid. 460 The federal government could overcome this presumption only
by demonstrating that tl1e funding constitutes "reimbursement spending," as
461
opposed to "regulatory spending." Under Professor Baker's formulation,
the federal government may specify how a given state is to spend federal
grants and may condition receipt of the federal money on meeting such
conditions, so long as the money to which tl1e conditions are attached is
only that money which is to be used to implement the program in
462
question. Such "reimbursement spending" is permissible under Professor
Baker's test. Spending conditions which otl1erwise seek to regulate the states

455. Baker & Berman, supra note 375, at 512.
456. I d. at 517.
457. But see id. at 516 (noting that such a test "dictates a different result on the very facts of
Dole").
458. ld. at 520-21.
459. I d. at 521.
460. See generally Lynn A. Baker, Conditional Federal Spending after Lopez, 95 COLUM. L. REV.
1911(1985).
461. Jd. at 1962-63.
462. ld.
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in a manner otherwise beyond the scope of Congress's powers would be
.
. 'bl e. 463
ImpermiSSI
Professor Berman proposes an alternative test, focusing on the
"coercion" element of the Dole test. Specifically, Professor Berman proposes
that a conditional offer of federal funds should be deemed unconstitutional
if withholding some or all of the federal funds at issue would be
464
unconstitutional. Whereas Congress may opt, in isolation, to provide states
with federal funds or not, Professor Berman suggests that Congress cannot
withhold money from the states for an impermissible or "improper" reason
if doing so would effectively penalize a state for failing to concede its
465
sovereign authority to set a given policy. Where the withholding of federal
funds can be justified on the grounds that it serves a legitimate federal
purpose, perhaps that withholding the funds in itself will advance the
purpose of the federal program, the state is not being penalized, and the
466
condition may be imposed. In effect, Berman hinges the coercion inquiry
on the congressional purpose behind withholding the federal funds and not
on the magnitude of the funds at issue or the "pressure" that the funding
condition appears to impose on the states.
Either of the tests put forward by Professors Baker and Berman would
be more restrictive than the Dole test, particularly as it is currently applied in
the lower courts. So, too, would proposals to reinvigorate the "general
welfare" requirement so as to limit the sorts of projects for which Congress
467
could appropriate funds,
or to otherwise limit federal grants to states
468
across the board. If the Court is less aggressive in its initial efforts to reign
in the spending power, as seems most likely, it would simply tighten the test
articulated in Dole, much as in Lopez it tightened the limitations on the
commerce power within the framework laid out in prior cases. While
simultaneously upholding ever-broader assertions of federal authority under
tl1e Commerce Clause; the Court nonetheless reiterated that the power was
469
limited, providing the doctrinal hook for the Court to use in Lopez.
The
limiting language in Dole could well be used to tl1e same effect, and this may

463. But see Call. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666,
687 (1999) ("Congress may, in the exercise of its spending power, condition its grant of funds
to the States upon their taking certain actions that Congress could not require them to
take ... .").
464. See generally Mitchell N. Berman, Coercion Without Baselines: Unconstitutional Conditions in
Three Dimensions, 90 CEO. LJ. l (200 1).
465. Id. at 37.
466. Id.
467. See John C. Eastman, Restoring the "General" to the General Welfare Clause, 4 CHAP. L. REV.
63, 64-65 (2001).
468. See generalfy Somin, supra note 379.
469. See, e.g., NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel, 301 U.S. l, 30 (1937) ("That distinction
between what is national and what is local in the activities of commerce is vital to the
maintenance of our federal system.").

JUDICIAL FEDERAIJSM AND EM!JRONMENTAL REGULATION

447

well yet occur as the Court's federalism cases would suggest that some
tightening of the Congress's conditional spending power is in order.
Left unrestrained, Congress may use the conditional grant of federal
funds to achieve those ends that would otherwise be barred by the holdings
of New York, Lopez, and Printz. States receive federal grants for welfare,
environmental programs, highways, police, and many other purposes, and
are therefore quite reliant upon the national fisc. A federal
recommendation that states implement a desired program or risk losing
federal support could be quite coercive. Thus, the ultimate import of the
Court's recent federalism cases may depend upon whether it opts to limit
Congress's ability to use conditional spending to bribe and compel state
actions.

B.

CONDITIONAL SPENDING IN ENviRONMENTAL LAW

Among all federal environmental statutes, the Clean Air Act ("CAA") is
the source of the greatest state-federal conflict. 470 It also represents
Congress's most aggressive effort to induce state regulation through the use
of conditional spending and is therefore the ~ost vulnerable to spending
power challenge. V\Thereas many federal envi:i-onmental statutes attach
conditions on the use of federal funding of state environmental programs,
the CAA relies upon the threat of withholding federal highway funds to
ensure state cooperation.
_,
Under the CAA, the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") sets
National Ambient Air Quality Standards ("NAAQS") for criteria air
pollutants, such as ozone ("smog") and particulate matter ("soot"). States
with metropolitan areas that fail to attain NAAQS are required to draft State
Implementation Plans ("SIPs"), which they submit to the EPA for its
approval. Among other things, an adequate SIP must include "enforceable
emission limitations . . . as well as schedules and timetables for
.
,471
.
.
c
b ase d perrmttmg
. .
compl1ance,
mon1tonng
systems, 472 a 1eesystem fi·or
.
473
c
474
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.
statiOnary sources, an eniorcement program, an proVI e 10r suffi1oent
475
public participation in the SIP process.
The 1990 Clean Air Act
amendments added additional requirements for state-permitting programs
476
c
.
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470.
471.
472.
473.
474.
475.
affected
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477.

See generally Dwyer, supm note 36.
42 U.S.C. § 7410 (a) (2) (A) (2000).
I d. § 7410 (a) (2) (B).
I d.§ 7410 (a) (2) (L).
I d. § 7410 (a) (2) (C) (a) (2), (E).
States must provide "reasonable notice" and public hearings on SIPs and consult with
local entities. Id. § 7410 (a) (2), (a) (2) (M).
42 U.S.C. § 7651o.
Union Elec. Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246, 249 (1976).
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Failure to submit a fully adequate SIP by the appropriate deadlines
results in the imposition of one or more federal sanctions, including the loss
of federal highway funds, increased offset requirements fOt- new
development, and the imposition of a Federal Implementation Plan ("FIP")
478
that the EPA will enforce. The imposition of such sanctions is not solely,
or even primarily, within the EPA's discretion, as individual citizens and
activist groups may force the EPA's hands through citizen suits seeking to
enforce the express requirements of the CAA and regulations promulgated
479
pursuant to it. Thus, short of legislation, states have little political ability to
480
seek compromise over the CAA's enforcement.
Moreover, local
transportation projects cannot receive federal funding unless they confonn
481
to an EPA-approve d SIP.
In 1995, two states, Missouri and Virginia, challenged the imposition of
482
sanctions under the CAA. Each alleged that the EPA's decision, if not the
statutory provisions authorizing sanctions themselves, were unconstitutional
infringements upon state sovereignty. According to the states, the CAA
impermissibly authOtized the EPA to impose severe sanctions upon those
states failing to comply with the EPA's interpretation of the Act.-1 83 Both
claimed that the highway fund sanction was an unconstitutional use of the
federal spending power. Neither state was successful.
According to the Fourth Circuit, the CAA's provisions passed
constitutional muster "because although its sanctions provisions potentially
burden the states, those sanctions amount to inducement rather than
'outright coercion. ,,-1 8-1 The district court in Missouri reached a similar
conclusion, relying upon dicta in New York that "conditions [on receipt of
federal funds] must ... bear some relationship to the purpose of federal
spending. ,-1ss For the Missouri court, "the appropriate focus is not on the
alleged impact of a statute on a particular state program but whether
Congress has 'directly compel[led]' the state 'to enact a federal regulatory
program. ,,-1 86 ·while the Missouri court only addressed the question of

478. 42 u.s.c. § 7509.
479. Id. § 7604.
480. See MichaelS. Greve, Friends of the Emth, Foes of Federalism, 12 DUKE EN\I"fL. L. & POL'Y F.
167,176 (2001).
481. 42 u.s.c. § 7506.
482. Virginia v. Browner, 80 F.3d 869, 873 (4th Cir. 1996); Missouri v. United States, 918 F.
Supp. 1320, 1323-25 (E.D. Mo. 1996), vacated, 109 F.3d 440 (8th Cir. 1997).
483. Virginia also argued that the EPA was wrong to conclude that its stationary source
penn it program failed to comply with Title V of the Clean Air Act. B-rowner, 80 F.3d at 872.
484. I d. at 881.
485. Missouri, 918 F. Supp. at 1333 (citing New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 167
( 1992)) (emphasis in Missouri opinion).
486. Id. at 1328 {quoting New York, 505 U.S. at 161).
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whether such sanctions were unconstitutional on their face, it implied that
487
an as-applied challenge would not fare any better.
488
Both courts based their decisions on Dole.
This reliance may be
misplaced, however. It is not clear that threatening federal highway moneys
489
Highway funds are raised from a
falls squarely 1¥ithin Dol.e's holding.
dedicated revenue source in gasoline taxes and placed in the Highway Trust
Fund. 49°For many states, federal highway funds represent the lion's share of
491
their transportation budget. These moneys are explicitly earmarked for
492
transportation projects.
Conditioning the receipt of such funds on
compliance 1'Vith myliad federal environmental requirements seems to strain
the Dole test, particularly when viewed against tl1e background of the Court's
broader federalism jurisprudence.
Federal highway legislation suggests many reasons why federal funding
of highway construction supports the "general welfare," but environmental
protection is not one of tl1em. On the other hand, both the highway
legislation and the dlinking age increase at issue .. in Dole were explicitly
493
enacted to improve highway safety.
The connection between tl1e CAA's
purpose and transportation is also ambiguous, as states can lose their
highway funding for failing to meet any of the CAA's myliad SIP
494
requirements. Nothing in tl1e CAA requires any connecti_on to highways,
mobile sources, or even the specific pollutants most associated I'Vitl1
vehicular traffic. Failure to adopt a sufficiently rigorous stationary source
permit scheme, sufficiently stringent emission regulations on dry cleaners,
bakeries and other "area" sources, or even failure to provide adequate
487. Id. at 1329. Missomi had sought to challenge the provisions on both grounds, but the
District Court detennined that an as-applied claim was not yet ripe. Id.
488. Browner, 80 F.3d at 881-82; Missowi, 918 F. Supp. at 1330, 1332-34.
489. However, it is certain that they would fall outside the test articulated by Justice
O'Connor in her dissent. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 216 (1987) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).
490. For a brief overview of the history and financing of the Highway Trust Fund, see
Salvatore Massa, Surface Freight Transp01tation: Accounting for Subsidies in a "Fl-ee Marhet ", 4 N .Y.U.
J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL\' 285, 318-19 {2000-2001).
491. Binder, supra note 54, at 160 (noting that federal funding can account for ninety-five
percent of a state's transportation budget).
492. Massa, supm note 490, at 318. Some argue that the "trust fund" system within the
federal budget is simply an accounting gimmick and that there is not, in fact, a separate "fund"
of highway monies. See, e.g., Thomas G. Donlan, Selling America Short, BARRON'S, Aug. 10, 1998,
at 34 (suggesting federal "trust funds" are "budgetary gimmicks"). vVhether this is true when the
issue is deficit reduction, a strong argument can be made that the federal government has a
moral, if not legal, obligation to expend money from the trust fund for road purposes and
nothing else, as this is the express basis upon which the relevant monies are raised.
493. See Dole, 483 U.S. at 208-09. v\lhether improving highway safety by, respectively,
imprm~ng road construction or reducing drunk dri\~ng was the actual motivating purpose
behind either of these enactments is another matter.
494. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(k) (2000) (stating that an SIP is inadequate if an EPA Administrator
finds, inte-r alia, SIP fails to comply "with any requirement of this chapter" (emphasis added)).
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citizen suit access to state courts can provide the basis for rejecting an SIP
495
and imposing sanctions.
Congress has sought to connect highway constmction to environmental
protection, but it has still stopped short of claiming highway constmction
serves the purpose of environmental protection. The Federal-Aid Highway Act
of 1970 instructed the Secretary of Transportation to ensure that federal
highway programs were "consistent with any approved plan for the
implementation of any ambient air quality standard for any air quality
496
control region designated pursuant to the Clean Air Act." Similarly, in
1991 Congress sought to create an environmentally sound interstate highway
system with the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991
("ISTEA"). 497 In 1998, Congress reauthorized ISTEA with the Transportation
498
Equity Act for the 21" Century ("TEA-21"), again reiterating its intent to
499
"minimize transportation-related fuel consumption and air pollution."
While Congress repeatedly noted the potential environmental impacts
of highway construction, none of these statutes establishes that a pu·rpose of
the federal highway programs is environmental protection. Yet it is the
purpose of federal funding that controls whether a given condition is
500
sufficiently related for purposes of Dole. These statutory provisions provide
an indication of the sort of highways Congress sought to fund; they do not
establish environmental protection as a purpose of highway funding. In
contrast, the federal statute calling upon states to raise the drinking age
echoed the explicit purposes of tl1e federal highway programs-safe
. h ways. 501
h tg
The conditions on receipt of federal highway funds imposed by the
CAA are more expansive than the conditions upheld in either Sabri or
Barbour. In Sabri, the Court based its holding on the conclusion that
Congress could impose conditions on the receipt of federal money that
502
would prevent the'ftmds from being diverted to other purposes. Requiring
states to adopt various pollution control measures, however, does not
prevent the diversion of highway monies to other purposes. In Barbour, the
D.C. Circuit joined other circuits in holding that Congress could prevent the
503
use of federal funds for injurious purposes.
This reasoning supports

495. !d.
496. Pub. L. No. 91-605, 84 Stat. 1713 (codified as amended at 23 U.S.C. § 101 (2000) ).
497. Pub. L. No. 102-240, 105 Stat. 1914 (codified as amended at 23 U.S.C. § 103).
498. Pub. L. No. 105-178, 112 Stat. 107 (1998) (codified as amended in scattered sections of
23 U.S.C.).
499. 49 U.S.C. § 5301 (a) (2000).
500. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 (1987).
501. See id. at 208-09.
502. Sabri v. United States, 124 S. Ct. 1941, 1947 (2004) ("Congress was within its
prerogative to protect spending objects from the menace of local administrators on the take.").
503. Barbour v. Wash. Metro. Area TransitAuth., 374 F.3cl1161, 1170 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
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imposing conditions on the receipt of highway funds under the CAA to
prevent the use of highway funds on projects that could increase air pollution.
Yet, as noted above, the relevant provisions of the CAA are far more
expansive. Not only must states refrain from spending federal money on
projects that could increase air pollution, they must also comply with
numerous conditions that have absolutely nothing to do with transportation,
let alone those projects and programs funded with federal highway monies.
Another important distinction is the severity of the financial penalty to
which states would be subjected for failing to abide by congressional
dictates. Dole involved a modest loss of highway funds, only five percent. Yet
under the CAA, virtually all highway funds are at risk, with only minor
504
exceptions for special purposes.
In this respect, the CAA creates a
situation more like SkinneT or Riley than Dole. Thus, even if the CAA's
sanctions are not facially suspect, the imposition of sanctions could
nonetheless cross the line from inducement to coercion if enough unrelated
505
funds were at stake.
Finally, there is some reason to question whether the imposition of
sanctions under the CAA satisfies the notice profig of the Dole test. ·while the
CAA itself outlines broad requirements for state implementation plans,
many of the details are left to the regulatory process. The text of the CAA
may place a given state on notice that a given air quality determination will
require the adoption of an "enhanced" vehicle inspection and maintenance
program, but the precise contours and costs of such a program are left to
506
the EPA. Whether a given metropolitan area must adopt pollution control
measures at all is, in part, a function of subsequent agency decisions. Under
the CAA, the EPA is authorized-indeed, required-to reconsider the
507
national ambient air quality standards periodically.
In recent years, tl1e
EPA has tightened air quality standards, thereby requiring states to adopt
more stringent air pollution control measures tl1an they may have
anticipated. 508 At the same time, the EPA has adjusted SIP requirements
504. 42 U.S.C. § 7509 (b) (l) (2000). The EPA may not cut off highway funds for projects
necessary to "resolve a demonstrated safety problem," mass transit, car pooling programs,
construction of high-occupancy vehicle ("HOV") lanes, "programs to limit or restrict vehicle
use in downtown areas," and other programs that will "improve air quality and would not
encourage single occupancy vehicle capacity." I d.§ 7509 (b) (l) (A), (B) (vi), (B) (vii).
505. According to Stewart, "Such a condition, accompanying funds which the state cannot
afford to forgo, intensifies federal interference with local mechanisms of political accountability
by compelling states to enforce against their constituencies restrictions that the constituencies
oppose." Stewart, supra note 46, at 1255.
506. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 75lla(a) (2) (B), (b) (4), (c) (3); 40 C.F.R. pt. 51, subt. S (2004).
507. 42 U.S.C. § 7409(a), (d).
508. See, e.g., National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Particulate Matter, 62 Fed. Reg.
38,652 (July 18, 1997) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 50); National Ambient Air Quality
Standards for Ozone, 62 Fed. Reg. 38,861 (July 18, 1997) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 50). See
generally Am. Tmcking Ass'ns v. EPA, 283 F.3d 355 (D.C. Cir. 2002), modifying 175 F.3d 1027
(D.C. Cir. 1999) (reviewing the constitutionality of the tightened standards).
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midstream to account for changes in atmospheric modeling or revised
estimates of upwind state contributions to downwind state pollution
problems. In combination, this level of fluidity in SIP requirements, and
therefore the conditions imposed on the receipt of state highway funds,
could make the highway fund sanction particularly suspect under Dole.
The Second Circuit concluded that "Pennhurst cannot be read as
broadly prohibiting amendments which add retroactive conditions to
funding statutes: at most, Pennhurst simply requires a clear indication of
509
congressional intent to impose such conditions." Yet subsequent changes
made by Congress may be substantively different than such changes made by a
regulatory agency. Particularly, if it is assumed that the states are protected
510
by the "political safeguards of federalism" in the legislative process -at
least as concerns the imposition of conditions on the receipt of federal
funds-it would follow that unambiguous statutory amendments to existing
conditions would be more acceptable than the imposition of new conditions
-n
through the regulatory process."
If the CAA sanction regime is potentially suspect under Dole, it would be
even more so under the va1ious alternative tests for conditional spending
proposed by some commentators, such as Professors Baker and Berman.
Conditional spending under other federal environmental statutes would be
far less vulnerable, however. At the present time, most other federal
environmental statutes impose conditions on the use of funds for specific
programs. Thus, the Clean Water Act and Safe Drinking Water Act provide
funds for state water quality and drinking water programs, respectively, that
are to be used in support of related programs that meet specific federal
requirements. 512 This sort. of "reimbursement" spending does not raise the
same constitutional questions as does the use of other monies to induce
cooperation in an environmental program.
V. jUDICIAL FEDERALISM AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION

The conventional wisdom holds that constricting federal regulatory
authority necessarily sacrifices environmental protection. According to some
environmental groups, the revival of federalism represents a "grave

509. Counsel v. Dow, 849 F.2d 731, 735-36 (2d Cir. 1988).
510. Nevada v. Skinner, 884 F.2d. 445, 452 (9th Cir. 1989).
511. Professor Somin notes, however, that the political safeguards argument is actually at its
weakest in the comext of spending power, for whereas state govemments will often have strong
incentive to resist the assertion of federal power in areas traditionally left to state control, state
govemments "have incentives to accept and even lobby for conditional federal grants." Somin,
sufJm note 379, at 484. For this reason, Somin argues that "there is a greater need for judicial
intervention" in the Spending Clause comext. !d.
512. See33 U.S.C. § 1252 (2000); 42 U.S.C. § 300j-2.
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challenge" that is "threatening the very core of environmental law." 513
Recent Commerce Clause decisions, for example, could provide "the
groundwork for pulling the rug out from under federal environmental
514
protections." This presumption is dominant both in the environmental
literature and in the language of judicial opinions. Dissenting in Solid Waste
Agenc:v, Justice Stevens suggested that the impact of the Court's opinion
could well be a return to burning rivers, excessive water pollution and "the
515
destruction of the aquatic environment."
Though widespread, this view
overstates the environmental impact of judicially enforced limits on federal
regulatory authority.
Judicial reluctance to enforce federalism limits on federal
environmental regulation may well stem, at least in part, from concerns that
such limits could hamper environmental protection. In Gibbs v. Babbitt, for
example, Judge Wilkinson suggests that to st1ike down the ESA take
prohibition on Commerce Clause grounds would necessarily limit federal
516
species protection efforts "to only federaJ lands"
and would "call into
question the historic power of the federal government to preserve scarce
517
resources in one locality for the future benefit ofall Ame1ica." If extended
to other statutes, Judge Wilkinson wrote, the holding would leave "many
518
environmental harms to be dealt with through state tort Jaw."
Such
concerns are misplaced, and their premises are largely unfounded. The
federal government's inability to prohibit the take of enaangered species, at
least without the inclusion of a jurisdictional requirement to ensure that the
given instance was sufficiently tied to commerce, would not affect the federal
government's ability to protect endangered species via the spending power
through direct subsidization of conservation efforts, funding of state
regulatory programs, and support for programs to increase the awareness of
519
biodiversity concerns and their importance. Limiting the use of, or even

513. SHARON BUCCINO ET AL., NATURAL RES. DEF. COUNCIL, HOSTILE EN\'lRONMENT: HOW
ACTMST JUDGES THREATEN OUR AlR, WATER, AND LAND-AN EN\'lRONMENTAL REPORT ON
JUDICIAL SELECTION v (2001); see also supra notes 4---8 and accompanying text.
514. BUCCINO ET AL., supra note 513, at 4.
515. Solid Waste Agency v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159, 175 (2001)
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (accusing the majority opinion of "needlessly weaken[ing] our
principal safeguard against toxic water").
It is worth noting that while both the Environmental Law Institute and Justice
Stevens's Solid Waster Agency dissent make reference to the 1969 Cuyahoga River fire as evidence
that water quality was in decline prior to the adoption of federal regulation, by the time of the
1969 fire, water quality on most major watenvays was improved during the 1960s with respect to
some key indices. See infra note 589 and accompanying text.
516. Gibbs v. Babbitt, 214 F.3d 483, 504 (4th Cir. 2000).
517. ld. at 492.
518. I d. at 502.
519. It is worth noting that none of these measures implicate the limits on Congress's
ability to adopt conditional spending programs discussed supra Part IV.
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eliminating, some tools in Congress's environmental policy toolbox is hardly
tantamount to proscribing all federal environmental protection.
520
As discussed above,
the application of Commerce Clause restrictions
to other environmental statutes would not result in the same curtailment of
federal regulatory authority insofar as such statutes, like the Surface Mining
521
522
Control and Reclamation Act or Clean Air Act, target economic activity.
Yet even if the Court's federalism doctrines were to disembowel much of the
existing federal regulatory structure, it is simply not true that this would
523
leave "many environmental harms to be dealt with by state tort law." The
federal government is hardly the nation's sole environmental regulator. To
the contrary, most environmental monitoring and enforcement occur at the
524
state and local level, and there is no a priori reason to assume that states
would be unable or unwilling to increase their environmental efforts were
525
federal regulation not already in place. Judge Wilkinson's concern is even
more misplaced because those environmental concerns most likely to be

520. See supra Part IIIA.
521. Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 277-81 (1981).
522. United States v. Ho, 311 F.3d 589, 598 (5th Cir. 2002).
523. It is worth noting, however, that there is growing environmental literature suggesting
that greater reliance on state tort law, or at least upon tort law principles, would improve
environmental protection. See generally THE COMMON LAW AND THE ENVIRONMENT: RETHINKING
THE STATUTORY BASIS FOR MODERN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (Roger E. Meiners & Andrew P.
Morris eds., 2000); BRUCE YANDLE, COMMON SENSE AND COMMON LAW FOR THE ENVIRONMENT
(1997); Keith N': Hylton, vVhen Should We Prefer Tort Law to Environmental Regulation?, 41
WASHBURN LJ. 515 (2002); Roger Meiners & Bruce Yandle, Common Law and the Conceit of
Modern Envimnmental Policy, 7 CEO. !VIASON L. REV. 923 ( 1999); Roger Meiners & Bruce Yandle,
Common Law Environmentalism, 94 PuB. CHOICE 49 (1998); Todd ]. Zywicki, A UnanimityReinforcing Model of Efficiency in the Common Law: An Institutional Comparison of Common Law and
Legislative Solutions to Large"Number Externality Proble1ns, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 961 (1996). For a
discussion of how tort law principles, if not tort law itself, might enhance environmental
protection, see David Schoen brad, Protecting the Envimnment in the Spirit of the Common Law, in
THE COMMON LAW AND THE ENVIRONMENT, supra, at 3. At the same time, there is significant
academic literature suggesting that this ne"found emphasis on tort law is misplaced. See, e.g.,
Frank B. Cross, Common Law Conceits: A Comment on iVIeiners & Yandle, 7 CEO. MASON L. REV. 965,
977 (I 999); PeterS. Me nell, The Limitations of Legal Institutions for Addressing Envimnmental Risks,
5]. ECON. PERSP. 93, 93-94 (1991); Christopher H. Schroeder, Lost in the Tmnslation: vVhat
Environmental Regulation Does that Tort Cannot Duplicate, 41 WASHBURN LJ. 583, 586 (2002);
Andrew McFee Thompson, Comment, Free 1\!Iarket Envimnmentalism and the Common Law:
Confusion, Nostalgia, and Inconsistency, 45 EMORY LJ. 1329, 1371-72 (1996). This author is
sympathetic to those calling for greater reliance on state tort law principles but not fully
convinced that such a transition is practicable. See Adler, mpra note II; Jonathan H. Adler,
Stand or DeliveT: Citizen Suits, Standing and Environmental Protection, 12 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F.
39, 69-82 (2001).
524. States are responsible for over eighty-five percent of environmental enforcement
action. The State of Texas alone performs twice as many inspections as the EPA, 41,803 to
18,530, respectively, in 1997. Jonathan H. Adler, Bean Counting for a Better Earth: Environmental
Enforcement at the EPA, REG., Spring I 998, at 40-48.
525. As noted infra notes 589-621 and accompanying text, states often regulate well in
advance of the federal government.
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found beyond Congress's reach are those most likely to be regulated by state
and local governments. Indeed, most such environmental concerns are so
526
regulated already, albeit in cooperation with federal efforts.
While limiting federal regulatory authority will necessarily affect
existing federal regulatory programs, it need not result in a significant
decline in environmental quality. Indeed, if responded to properly,
limitations on federal regulatory authmity could actually improve
environmental performance insofar as it fosters greater reliance on more
527
efficient and effective approaches to environmental protection. First, just
as constitutional constraints on federal authority limit federal protection,
such constraints also limit the federal government's ability to impose
environmental harm. Second, in many instances alternatives to federal
environmental protection can be just as, if not more, protective of
environmental values. Reducing the scope of federal environmental
regulation produces greater opportumtJes for the adoption and
implementation of such non-federal efforts. Third, direct regulation is not
the federal government's only means of advancing environmental values.
Even if the Supreme Court were to impo!le highly restrictive federalism
constraints on federal regulatory power, including the use of conditional
spending under Dole, the federal government would retain substantial
authmity to advance environmental protection.

A.

LIMITING FEDERAL POWER LIMITS FEDERAL HARM

Most discussions of the environmental impact of the Supreme Court's
federalism jurisprudence focus on the extent to which judicially enforced
constraints on federal regulatory power will limit the federal government's
ability to address environmental concerns. This is a valid concern. At the
same time, it must be remembered that expansive federal authority is not
inherently protective of the environment. Rather it is a double-edged sword.
Just as broad federal authority can be used to protect environmental
concerns, a powerful federal government has the ability to cause substantial
amounts of environmental harm.
The nation's history is littered with examples of environmental
degradation directed, funded, or otherwise encouraged by tl1e federal
government. Many of our country's present environmental struggles are the
legacy, at least in part, of ill-conceived (albeit sometimes well-intentioned)
federal programs. Environmental harm brought about by federal
environmental programs span the spectrum from pollution at federal
526. In addition to state pollution control laws, many state and local growth management
and land-use regulations can be used to advance specific environmental goals, such as pollution
control, wetland conservation, or biocliversity protection. See generally Linda Breggin & Susan
George, Planning j01· Biodiwrsit:y: Sources of Authority in State Land Use Laws, 22 VA. ENVTL. LJ. 81
(2003) (noting the potential to use such statutes for biodiversity conservation).
527. See Adler, supm note 48, at 264--70.
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facilities and the mismanagement of federal lands to ecologically destructive
528
public works projects and wasteful subsidies to farmers and businesses.
Subsidies to farmers have encouraged the draining of wetlands and waste of
529
water resources; subsidies to ranchers have depleted populations of wild
530
species;
subsidies to corporations lower the costs of polluting fuel
539
I .
sources; 531 an d sub sr"d"res to firs h errnen contrr"b ute to ove rfi sung.
The federal government's environmental record on federally owned
properties is equally poor. The federal government chronically underfunds
national park maintenance and restoration, while spending more money on
533
land acquisition.
The result is substantial pollution and ecological
degradation. The sewer system in Yellowstone National Park, for example, is
"3-!
so degraded that it pollutes local trout streams and groundwater." The
federal government loses money on timber sales in the national forests, and
chronic mismanagement has led to ecosystem decline and a literally
535
explosive threat of catastrophic wildfire.
The approximately 50,000 sites
contaminated by the federal government will cost an estimated $235-389

528. For examples of how federal policy has encouraged environmental harm, see generally
David F. Gerard, Federal Flood Politics: 150 Yean of Environmental Jvfischiej in GOVERNMENT VERSUS
ENVIRONMENT 59 (Donald R. Leal & Roger E. Meiners eds., 2002); see also Jonathan H. Adler,
Free & Green: A. New Approach to Environmental Protection, 24 HARV.J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 653, 677-81
(2001).
529.
See PAUL SCODARI, MEASURING THE BENEFITS OF FEDERAL WETLANDS PROGRAMS 16
(1997) (noting that federal flood-control projects encouraged the loss of forested wetlands in
the lower Mississippi valley); Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Peo-ple or Prairie Chickens: The Uncertain
Search for Optimal Biodiversity, 51 STAN. L. REv. 1127, 1167-68 (1999).
530.
See KARL HESS, JR., THE THOREAU INST., SAVING THE BLACK-FOOTED FERRET: POUCY
REFOIUvl AND PRIVATE SECTOR INCENTIVES, http:/ /www.ti.org/bffitess.html (last visited Dec. 6,
2004) (on file with the Iowa I::aw Review).
531.
See ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, FEDERAL FINANCIAL INTERVENTIONS
AND SUBSIDIES IN ENERGY!VIARKETS 1999: PRIIvlARYENERGYapp. B, at 63-114 (1999).
532.
See Donald R. Leal, Fueling the Race to the Fish, in GOVERNMENT VERSUS ENVIRONMENT,
supra note 528, at 39.

See Holly Lippke Fretwell & Michael Podolsky, A Strategy for Restoring Americas National
533.
Parks, 13 DUKE ENVTL. L. & PoL'Y F. 143, 149 (2003). See generally AlsTON CHASE, PL·\\1NG GOD
IN YELLOWSTONE: THE DESTRUCTION OF AMERICA'S FIRST NATIONAL PARK (1986); KARL HESS, JR.,
ROCI\YT!MES IN ROCKY MOUNTAIN NATIONAL PARI\: AN UNNATURAL HISTORY (1993).
534. Fretwell & Podolsky, supra note 533, at 149; HOLLY L!PPKE FRETIVELL, PAYING TO PL\.Y:
THE FEE DEMONSTRATION PROGRAM 3 (Prop. & Env't Research Ctr., PERC Policy Series No. PS17, 1997).
535. See HOLLY LTPPlili FRETIVELL, PROP. & ENV'T RESEARCH CTR., FORESTS: DO WE GET
WHAT WE PAY FOR?(l999), http://www.perc.org/publications/landreports/report2.php (on
file with the Iowa Law Review); U.S. GAO, WESTERN NATIONAL FORESTS: A COHESIVE STRATEGY
NEEDED TO ADDRESS CATASTROPHIC WILDFIRE THREATS 6 (1999) (noting an estimated 39
million acres of federal lands are at risk of catastrophic wildtire). See genemlf)' ROBERT H.
NELSON, A BURNING ISSUE: A CASE FOR ABOLISHING THE U.S. FOREST SERVICE (2000); DONALD
LEAL, TURNING A PROFIT ON PUBLIC FORESTS (Prop. & Env't Research Ctr., PERC Policy Series
No. PS-4, 1995).
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billion to clean up, according to the General Accounting Office. 536 The U.S.
Department of Energy alone is responsible for environmental
contamination at over 100 sites in thirty states, covering approximately two
537
million acres.
Solid Waste AgenC)' undoubtedly restricted the federal government's
ability to regulate activities that harm isolated wetlands. Ironically, tl1e
federal government maintained an active policy of draining or otl1erwise
538
destroying wetlands for well over a century. The Swamp Land Act of 1849,
for example, provided for the transfer of government-owned "swamp" into
private hands on tl1e condition that tl1ey were drained. 539 In 1900, tl1e
Supreme Court characterized wetlands as "the cause of malarial and
malignant fevers" and declared that "[t]he police power is never more
legitimately exercised than in removing such nuisances." 5.J 0 At the time, tl1e
country "was draining everything in sight to make communities healthful." 541
Otl1er government policies, ranging from subsidized inigation projects and
fann subsidies to flood control projects and subsidized disaster insurance,
542
furtl1er contributed to wetland loss. For example, it is estimated that as
much as thirty percent of tl1e forested wetlandJoss in the lower Mississippi
543
Valley was due to incentives created by federal flood-control projects.
Flood control projects and otl1er policies continued to encourage wetland
544
loss well into tl1e 1970s.
In addition to subsidizing the filling of wetlands and building
ecologically disruptive water projects, the Arn1y Corps of Engineers helped
despoil the waters it was entrusted to protect. For instance, the Cmps
contributed substantially to tl1e pollution that rendered Lake Erie a "dead"
water body, regularly depositing contaminated dredge from tl1e bottom of
545
the Cuyahoga River into the lake.
This activity continued through the
1960s, even after Congress adopted legislation to force tl1e Corps to clean up

536. U.S. GAO, FEDERAL FACILITIES: CONSISTENT RELEVANT RISK EVALUATIONS NEEDED FOR
PRIORITIZING CLEANUPS 29 (1996).
537. F.W. vVhicker et al., Avoiding Destntclive Remediation at DOE Sites, 303 SCI. 1615, 1615
(2004).
538. See geneml~v Gerard, supra note 528, at 59-77.
539. Swamp Land Act, ch. 84, 9 Stat. 519 (1850).
540. Leovy v. United States, 177 U.S. 621, 636 (1900).
541. Robert Beck, The Movement in the United States to Restoration and CTeation of Wetlands, 34
NAT. RESOURCES]. 781, 781 (1994).
542. See RALPH E. HEIMLICH ET AL., WETLANDS AND AGRICULTURE: PRIVATE INTERESTS AND
PUBLIC BENEFITS, Agriculture Economic Report No. 765, 24-25 (1998).
543. Robert N. Stavins & Adam B. Jaffe, Unintended Impacts of Public Investments on Private
Decisions: The Depletion ofForested Wetlands, 80 AM. ECON. REV. 337, 337 (1990).
544. See Gerard, supra note 528, at 64.
545. See Arnold W. Reitze, Jr., Wastes, Watm; and Vl'isliful Thinking: The Battle of Lake ETie, 20
CASE W. REs. L. REV. 5, 35 (1968) (noting that the Corps dumped over one million cubic yards
per year from the Cuyahoga and Cleveland's outer harbor each year in the late 1960s).
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its act. To the Corps, defiling Lake Erie in this fashion was costjustified.
Today the Corps has a lead role in helping to restore the Florida Everglades,
yet it was the Corps's water projects in southern Florida that helped disrupt
547
the Everglades ecosystem in the first place.
Given its record of
environmental harm, it is ironic that the Corps of Engineers, of all federal
548
agencies, now has such a prominent role in environmental protection.
Most of the environmental harm to be laid at the federal government's
feet is the result of various spending programs, yet it is the federal
government's 1·egulat01y authority that is most threatened by the Court's
federalism jurisprudence, particularly in the Commerce Clause context.
Therefore, it is possible that limits on the scope of federal authority will
affect the federal government's ability to do environmental good far more
than it will curtail the federal government's penchant for encouraging
environmental harm. Yet it would be a mistake to assume that federal
regulations, including federal envimnmental regulations, are not themselves
responsible for some degree of environmental harm.
Examples of federal regulations that have the potential to cause
negative environmental effects are more common than one might expect.
Technology-based emissions standards, such as those embodied in the CAA
and CWA, "play a key role in discouraging innovation" that can lead to
549
environmental improvements.
The federal Superfund program has
discouraged the rapid and cost-effective cleanup of many unused or
550
abandoned hazardous waste sites. The complexity and rigidity of federal
hazardous waste regulations can discourage hazardous waste recycling, even
though such recyclingjs officially considered environmentally preferable to
the alternatives of incineration or land disposal. 551 The claim here is not that
environmental regulations necessarily do more good than harm, but that at
least some environmental regulations have negative environmental

546. Id. at 36.
547. Michael Grunwald, In Everglades, a Chance for Redemption; Can Agenc} Reverse the Damage
It Has Done?, WASH. POST, Sept 14. 2000, at AI. Other federal programs, including sugar
subsidies, also played a substantial role in the degradation of the Everglades.
548. See, e.g., Michael Grunwald, An Agency of Unchecked Clout: Water Projects Roll Post
Economic, Environmental Concerns, WASH. POST, Sept. 10, 2000, at A1 (discussing the
environmental legacy of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers).
549. ENVTL. LAW lNST., BARRIERS TO ENVIRONMENTAL TECHNOLOGY INNOVATION AND USE
(1998) ("Technology-based emission limits and discharge standards, which are embedded in
most of our pollution laws, play a key role in discouraging innovation.").
550. See, e.g., Paul S. Kibei, The Urban Nexus: Open Space, Brownfields, and Justice, 25 B.C.
ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 589, 60().....05 (1998); Becky L.Jacobs, Basic Brownfields, 12]. NAT. RESOURCES
& ENVTL. L. 265, 267-72 (1996-97).
551. See Jonathan H. Adler, Wasted Lights, REG., Spring 1996, at 15-18 (citing regulatory
disincentives for corporations to install more energy efficient lighting).
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consequences and that in at least some instances environmental regulations
552
are the source of net environmental harm.
The Endangered Species Act ("ESA") is the federal regulatory statute
most at risk under the Court's Commerce Clause jurisprudence, but it would
be a mistake to assume a threat to the Endangered Species Act necessarily
poses a threat to the survival of endangered species. Enacted in 1973 to save
species from the brink of extinction, the ESA has hardly been a success. In
over thirty years, fewer than forty of over 1,000 species have been delisted as
553
endangered or threatened. In this time more species have been delisted
because they went extinct or never should have been listed as endangered in
554
the first place than have been legitimately "recovered" due to the Act.
Among the various factors that contribute to the ESA's ineffectiveness
as a conservation tool are the very regulatory strictures most at risk to
Commerce Clause challenge. Section 9 prohibits the "take" of endangered
species, including significant modification of listed species' habitat. The
presence of a listed species can freeze the use of private land, barring
everything from timber cutting and ditch digging to plowing a field or
building a home. In Riverside County, Califoifiia, the ESA even prevented
private landowners from disking to clear firebreaks on their own land lest
555
they disturb the habitat of the Stephens' kangaroo rat.
Consequently,
556
ptivate landowners are penalized for owning endangered species habitat.
In this fashi.on, the ESA creates economic .incentives for ptivate
landowners to engage in tl1e deliberate destruction of actual or potential
wildlife habitat and to forego or prevent future habitat creation on privately

552. See generally Frank B. Cross, Paradoxical Perils of the Precautionary Principle, 53 WASi-L &
LEEL. REv. 851 (1996).
553. See U.S. FISH & WILDUFE SERV., THREATENED AND ENDANGERED SPECIES SYSTEM,
http:/ /ecos.fws.gov/tess_public/TESSWebpageDelisted?listings=O (last visited April 20, 2004)
(on file with the Iowa Law Review).
554. !d.; see also Robert E. Gordon,Jr. et al., Conservation Under the Endangered Species Act, 23
ENVTL. INT'L 359, 359 ( 1997); Ike C. Sugg, Caught in the Act: Evaluating the Endangered Species Act,
Its Effects on Man and Prospects for Reform, 24 CUMB. L. REv. 1, 42-44 ( 1993). It is worth noting that
many of the alleged "successes" of the ESA are nothing of the kind and involve species that were
either never in danger of extinction or were helped by exogenous factors. See id. (discussing the
examples of the Palau dove, Palau fantail flycatcher, Palau owl, Rydberg milk-vetch, and
American alligator).
555. Seeike C. Sugg, California Fires-Losing Houses, Saving Rats, WALL ST.j., Nov. 10, 1993,
at A20. While there is dispute whether disking firebreaks would have adequately protected
homes ·in Riverside County from the fire threat, it is undisputed that landowners were
threatened with prosecution under the ESA if they were to use the traditional method of
disking to dear firebreaks on their own land. Id.; see also Ike C. Sugg, Editorial, Environmental
Overprotection, WASH. POST, Aug. 9, 2004, at Al8.
556. As explained by Sam Hamilton, former Fish and Wildlife Service administrator for the
state of Texas: "The incentives are wrong here. If I have a rare metal on my property, its value goes
up. But if a rare bird occupies the land, its value disappears." Betsy Carpenter, The Best-Laid Plans,
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Oct. 4, 1993, at 89 (quoting Hamilton).
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557

owned land.
Professors Lueck and Michael report that forest owners
respond to the likelihood of ESA regulation by harvesting timber and
558
reducing the age at which timber is harvested.
Such preemptive habitat
destruction could well "cause a long-run reduction in the habitat and
559
population" of endangered species. In some instances, it is likely that the
economic incentives created by the Act result in the net loss of species
habitat. That is, in some cases the ESA may be responsible for more habitat
.
. 560
loss th an h a b 1tat protectiOn.
Professors Lueck and Michael are not alone in their findings. A study in
Conservation Biology further reports that just as many landowners responded
to the listing of Preble's meadow jumping mouse by destroying potential
561
habitat as undertook new conservation efforts. It also found a majority of
landowners would not allow biologists on their land to assess mouse
populations out of fear that land-use resnictions would follow the discovery
552
of a mouse on their land. The Fish and Wildlife Service also acknowledges
that its own regulations can lead to habitat loss on private land. In the Pacific
northwest, land-use resuictions imposed to protect the northern spotted owl
made private landowners fear the lost use of their land and that "this concern
or fear has accelerated harvest rotations in an effort to avoid the regrowth of
563
habitat that is useable by owls."
Insofar as ESA regulation discourages private land conservation, it is
undermining species conservation efforts. The majority of endangered and
564
threatened species depend on private land for some portion of their habitat,
so by discouraging private land conservation, the ESA could well have a
devastating impact on species conservation efforts. While there is no conclusive
evidence as to .[:he net effect of the ESA on species conservation on private
land, there is more than enough evidence to challenge the prevailing

557. For a broader discussion of this, see Michael]. Bean, The Endangered Species A.ct and
Pdvate Land: Four Lessons Lem'hed from the Past Qumter Centwy, 28 ENVTL L. REP. 10701 (1998).
558. Dean Lueck & Jeffrey- A. Michael, Preemptive Habitat Destmction Under the Endange~·ed
Species Act, 46 J.L. &. ECON. 27, 27 (2003).
559. !d. at 30.
560. Dr. Larry McKinney, Director of Resource Protection for the Texas Parks and Wildlife
Department, concluded: "vVhile I have no hard evidence to prove it, I am convinced that more
habitat for the black-capped vireo, and especially the golden-cheeked warbler, has been lost in those
areas of Texas since the listing of these birds than would have been lost without the ESA at all.'"
Larry McKinney, Reauthorizing the Endangered Species Act-Incentives joT Rural Landowners, m
BUILDING ECONOMIC INCENTlVES INTO THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT 71, 74 (Defenders of
Wildlife ed., 1993).
561 . See generally Amara Brook et al., Landowners' Responses to an Endangered Species Act Listing
and Implications for Encouraging Conservation, 17 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 1638 (2003).
562. Id.
563. 60 Fed. Reg. 9484, 9507-08 (proposed Feb. 17, 1995) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt.
17).
564. U.S. GAO, ENDANGERED SPEClES ACT: INFORMATION ON SPECIES PROTECTION ON
NONFEDERAL L.-\NDS 4 (1994).
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assumption that limitations on ESA regulation of private land will result in net
harm to endangered species. If courts hold that the Commerce Clause limits
federal regulation of private land, it may even prompt the federal government
to adopt alternative approaches to species conservation that do not produce
the same unintended consequences and conserve species in a more effective
and equitable manner.
The imposition of federal priorities on unconsenting states can also
have negative environmental results. In many cases, the assertion of federal
regulatory authority to advance environmental goals will safeguard
important environmental concerns. But in other cases, federal authority can
prevent states from adopting environmentally preferable alternatives.
Federal preemption of more protective state environmental standards can
inhibit more effective environmental protection, as well as experimentation
565
with new approaches of addressing environmental concerns.
Sovereign immunity will frustrate some environmentalist suits against
recalcitrant states, but it will also limit corporate efforts to preempt local
decisions about land-use and community character. In Federal Maritime
555
Commission v. South Carolina State Ports Authority, f~r instance, a cruise ship
operator sought to force South Carolina to allow the berthing of a gambling
boat. Due to South Carolina's sovereign immunity, the private cruise ship
operator could not force the port authority to allow its ship to berth at the
557
port absent federal intervention. Opposition to the boat may have been
driven by concerns about gambling or specific parochial interests in this
case, but it illustrates how limitations on federal regulatory authority can
limit the federal government's ability to impose development or other
potentially environmentally harmful activity on unconsenting states. Coastal
communities throughout the nation, including in South Carolina, are
concerned with the negative environmental impacts of congested ports,
which include air and water pollution, as well as harm to sensitive coastal
558
lands.
Judicial reinvigoration of federalism limits on the spending power
would have the greatest impact on the Clean Air Act ("CAA"). Here again,
there is reason to question whether such limitations would result in net
environmental harm. Under the CAA, the federal government uses the

565. See, e.g., Engine Mfrs. Ass'n v. S. Coast Air Quality Mgrnt. Dist., 124 S. Ct. 1756, 176164 (2004) (holding local low emission vehicles fleet purchase rules preempted by Clean Air
Act); United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 115 (2000) (holding state oil spill regulations
preempted by Ports and Waterways Safety Act); see also Richard L. Revesz, Federalism and
Environmental Reg;ulation: A Public Choice Analysis, 115 HARV. L. REV. 553, 577 (2001) ("[W]hen
industry seeks preemption of state standards, less stringent regulatory standards in the affected
states generally result.").
566. 535 u.s. 743 (2002).
567. ld. at 747-51.
568. See Daniel Machalaba, U.S. Ports Hit a Stann, WALL ST.j., Mar. 10, 2004, at Bl.
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threat of sanctions to impose federal air pollution control priorities on state
governments. Specifically, the threatened loss of highway funds induces
states to adopt that mix of air pollution control measures preferred by
federal policymakers, even when an alternative rnix of pollution control measures
rnay pmduce greater envimnrnental results.
The adoption of one air pollution control measure may increase other
forms of pollution or otherwise contribute to other environmental
569
problems.
The federal gasoline oxygenate requirement is a notorious
570
example of how environmental regulation can cause environmental harm.
Under the CAA, oil companies are required to use fuel additives to increase
571
the oxygen content of fuels in certain non-attainment areas. Although
ostensibly designed to reduce automotive emissions, there is substantial
scientific evidence that oxygenated fuels provide little environmental
572
benefit.
The addition of one oxygenate, ethanol, can reduce some
emissions at tl1e expense of increasing others. 573 Another oxygenate in wide
.use until recently, methyl tertiary butyl ether ("MTBE"), has been linked to
57 1
widespread water pollution problems throughout the country. '
Several states sought relief from the various federal fuel mandates,
preferring to adopt other measures to reduce auto-related air pollution, but
575
were precluded from doing so under the CAA.
In these states, air
pollution may be worse than it would otherwise be due to the assertion of
federal regulatory authority. This is not the only instance in which CAA
mandates may impede the achievement of optimal levels of environmental

569. AB Justice Breyer, then Judge Breyer, observed, "[O]ne can find many examples of
regulators' ignoring one program's safety or environmental effects upon another." STEPHEN
BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE RISK REGULATION 22 ( 1993).
570. See generally Jonathan H. Adler, Clean Fuels, Dirty Air, in ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS:
PUBLIC COSTS, PRIVATE ~WARDS (MichaelS. Greve & Fred L. Smith, Jr. eds., 1992).
571. 42 U.S.C. § 7545'(k) (2) (B) (2000).
572. NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, OZONE-FORMING POTENTIAL OF REFOR/viULATED GASOLINE
7 (1999) ("The use of commonly available oxygenates in RFG has little impact on improving
ozone air quality and has some disadvantages."); id. at 4 (noting it is "not certain" whether any
of the documented improvement in urban air quality is due to tl1e use of reformulated
gasoline). See generally EPA, ACHIEVING CLEAN AIR AND CLEAN WATER: REPORT OF THE BLUE
RIBBON PANEL ON OXYGENATES IN GASOLINE (1999). At times, tl1e EPA has also sought to use the
federal oxygenate requirement as much to benefit etl1anol producers and other agricultural
interests as much as to improve air quality. See Am. Petroleum Inst. V. EPA, 52 F.3d 1113, 1!19
(D.C. Cir. 1995).
573. See Davis v. EPA, 348 F.3d 772, 777 (9tl1 Cir. 2003) (noting that the federal oxygenate
requirement increases emissions of nitrogen oxides); HAROLD M. HASKEW ET AL., CAL. ENVTL.
PROT. AGENCY, FUEL PER!v!EATION FROM AUTOMOTIVE SYSTEMS 5 (2004) (documenting increased
auto-related
emissions
from
the
use
of
etl1anol
as
an
oxygenate),
http:/ I www.arb.ca.gov I fuels/ gasoline/ permeation/ 090204finalrpt. pdf.
574. See generally U.S. GAO, MTBE CONTAMINATION FROM UNDERGROUND STORAGE TANKS
(2002) (reporting that a majority of states have found MTBE in groundwater); see also EPA,
supra note 572.
575. See Davis, 348 F.3d at 785.
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protection. Because the formation of troposphe1ic ozone ("smog") is in pan
dependent upon ratios of ozone precursors in the ambient air, measures
that reduce ozone levels in some cities increase ozone levels somewhere
576
else. Earlier air pollution control provisions adopted as part of the CAA
Amendments of 1977 were tailored to advantage regional coal producers at
577
the expense of their competitors, and air quality suffered as a result.
If the federal government's ability to condition the receipt of highway
funds on state implementation of detailed pollution control requirements
were more limited, it is likely that many states would adopt a different mix of
air pollution control measures. vVhile some may fear that such state
578
the
flexibility could result in less protective environmental regulations,
expe1ience with the CAA suggests that at least some states would adopt a mix
of air pollution control measures that are more appropriate to their regions'
specific air pollution concerns and would be more attentive to the potential
negative consequences of specific federally-preft::,rred pollution control
strategies. Without the ability to condition highway funding on all aspects of
air pollution control policy, the federal government would retain substantial
ability to influence state decision-making-conditional spending could still
be used in a less "coercive" manner-but it would lack the ability to force
states to adopt specific measures over state opposition. Insofar as the CAA
discourages some states from adopting locally optimal air pollution control
measures, this could be environmentally beneficial.
It is important to note that the claim here is not that the extension of
federal power always or inexorably results in net environmental harm. The
federal govemment has encouraged substantial environmental progress, just
as it has caused, or otherwise encouraged, much environmental
despoliation. The impact of federal power on environmental protection is a
function of what the federal government does. A more powerful federal
government is no less prone to causing or subsidizing environmentally
destructive activities than it is to effectively controlling environmental
harms. An increase in federal power does not necessa1ily translate into
increased environmental protection. By the same token, the curtailment of
federal power will not necessa1ily lead to greater environmental harm.

576. See, e.g., NAT'L ACAD. OF SCIENCES, RETHINKING THE OZONE PROBLEM IN URBAN AND
REGIONAL AlR POLLUTION 11 (1991) ("[Nitrogen oxide (NOx)] reductions can have either a
beneficial or detrimental effect on ozone concentrations, depending on the locations and
emissions rates of [volatile organic compound] and NOx sources in a region.").
577. See generally BRUCE A. ACKERMAN & WILLIAM T. HASSLER, CLEAN COAL/DJRIT AlR
( 1981) (detailing the influence of regional and other economic interests on the 1997 Clean Air
Act Amendments).
578. See infra note 598 and sources cited therein.
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NON-FEDERAL ENVIRONiviENTAL PROTECTION

The federal government is not the only provider of environmental
protection. Many of today's federal environmental programs were preceded
579
by-if not modeled on-state efforts. States regularly adopt environmental
measures that are more protective than the federal "floor," and most
innovative environmental reforms have their roots 'in state and local efforts.
580
Yet existing federal programs often obstruct or discourage state reforms.
In particular, the existing regulatory system is stultified and inhibits the
evolution of policy measures to account for new information and knowledge
581
or changing circumstances.
Even so-called "cooperative" efforts, under
which the federal government funds approved state environmental
programs, can distort state and local priorities, redirecting resources from
more to less urgent environmental matters. Insofar as the Court's articulated
federalism principles reduce the federal government's ability to dictate
environmental policy from Washington, D.C., states will have greater
opportunity to pick up the slack.
Decentralized approaches to environmental protection have many
potential advantages over centralized regulatory regimes. Decentralization
582
can enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of environmental controls.
No less important, decentralization can allow for experimentation with
alternative approaches to environmental protection with which there is
relatively little practical experience. 583 "By decentralizing environmental
decision making, we may be able to obtain improved responsiveness to
58 1
changing circums~ances and new information," notes Professor Farber. .
There is no reasori;" a jJriori, to view the decentralization of environmental
protection as a threat to environmental protection, as opposed to a way of
585
making it "more effective."
The potential environmental benefits of decentralization are not merely
theoretical. The history and current practice of state and local
environmental protection provide ample reason to question the assumption
that lessening federal environmental regulatory authority necessari('V results in
579.
580.

Percival, sujJra note 9, at 1172.

See DANIEL A. FARBER, ECO-PRAGtvlATISM: MAIUNG SENSIBLE ENVIRONMENTAL DECISIONS
IN AN UNCERTA.!NWORLD 181 (1999) ("Federal regulations tend to be insensitive to differences
in technological and economic constraints and to variations in environmental problems.").

581. !d. at 179 (noting that "the information base is itself subject lo rapid change"); see also
HENRY N. BUTLER & JONATHAN R. l.VlACEY, USING FEDERALISM TO IMPROVE ENVIRONMENTAL
POLICY 1 (1996) (noting that federal environmental regulations are a substantial source of
"inflexibility and inertia").
582. See FARBER, supra note 580, at 179 ("One way to improve environmental learning is
decentralization-moving decision making from large federal bureaucracies to the private
sector or to smaller units of government."); Adler, supra note 48, at 265-70.
583.
584.
585.

See Adler, supra note 48, at 266-67.
FARBER, supra note 580, at 180.

Id. at 183.
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lessened environmental protection. While the federal government is the
most conspicuous actor on the environmental stage, state and local
governments are the avant gaTde, developing innovative efforts to enhance
the ecological and economic performance of environmental protection. 586
From brownfield redevelopment plans and audit privilege rules to propertybased water management and unified, multimedia permitting systems, states
are trying to find ways of maximizing the return on investments in
.
tal po 1Icy.
. ss7
env1ronmen
The conventional wisdom holds that federal environmental regulation
was necessary because states failed to adopt adequate environmental
measures. This view ignores the substantial environmental progress in many
areas due to state and local efforts adopted p1ior to the enactment of most
588
major federal environmental laws. The EPA's first national water quality
inventory, conducted just one year after adoption of the Clean Water Act
("CWA"), found that there had been substantial improvement in water
589
quality in major waterways over the preceding decade. vVhile water quality
problems persisted, the evidence suggests that states began addressing those
water quality problems that were clearly identified and understood well
before the federal government.
Several studies of air pollution similarly find evidence of significant
environmental improvement p1ior to the adoption of federal environmental
regulation. Historically, the first municipal smoke ordinances were adopted
in the late nineteenth century, and the number of cities \'lith effective local
controls increased dramatically in the post-World War II period. 590 In a
comprehensive study of air pollution trends, Indur Goklany documents that
levels of key pollutants were in decline prior to adoption of the 1970 Clean
586. See Revesz, supra note 565, at 636 (" [T]he states, not the federal government,
produced the most innovation in pollution control legislation in the 1990s.").
587. In the area of hazardous waste site cleanups and brownfield redevelopment, for
example, states are responsible for "the bulk of the initiative," whereas the federal government's
role "remains limited and largely reactive."/d. at 603. For additional examples of state-level
experimentation, see ALEXANDER VOLOKH ET AL., NAT'L ENVTI.. POLIC\' INST. & REASON PUB.
POLICY lNST., RACE TO THE TOP: THE INNOVATIVE FACE OF STATE ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT
(1998).
588. See Revesz, supra note 565, at 578-79 ("[T]he view widely held in the legal literature
that the states ignored environmental problems before 1970 is simply not correct.").
589. A. Myrick Freeman, Water Pollution Policy, in PUBLIC POLICIES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION 169, 187 (Paul Portney & Robert N. Stm~ns eds., 2d. ed. 2000) (noting that the
results of the EPA's first National Water Quality Inventory, conducted in 1973, "indicated
significant improvements in most major waterways over the preceding decade, at least in regard
to organic wastes and bacteria").
590. See Arthur C. Stern, Hisl01)' of Ai,- Pollution Legislation in the United States, 32 ]. AIR
POLLUTION CONTROL Ass'N 44, 44 (1982). For details of one city's efforts to reduce air
pollution prior to the adoption of federal environmental regulation, see ROY LUBOVE,
TWENTIETH-CENTURY PITTSBURGH: GOVERNMENT, BUSINESS, AND ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE 10641 (1969). See also Cliff I. Da\~dson, Air Pollution in Pittsburgh: A Historical Perspective, 29]. AIR
POLLUTION CONTROLAsS'N 1035 (1979).
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591

Air Act Amendments.
More significantly, the rate of improvement for
some pollutants was greater prior to the adoption of federal controls than
-g9
after." - A study by Paul Portney of Resources for the Future also found that
"at least some measures of air quality were improving at an impressive rate
593
before 1970." Research by Robert Crandall of the Brookings Institution
similarly concluded that pre-federal air pollution control efforts were more
successful than is typically assumed: "Pollution reduction was more effective
in the 1960s, before there was a serious federal policy dealing with stationary
594
sources, than since tl1e 1970 Clean Air Act Amendments." These studies
suggest that state and local governments had the ability and motivation to
595
address identified environmental concerns, such as air pollution.
As with water pollution, once a given air pollution problem was clearly
identified and understood, state and local governments began enacting
measures to address these concerns before the federal government got into
the act. Indeed, in some cases the early state efforts became the model for
subsequent federal measures. In others, federal regulations were adopted,
with the support of industry, to preempt more stringent or less uniform state
regulatory standards. 596 While it is common to suggest that federal
intervention was necessary because state and local efforts "failed" to protect
environmental quality, the historical record is more ambiguous. Prior to the
1970s, the federal government failed to fulfill many of its preexisting
environmental obligations. Yet, as discussed above, some state and local
governments were beginning to make substantial progress in addressing
597
local environme~'tal concerns.
A common concern voiced in environmental policy debates is that
lessening federal authority will lead to environmentally harmful
interjurisdictional comp~.tition. Specifically, the lack of federal regulation
will set off a "race to the bottom" in which state jurisdictions compete for
corporate investment and economic development by reducing

591. INDUR M. GOKLANY, CLEARING THE AIR: THE REAL STORY OF THE WAR ON AIR
POLLUTION (1999).
592.

!d. at 54-57.

593. Paul R. Portney, Air Pollution Policy, in PUBLIC POLIClES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION, supra note 589, at 77.
594. ROBERT W. CRANDALL, CONTROLUNG INDUSTRIAL POLLUTION: THE ECONOMICS AND
POUT!CSOFCLEANA1R19 (1983).
595. As noted by Portney, "These data ... call into question one of the fundamental
premises behind the [Clean Air Act]- that states and local governments would never impose
the controls necessary to achieve healthful air." Portney, supra note 593, at 77.
596.

See Elliott eta!., supra note 18, at 330-33.

597. See, e.g., Adler, supra note 11, at 133-38; GOIQANY, supra note 591; Adler, supra note 93,
at 47-53 (documenting state wetland regulation prior to the adoption of federal wetlands
regulations).
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598

environmental safeguards. The theory is based upon the intuitive notion,
599
supported by some empirical evidence, that firms are more likely to invest
in states with less costly regulatory regimes. This concern is the "central
600
underpinning" of federal environmental regulation and has been relied
upon by courts to uphold federal environmental statutes against
601
constitutional challenges. Yet on both theoretical and empirical grounds,
concerns about an environmental race to the bottom seem overstated.
Professor Revesz has demonstrated that the framework underlying tl1e
race to the bottom theory has several analytical failings. 602 Firms base siting
and relocation decisions on a wide range of criteria, of which environmental
regulation is only one, and there is ample evidence that other factors
603
typically play a greater role in such decisions.
Tax rates, infrastructure,
availability, cost, skill of local labor, and other regulatory policies are also
important considerations for businesses. If ilie race to the bottom operates
in the environmental sphere, there is every reason to expect it to operate to
tl1e same extent in tl1ese other contexts, suggesting iliat federal regulation
604
would be necessary across the board. In iliis way;'-the race to the bottom
theory-if taken seriously-proves too much. In addition, the adoption of
minimum federal environmental standards to prevent a race to the bottom
in environmental policy would not eliminate the competitive pressures.
Rather, it would shift them to oilier contexts, and the hypoiliesized welfare

598. Kirsten H. Engel, State Environmental Standard-Setting: Is There a "Race" and Is It "To the
Bottom"?, 48 HASTINGS LJ. 271, 274 (1997); Daniel C. Esty, Revitalizing Environmental Federalism,
95 MICH. L. REv. 570,597-99 (1996); Stewart, suj;m note 46, at 1212; Peter P. S\\~re, The Race to
Laxity and the Race to Undesimbility: Explaining Failures in Competition Among ]u1isdictions in
Environmenta.l Law, 14 YALE]. ON REG. 67, 69 (1996).
599. See, e.g., WAYNE B. GRAY, MANUFACTURING PLANT LOCATION: DOES STATE POLLUTION
REGULATION MATTER? (Nat'! Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. W5880, 1997)
(finding states with more stringent environmental regulation have fewer new manufacturing
plants).
600. CLiffORD RECHTSCHAFFEN & DAVID L. MARICELL, REINVENTING ENVIRONMENTAL
ENFORCEMENT & THE STATE/FEDERAL RELATIONSHIP 22-25 (2003).
601. See, e.g., Solid Waste Agency v. United States Army Corps ofEng'rs, 531 U.S. 159, 19697 (2001) (citing the desire to avoid destructive interstate competition as a basis for federal
environmental regulation); Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264,
281-82 (1981) (defening to Congress's finding that nationwide standards are "essential" to
prevent "destructive interstate competition" that might undermine environmental standards);
Gibbs v. Babbitt, 214 F.3d 483, 501-02 (4th Cir. 2000); Nat'! Ass'n of Home Builders v. Babbitt,
130 F.3d 1041, 1054-56 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (Wald, J.) (stating that federal regulation removes
incentives for states to adopt lower environmental standards in order to attract development,
thereby preventing a destructive "race to the bottom").
602. See Richard Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the 'Race-to-the-Bottom'
Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1210, 1233-44 (1992).
603. Richard Revesz, Federalism and Environmental Regulation: A Normative Critique, in THE
NEW FEDERALISM: CAN THE STATES BE TRUSTED? 105 (John Ferejohn & Barry R. Weingast eds.,
1997).
604. !d. at 107.
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505

losses would remain.
Professor Revesz also points out that the same
dynamic that could theoretically produce systematic environmental
605
underregulation could also produce overregulation.
If states are more
aggressive at ·competing for industry through tax policy than through
environmental policy, the likely result would be suboptimal tax rates but
507
superoptimallevels of regulation.
The theory persists, despite its flaws, because it is reasonable to assume
that jurisdictions will seek to create a comparatively more attractive
investment climate in order to better compete economically. Insofar as
environmental regulations impose significant economic burdens on existing
and prospective economic actors in a given area, it is also reasonable to
608
expect jurisdictions to act so as to lessen such burdens.
Recent empirical
work suggests that this is in fact the case as govemment officials
acknowledge efforts to reduce the economic pinch of environmental
509
regulation for economic purposes. Yet for this to prove the race to the
bottom hypothesis, it is necessary to further assume that reducing the
economic cost of environmental regulation necessarily reduces the level of
environmental protection. While such a conclusion may be justified m
certain contexts, it cannot be assumed across the board. As not all
environmental protection measures produce equivalent levels of
environmental protection at equivalent costs, it should be possible for many
jurisdictions to reduce the economic cost associated with environmental
610
measures without sacrificing environmental quality.
In addition, it is
important to recognize that many states compete for citizens by seeking to
improve their environmental performance. Because many people may be
more likely to move to a state with high levels of environmental quality, this

605.
606.

ld. at 106.
Richard Revesz, The Race to the Bottom and Federal Environmental Regulation: A Response to
Critics, 82 MINN. L. REv. 535, 539 (1997); Revesz, supra note 602, at 1241-42.
607. Revesz, wpm note 603, at 104-05.
608. It is important to note here that a premise of the race to the bottom argument is that
environmental regulations impose substantial costs on business activity. If this were not the case
there would be no reason to reduce environmental regulation in order to attract economic
investment. This premise contradicts common claims that environmental regulations do not
reduce job growth or otherwise harm economic development.
609. See generally Scott R. Saleska & Kirsten H. Engel, "Facts Are Stubborn Things": An
Empi1ical Reality Check in the The01'Btical Debate Over the Race-to-the-Bottom in State Environuumtal
Standard Setting, 8 CORNELLJ.L. & PUB. POL'Y 55 (1998) (citing empirical evidence purporting to
support race-to-the-bottom claims); Engel, supm note 598 (same).

610. For example, if the use of tradable emission credits can reduce the cost of achieving a
given level of pollution reduction at less cost than a similarly protective technology standard, it
should be possible for a state to reduce the economic burdens of environmental regulation
without lessening the level of health and environmental protection. Indeed, it could be possible
to both reduce the cost of regulatory compliance and increase the level of em~ronmental
protection simultaneously. See Jonathan H. Adler, The Ducks Stop Here? The Environmental
Challenge to Federalism, 9 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 205, 226 (2001).
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creates pressure for states to adopt more protective environmental policies.
611

In practice, the race to the bottom has not been obsen,ed in
612
environmental policy. As already noted, state and local governments often
regulated well before the federal government became involved. While this
fact alone does not disprove the race to the bottom thesis-such state
regulations could still have been suboptimal when compared to the federal
alternative or some theoretical ideal-they demonstrate that competitive
pressures do not preclude effective state regulation. More significantly,
where the race to the bottom thesis has been directly tested in the context of
wetlands, the pattern of 3tate regulation has been pTecisely the opposite of what
the tl1eory would predict.
Were there a race to the bottom in the context of wetlands regulation,
those states with the most wetlands should be least likely to regulate
development of such areas. As explained by Professors Houck and Rolland,
"[T]he larger a state's wetland inventory, the more important it is to the
nation, but the less important saving it may appear to the state itself613
indeed the more onerous the burden of protecting it will appear."
Imposition of wetland regulations in a state in which there is a g1·eater
proportion of wetlands as a percentage of the state's total land area will
impose greater costs than the imposition of similar regulations in a state in
which wetlands represent a smaller proportion of its lana area. Thus, one
would expect such states with more wetlands to begin regulating after those
states with fewer wetlands, if they were to ever regulate at all.
The pattern of state wetland regulation prior to 1975-when the federal
government was ordered by a federal court to regulate wetlands under§ 404
614
of the CWA -is precisely tl1e opposite of what the race to the bottom

611. See Merritt, supra note 93, at 706 ("Residents have flocked to some western states that
use aggressive measures to protect the environment-despite the fact that these laws impose
significant costs on business and taxpayers.").
612. Several economic studies have failed to find empirical evidence of any race to the
bottom in environmental policy. See generally John A List & Shelby Gerking, Regulatmy Federalism
and Environmental Protection in !he United States, 40 ]. REGIONAL SCI. 453 (2000) (prm~ding
empirical e\~dence); Daniel L. Millimet, Assessing the Empirical Impact of Envimnmental Federalism,
43]. REGIONAL SCI. 711 (2003) (same); DanielL. Millimet &John A List, A Natural Experiment
on the 'Race to the Bottom' Hypothesis: Testing for Stochastic Dominance in Tempoml Pollution Trends, 65
OXFORD BULL. ECON. & STAT. 395 (2003) {same); HIU\RY SIGMAN, LETTING STATES DO THE
DIRTY WORK: STATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION {Nat'] Bureau
of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 9451, 2003) (suggesting that decentralization of
environmental decision-making "allows welfare-based heterogeneity in stringency").
613. Oliver A. Houck & Michael Rolland, Federalism in Wetlands Regulation: A Consideration of
Delegation of Clean Water Act Section 404 and Related Programs to the States, 54 MD. L. REV. 1242,
1253 (1995).
614. Natural Res. Def. Council v. Callaway, 392 F. Supp. 685, (D.D.C. 1975); see also United
States v. Holland, 373 F. Supp. 665, (M.D. Fla. 1974) (upholding Corps's jurisdiction over
nonnavigable waters and intertidal wetlands connected to na,~gable waters).
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theory would predict. According to the National Wetland Inventory, all
fifteen states in the continental United States with more than ten percent of
their land area in wetlands adopted wetland protection measures prior to
616
1975. As one review of state wetland regulations noted, "[M] ost of the
states with the largest wetland acreages have adopted wetland regulatory
617
efforts for all or a portion of their wetlands." Although the adoption of
such measures can entail significant costs, the states with the most wetlands
clearly determined that the value of protecting wetlands was greater than the
attendant costs of regulating them-interstate competitive pressures
notwithstanding.
There is also no evidence that interstate competition has resulted in any
erosion of state wetland protection efforts, as "no state has repealed or
618
substantially undercut its wetland statutes once adopted." To the contrary,
when the Supreme Court narrowed the jurisdictional scope of CWA,
including the protection of wetlands under § 404, some states quickly
adopted additional regulatory measures to fill the gap. 619 In fact, after the
Supreme Court found that the proposed balefill site at issue in Solid Waste
Agency was beyond the scope of federal jurisdiction, local government
agencies that previously had supported the project quickly acted to preserve
620
the land at issue. While not every state has adopted post-Solid Waste Agency
measures to address isolated wetlands, one reason for this might be the
continuing uncertainty as to the precise scope of the federal government's
regulatory authority post-Solid Waste Agency-and therefore continuing

615. See Adler, supra ~ate 93, at 47-54.
616. JON A. KUSLER ET AL., Ass'N OF STATE WETLAND MANAGERS, STATE WETLAND
REGULATION: STATUS OF PROGRAMS AND EMERGING TRENDS 5-8 tbl.l. The states in question are
Alabama, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota,
Mississippi, New Jersey, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Wisconsin.
617. Id. at 3.
618. Id. at 20.
619. The state of Ohio, for example, enacted an "emergency measure" to extend state
regulations to isolated wetlands in July 2001. 2001 Ohio H.B. 231. More broadly, Michael
Gerhardt reports that many states responded to the decision by considering, if not adopting,
additional protections for isolated wetlands:
[A] t least 19 states have responded to the decision by either enacting or
recommending the enactment of laws to fill the void left as a result of the Court's
decision. These states include, inter alia, California, Connecticut, Illinois, New
Jersey, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, South Carolina, Virginia, and vVisconsin.
These reactions are a clear illustration of environmental federalism in action.
Michael]. Gerhardt, The Curious Flight of the j\,;figratoTy Bird Rule, 31 ENVTL. L. REP. 11,079, 11,085
(2001).
620. See Michael Higgins, Brzlefill Battle Winds Down: State Offer To Buy Bmtlett Site LVIa_~ End 16year Feud, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 10, 2001, at Metro 1; Sue Ter Maat, With Balefill Out of Game, Developers
Have Whole New Playing Field, CHI. DAILY HERALD,Jan. 12, 2003, at 1.
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uncertainty about the need for state interventions. It is possible that once
the precise scope of the federal government's CWA auth01ity is clarified,
more states will follow suit, much as local agencies acted to be protected
from the Solid Waste Agency decision only after it was clear the federal
government would not.
Limiting federal regulatory authority would certainly create room for
the expansion of state and local regulatory efforts. At the same time, such
contraction is likely to create niches filled by non-governmental efforts. The
United States has a long and proud tradition of private conservation efforts,
ranging from the earliest hunting assoCiatiOns and conservation
organizations to modern land trusts and "enviro-capitalists." To return to the
wetlands context, groups ranging from Ducks Unlimited at the national level
to Chesapeake Wildlife Heritage at the local level engage in substantial
wetland restoration and conservation efforts, both independently and in
622
conjunction 1vith government agencies.
Other groups, such as the
Peregrine Fund, National Wild Turkey Federation, and Oregon Water Trust,
to name but a few, focus their efforts on particular .~pecies, habitats, or areas
of environmental concern. Insofar as there is ev{aence that government
efforts to support public goods may crowd out private investments in such
623
goods, it is possible tl1at the curtailment of federal regulatory efforts would
provide more room for p1ivate efforts. By the same token, ipsofar as existing
federal regulations discourage private conservation efforts, as has been
624
documented in the context of endangered species,
the curtailment of
federal regulat011' authority could remove significant barriers to greater
private conservation efforts.
C.

A CONTINUING FEDERAL ROLE

This Article's focus on the extent to which federalism doctrines could,
and perhaps should, curtail federal regulatory auth01ity in the
environmental context should not obscure the fact that federal regulatory
power is likely to remain substantial for the foreseeable future. Federalism
limits the regulatory power of tl1e federal government, but it does not
eviscerate federal efforts. ·where federalism's pinch is most severe, it is

621. Regarding Implications of the Supreme Cowt's SWANCC Decision: Hearing Before Comm. on
House Gov't Reform, Subcomm. On Energy Policy, Natu.ml Res. and Regulatory Affairs, 107th Cong.
(2002) (statement of Patrick Parenteau, Professor of Law, Vt. Law School) (stating that Solid
Waste Agenry "has created substantial uncertainty regarding the geographic jurisdiction of the
Clean Water Act"); see also Editorial, Saving Wetlands, WASH. POST,]an. 18, 2003, at A22 (noting
"confusion" in the lower courts and regulatory agencies over the scope of federal regulatory
authority under the CvVA after Solid Waste AgenC)•).
622. See Adler, supra note 93, at 59-62.
623. See, e.g., James Andreoni & A. Abigail Payne, Do Govemment Grants to Private Chmities
Crowd Out Giving or Fund-Raising?, 93 AM. EcoN. REv. 792 (2003) (finding government grants to
private charities reduce fund-raising by such groups).
624. See supm notes 554-63 and accornpanyjng text.
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reasonable to expect one or more justices to blink before applying the logic
of existing precedents. Yet even if the Court applies the federalism
principles in an unflinching manner, it will still be possible to protect
environmental values.
Under strict application of Lopez and Morrison, the federal government
will retain the ability to regulate economic activity and truly interstate
625
environmental problems.
Industrial operations will remain within the
federal government's regulatory ambit, as would activities that produce
interstate spillovers. Precedents such as Hodel would not be threatened by
such an approach to the Commerce Clause, nor would lower court decisions
upholding federal regulatory statutes that focus on indusuial enterprises
and other economic activity. Adding a jurisdictional element to even the
most ambitious federal environmental statutes would preserve their
constitutionality,
albeit
at
the
expense
of
each
statute's
625
comprehensiveness.
A requirement that Congress include jurisdictional
elements in environmental statutes that criminalize or otherwise regulate
non-commercial activity would still cover the vast majority of
environmentally destructive behavior. Commercial real estate developments
of the sort at issue in Rancho Viejo and GDF Realty would satisfy even fairly
narrow readings of such requirements, whereas non-commercial activities by
627
individual landowners would not.
The greatest environmental impact on federal regulatory power would
not be the result of an affirmative limitation on congressional power, but
rather from the inherent inertia of the legislative process. Were the
Supreme Court to find § 9 of the Endangered Species Act to extend beyond
the scope of'Congress's enumerated powers, it could take some time before
Congress amends the statute. The degree of inertia in the legislative process
is substantial, and it is far easier to block legislation than to enact it. Still,
there is some rea&on to believe that an urgent need for a new species
protection statute could tligger political action.(i 28 Assuming widespread
public support for strong federal environmental measures, such legislation
would be adopted in relatively short order.
The federal government lacks the power to commandeer state
governments for the purposes of implementing federal programs, but state

625. See supra Part III.A.
626. See, e.g., Gibbs v. Babbitt, 214 F. 3d 483, 508 (4th Cir. 2000) (Luttig, J., dissenting)
(noting that "an express interstate commerce jurisdictional requirement" in the ESA "would all
but ensure constitutional validity").
627. See Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848 (2000) (applying the jurisdictional
requirement of a federal arson statute).
628. See Daniel A. Farber, Politics and Procedure in Environmental Law, 8J.L. ECON. & ORG. 59,
66-67 (1992) (suggesting federal em~ronmental laws adopted during a "republican moment");
see also Christopher H. Schroeder, Rational Choice Ve1:>1ts Republican Moment-Explanations for
Environmental Laws, 1969-73, DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'YF. 29, 43 (1998).
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entities are still subject to general federal environmental requirements. A
state-run facility is still required to meet applicable federal environmental
laws. State sovereign immunity limits Congress's ability to authmize citizen
suits and contribution actions against state governments, but the federal
government retains several means of inducing state compliance with federal
law. Sovereign immunity does not prevent the federal government from
directly suing state governments, nor does it limit other avenues of relief.
The extent to which the Supreme Court enforces constitutional
limitations on the use of conditional spending could have the greatest
impact on tl1e federal government's ability to direct environmental policy at
530
the state and locallevel. Yet here too it would be easy to overestimate the
likely impact of such rulings. Applying tl1e Dole formulation to
environmental statutes would curtail federal efforts to coerce state
cooperation with tl1e Clean Air Act, but it is unlikely that it would affect
other environmental laws. A more stringent spending power doctrine, while
unlikely, would certainly constrain federal environmental authority to a
greater degree, but the federal government would retain the ability to spend
federal funds for environmental purposes. To the extent this compromises
environmental protection-, more precisely, to the extent it limits
expenditures on environmental measures because environ,?lental programs
have difficulty competing against other p1iorities for a share of the public
fisc-this would simply reflect political priorities.
CONCLUSI01~

The Supreme Court's federalism jurisprudence appears to be on a
collision course with large swaths of federal environmental law. While
federal courts have yet to curtail federal environmental regulatory authmity,
the underlying p1inciples of limited and enumerated powers and residual
state sovereignty would seem to constraint the federal government's
authmity in this area. Judicially enforced limits on federal power could well
limit federal environmental regulation. Yet, this Article suggests such limits
need not come at the expense of environmental protection.
Professor Robert Percival argues that "[t]he Constitution need not
stand as an obstacle to environmental progress." 631 To ensure this result, he
suggests a broad reading of the Constitution to incorporate em~ronmental
values. But such an approach is not necessary to advance those
environmental values held dear by the majority of Americans. Limits on the
scope of federal regulatory authority need not be an obstacle to continued
environmental progress eitl1er. There is more tl1an one way to advance

629.
630.
631.

See supm Part III. B.
See supra. Part IV.
Percival, supra note 4, at 870.
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environmental values, and not every environmental end-indeed, perhaps
not many environmental ends-necessitate a federal solution.
Constitutional limits can often make it more difficult or costly to
achieve desired public ends. Presently, there is a vigorous debate about the
extent to which the Constitution limits federal efforts to combat terrorism
and ensure domestic security. These are unassailable goals, yet it is generally
accepted that the Constitution does-and should-constrain the manner in
which these goals are pursued. To insist on such limits is not to question the
underlying policy goal. This is what it means to have a constitutional
government, and it need not result in the sacrifice of important public goals.
The federal government can seek effective ways to prevent terrorism
and ensure domestic security while operating within constitutional limits. By
the same token, the federal government can seek to ensure continued
environmental progress while operating within the constraints imposed by
the Constitution. Like domestic security, the goal of environmental
protection is unassailable in itself, but the import&nce of the goal does not
justify jettisoning the constitutional baseline. The challenge for the future is
to pursue effective environmental protection within constitutional limits.

